Insider dealing and market manipulation: a comparative analysis of regulatory enforcement in the United Kingdom and United States by Fryer, Paul A.
INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET MANIPULATION: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT IN TILE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES 
PAUL A. FRYER LLB (lions) LLM 
bxaý"I8'ý 
UN IV FP. S! TYOF''v; Fý'rýný: ! ý".? TCýýý 
! C. /,R"\! 3'; '.: f': ý' ; ')" ý, 'ý" x: ti 
ry% ý..... ý 
. 
ý1, n"ý! ^^'i`ýi 
ýý^"C9? ;_ý. _. L ýý. 
ýa 
(..; " ....... ^""'ý 
ý -^ ý1 ý'ý'ý ýv 
Wýfl'. tJi. ý 
Cßl, t. lOtý ýAnhnt_/_CLI. It3 jI+wvvWq. irrvv{ a1 
41 
tJýT6 '7, . 
-, 1 ' 1ý., fAV. 2CO1 INN 
f1 thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the University of Wolverhampton 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
February 2000 
This work or any part thereof has not previously been presented in any form to the 
University or to any other body whether for the purposes of assessment, publication or 
for any other purpose (unless previously indicated). Save for any express 
acknowledgments, references and/or bibliographies cited in the work, l confirm that the 
intellectual content of the work is the result of my own efforts and of no other person. 
The right of Paul A. Fryer to be identified as author of this work is asserted in accordance 
with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. At this date 
copyright is owned b, the author. 
Abstract 
This purpose of this research is to examine the means adopted by the United States 
and the United Kingdom in combating the main two types of fraud that interfere with 
financial market trading. These are namely insider dealing or insider trading 
depending on the jurisdiction that is examined and market manipulation. Both these 
jurisdictions are examined in relation to the ways each uses differing methods of 
regulatory enforcement mechanisms to control these types of market fraud. 
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Section One 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the appropriateness of the procedural and 
substantive issues that relate to insider dealing and market manipulation. In order to 
achieve this aim the use ofAmerican law and its legal system have been analysed. 
The reasons for choosing this jurisdiction will become apparent upon the reading of 
this research. For the sake of clarification the thesis is divided into three broad 
categories, each of which incorporates a number of chapters. Thus, chapters that fall 
under section one (chapters one and two) examine the theoretical and philosophical 
aspects that underpin this work Section two (chapters three and four) examines the 
substantive issues relating to these forms of market abuse. Lastly, section three 
(chapters five, six and seven) examines the theoretical and procedural aspects related 
to detecting, investigating and prosecuting insider dealing and market manipulation 
and the problems associated with each facet. 
While chapter one has been used to set the scene, by identifying those themes 
that will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters, chapter two has been 
used to identify the theoretical and philosophical miens of market regulation common 
to both the United Kingdom's and United States' financial markets. This chapter is 
also used to explore the antithetical arguments that specifically relate to the issue of 
whether insider dealing and market manipulation should be regulated or not. 
Introduction 
When this research project into insider dealing and market manipulation in the United Kingdom 
commenced five years ago a number of certainties could be drawn. It was almost universally 
accepted that these two essential variants of white-collar crime were not only extremely difficult to 
detect and investigate but also, more importantly, prosecute. Five years on, little has changed. 
What has emerged is growing support for reform of an area seen as shackled with fundamental 
flaws. Whilst most research has tended to focus on one or two distinct issues, the published 
research does not amount to a coherent overview of the problem. Indeed, of those studies that have 
emerged they have either tended to be out of date or centre on general criminological aspects of 
white-collar fraud. Accordingly, little research has been attempted on specifically examining all 
the problems and the feasibility of all the possible reforms directly applicable to insider dealing and 
market manipulation. This is the crux of this research. 
Given the elusiveness of insider and manipulative activities, any success on the part of those 
involved in its interception has attracted media attention. Yet the majority of this attention has 
tended to focus on sensationalising the inadequacies of the very systems used to combat such 
fraudsters. From this perspective it can be deduced to be a high profile area. However, given the 
small number of convictions actually achieved growing criticism has arisen (some would argue 
rightly so) and consequently the present system used in the United Kingdom has been perceived by 
many as being wholly inadequate. Paradoxically, it is generally acknowledged in the City that 
these types of fraud take place on a daily basis and some are of the opinion that there is nothing 
wrong in carrying it out. Those that are caught, they quip, deserve it because they are not careful 
enough. Others are of the opinion that those caught are sacrificed. So what can be done if such 
views prevail? 
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ALL MISSING PAGES ARE BLANK 
i IN 
ORIGINAL 
structural differences that are usually apparent. However, guidance may be inferred given that in 
many areas the two legal systems have similarities and have in many ways influenced each other. 
III 
Chapter six scrutinises and assesses the appropriateness of the role criminal prosecutions 
play in dealing with these categories of securities law violation. Generally, key issues relating to th 
prosecution offinancial fraudsters will be critically examined to assess their relevance. As a 
consequence, reformist views of this area will be put forward along with the problems that may be 
encountered in their implementation. Again, a comparative approach is used throughout this 
chapter. 
Chapter seven critically analyses the issue of extraterritoriality and its impact on fraud 
investigations. This chapter seeks to highlight the problems and the possible ways in which they 
may be improved by looking to the United States for answers. 
The final chapter outlines what practical solutions to the problems associated with regulatory 




The purpose of this thesis is to examine the appropriateness of the procedural and 
substantive issues that relate to insider dealing and market manipulation. In order to 
achieve this aim the use ofAmerican law and its legal system have been analysed. 
The reasons for choosing this jurisdiction will become apparent upon the reading of 
this research. For the sake of clarification the thesis is divided into three broad 
categories, each of which incorporates a number of chapters. Thus, chapters that fall 
under section one (chapters one and two) examine the theoretical and philosophical 
aspects that underpin this work Section two (chapters three and four) examines the 
substantive issues relating to these forms of market abuse. Lastly, section three 
(chapters five, six and seven) examines the theoretical and procedural aspects related 
to detecting, investigating and prosecuting insider dealing and market manipulation 
and the problems associated with each facet. 
While chapter one has been used to set the scene, by identifying those themes 
that will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters, chapter two has been 
used to identify the theoretical and philosophical miens of market regulation common 
to both the United Kingdom's and United States' financial markets. This chapter is 
also used to explore the antithetical arguments that specifically relate to the issue of 
whether insider dealing and market manipulation should be regulated or not. 
' Chapter 'One 
Setting the Scene: 
Problems Policing the City 
Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad basis of understanding apropos to 
this research. This is attained through examining the three issues that permeate this 
thesis. Firstly, a historical foundation is provided, briefly examining the factors that 
have significantly influenced the moulding of the current financial markets of the 
United Kingdom. Secondly, a general consideration of the meaning of white-collar 
crime and how the categorisation of insider dealing and market manipulation falls 
within such a broad definition is given. Finally, the key problems that relate to 
enforcing regulation against these two activities are identified so that each issue can 
be developed in subsequent chapters. 
1 
1.1. Growth of the City: Influential Factors and its Affect 
1.1.1. Modes of Historical Market Regulation 
Since the seventeenth century the city of London has always been perceived as one of 
the world's main financial centres. 1 Originally, this importance was drawn from its 
versatility as a trading port and its venerable readiness to attract trade from distant , 
shores offering rare yet highly desirable items. Consequently, as its popularity grew, 
particularly with the development of British maritime power and the program of 
colonisation, it became more powerful than Amsterdam, one of the first true financial 
markets. With power came influence and through the combination of. embracing the 
doctrine of laissez-faire ideals, 2 high productivity yields and parochial practices by 
market professionals. Dramatic influential changes established the parameters by 
which these markets developed, a fact that greatly influenced both Governmental and 
Sovereign hold over City practices. The City became little more than an exclusive 
club, a state of affairs some still argue is true today. 3 Yet, even during these times 
such financial markets were often affected by fraudulent activity that permeated many 
so-called legitimate securities transactions .4 
Consequently, during the reign of 
Edward VI a number of laws were enacted to combat the growing tide of fraudulent 






Ingham, G. (1984), Capitalism Divided? The City and industry in British Social Development, 
London: Macmillan, at 40. 
Ingham, G. (1984), op. cit., at 130 et seq.. 
Entry into the City was through either family ties or knowing of someone in the City. Once in 
position continued membership heavily relied on the principle of honour towards fellow 
members, with the adoption of trust or the ̀ my word is my bond' approach. 
For a detailed historical perspective on these practices see post, chapters three and four. 
However, see generally Morgan, E. V. and Thomas, W. A. (1962), The Stock Exchange - Its 
History and Functions, London: Elak Books. 
`Forestalling' was thus defined: 
`That whatsoever person or persons... shall buy or cause to be bought, any merchandise. 
victual, or any other thing whatsoever, coming by land or by water toward any market or 
fair, to be sold in the same... or make any bargain, contract, or promise, for the having 
or buying of the same, or any part thereof, so coming as is aforesaid, before the said 
2 
criminalized. 8 Moreover, there are also many examples of attempts being made to 
regulate other malpractices viewed as equivalents to fraud during the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries. 9 To some the extent of regulation imposed on stock jobbers and 
brokers in the City during this time can be seen as being stricter than under the regime 
currently used in this country. Thus, under the Statute of 1696 stock jobbers had to 
obtain a licence, swear an oath to deal ̀ without fraud and collusion', adhere to `good 
practices' and record transactions. They were also required to post bonds of 
approximately £500 that could be forfeited for `misconduct'. Draconian penalties 
were also provided, including a fine up to £500, disqualification and public censure. 10 
However, given the number and extent to which the City enacted such laws it rarely 
merchandise, victuals, or other things, shall be in the market, ... ready to be sold; or 
shall be in the market, letter, message, or otherwise, to any person or persons, for the 
enhancing of the price, or dearer selling of any thing or things above-mentioned, or else 
dissuade, move, or stir, any person or persons coming to the market.., to abstain or 
forbear to bring, or convey to the market ... to abstain or 
forbear to bring, or convey any 
of the things above rehearsed, to any market ... shall 
be deemed ... for a forestaller. ' 
6 
; (1552) 5 and 6 Edw. VI c. 14. 
`Engrossing' was defined as: 
`That whatsoever person or persons ... shall engross or get 
into his or their hands, by 
buying, contracting, or promise taking, other than by demise, grant, or lease of land or 
title, any corn growing in the fields, or any other corn or grain, butter, cheese, fish of 
other dead victuals whatsoever, within the realm of England, to the intent to sell the 
same again, shall be accepted, reputed, and taken an unlawful engrosser. ' 
7 
; op. cit.. 
'Regrating' was defined as: 
`That whatsoever person or persons ... shall 
by any means regrate, obtain, or get into his 
or their hands or possession, in a fair or market, any corn, or other commodities, that 
shall be brought to any fair or market within this realm ... to 
be brought to any fair or 
market within this realm ... to 
be sold, and do sell the same again in any fair or market 
holden or kept in the same place, or in any other fair or market within four miles thereof, 





; supra, note 5. 
lllingworth, Forestalling, (1800), at 67 and Turner (ed. ), Russell on Crime, (1964), at Chapter 
one hundred. 
Morgan, E. V. and Thomas, W. A. (1962), supra, note 4, at chapter one. 
Rider, B. A. K., Abrams, C. and Ferran, E. (1992), Guide to the Financial Services Act, Bicester: 
CCH, at chapter one; Rider, B. A. K. and Ashe, T. M. (1993), Insider Crime - The New Law, 
London: Jordans, at 2 et seq.; and Kirk, D. N. and Woodcock, A. J. J. (1996), Serious Fraud: 
Investigation and Trial, London: Butterworths, at chapter one. 
3 
intervened in such matters due to the exclusivity bestowed upon it by fellow 
members. I 1 So defensive was the City about regulation that it vigorously resisted any 
attempts made by the courts and Parliament to intervene. 12 Of those eventually 
penalised the majority were perceived as piece-meal offerings. The real crooks were 
never caught! 13 Interestingly, this is in stark contrast to other societies who 
vehemently adhered to regulatory principles. In ancient China and Egypt, for 
instance, both societies set about imposing regulation of their commodity markets to 
prevent abuses such as cornering and misrepresentation from becoming firmly 
established. With regards to the latter jurisdiction, rules were created which related to 
stabilising the commodity markets by outlawing persons from rural areas purchasing 
more than a shih of rice in Peking, 14 and even strikes by ferrymen were published as 






Members of the market world who were believed to have carried out dubious transactions were 
simply ostracised from City life; Sugarman, D. and Rubin, G. R. (eds. ) (1984), Law, Economy 
and Society, 1750 - 1914: Essays in the History of English Law, Abingdon: Professional Books 
Limited, at 195 et seq.. 
Robb, G. (1992), White-Collar Crime in Modern England, Financial Fraud and Business 
Morality: 1846-1929, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at 85 et seq.. 
See, for example, The Times, 3`d May 1858. 
Boulais, J. (1924), Manuel du code chinois (Varieties sinologiques series number 55), at 754. 
See the memorial of the Governor-General of Kiangsu, concerning Hou-Ming-Chang, who was 
duly decapitated for `restraining trade'; Hsing-an hui-lan, Shanghai, at 6.10/20b-21a. 
4 
1.1.2. New Technology, New Investments, New Problems 
Today's financial markets are not too different from those markets of old in this 
respect, as fraud has always accompanied market growth and development. Yet, 
where these two markets differ is in the way technological development has played an 
important role in running today's financial markets. 16 The increased use of 
information technology has made paperless transactions a reality. Computerisation 
and fibre optic telecommunication can provide global market changes, and abuses, on 
a rapid scale. 17 Hence, market transactions have become global and subsequently: 
"... allow[ed] investors in London to trade as easily on those financial 
markets in New York as they can on their own markets... " 18 
Although securities trading is now globally based, the City has continued to 






For an insight into the evidential problems associated with `paperless' transactions; post, 
chapters five and six. Also, see Salako, S. (1992), `Transition to a 'Paperless 'System Using 
EDI Techniques: the Evidential Minefield, International Yearbook of Law Computers and 
Technology, Vol. 6, at 59 et seq.. 
Atkinson, D. (1997), `Call for Special Courts to Deal with Cyberspace Crime', The Guardian, 
19/6/97; Nuttall, A. (1997)'Internet Investors Urged to Beware of Fraudsters', The Times, 
22/8/97 and Securities and Investment Board Press Release on Bogus Web Sites, PN/S1ß/33/97, 
21/8/97. 
Soloman, D. (1991), 'The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging 
Global Market and the Implications for Regulation', John Marshall Law Journal, Vol. 24, at 299 
and McRae, H. and Cairncross, F. (1991), Capital City: London as a Financial Centre, London: 
Methuen, at chapter one. 
For a discussion of the impact Eurodollar markets have had on the United Kingdom see Harvey, 
D. (1989), The Condition ofPostmodernity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell; at 123 et seq.. In addition 
see Regulation D and Q of the United States Federal Reserve regarding requirements taken by 
United States banks on deposit making in Europe and the ceiling rate on interest payable on 
time deposits respectively. 
"... The total cash value of all transactions in foreign equities reported to the Exchange 
by its member firms [in 1996] exceeded £1,000 billion for the first time - an 850 per cent 
increase over the last IOyears... "
; Minutes ofEvidence: Treasury Committee on the Stock Exchange, 12/2/97, at 2. 
5 
bonds21 and derivative markets. 22 Although derivative trading is not a new 
phenomenon23 the impact this form of trading has made on the City in the last two 
decades is formidable, as the City's overall annual turnover is now considerably 
higher than many other developed markets. However, it is the United States and 
especially American banks, which can be seen to trade more extensively than any 
other country or organisation. Yet, as more emphasis is placed on these markets, with 
their ability to generate vast capital sums, the problem of how to best regulate them 
has become more apparent. 24 This has been magnified in recent years by the high 
profile financial investigations brought into focus by Barings Bank25 and the 
Sumitomo Corporation. 26 Fears associated with the abuse of derivatives centres 
around the notion that because of the types of: 
"... modern financial markets, the types of risks involved and the speed of 








See generally `Insider Trading in Junk Bonds', (1990) Harvard Law Review, at 1720 and `Who 
Dares Wins Wall Street', The Independent, 16/4/95. 
Sec generally Thomson, R. (1998), Apocalypse Roulette: The Lethal World of Derivatives, 
London: Macmillan, for an account of the many problems and scandals associated with 
derivative markets. 
Swan, N. (ed. ) (1993), The Development of the Law of Financial Services, London: Cavendish 
Publishing, at chapters one-three. 
Walker, B. (1996), `Financial Derivatives - Global Regulatory Developments', Journal of 
Business Law, at 66; S. I. B. Guidance Release, Advice Under Section 206 of the Financial 
Services Act 1986-Equity-related Derivatives: Use of Inside Information, December 1996 and 
Peston, R. and Wighton, P. (1995), `DTI Scans Swiss Bank Derivatives Dealings', The 
Financial Times, 20/1/95. 
See generally Board of Banking Supervision, Report of the Board of Banking Supervision 
Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings, Bank of England, 18/7/95. 
Gooding, E and Denton, J. (1996), ̀ Sumitomo Copper Market Loss May Double to $4bn'. The 
Financial Times, 22-23/6/96; ̀ The Same Old Story of Manv Warnings Ignored', The 
Independent, 18/6/96 and Dawkins, F., Nakamoto, J. and Gooding, E. (1996), ̀ Rogue Deals 
Cost Sumitomo $1.8bn', The Financial Times, 14/6/96. 
6 
Regulation of these markets has therefore proven to be less than effective. As a result 
a number of reports have been analysed to consider how to best regulate these markets 
whilst at the same time not stifling natural growth through over-regulation. 27 
One of the great attractions of derivative trading is that by their very nature they 
are malleable financial products, able to be adapted to fit a number of different 
circumstances at different times. Yet some are extremely complex arrangements 
created on assumptions related to probability, volatility and future costs. In their most 
basic form derivatives can be divided into three categories: 28 
(i) futures29 - which are promises to purchase or sell a particular 
commodity or security at a set price on a set date (often in a set 
place) in the current future; 
(ii) options30 - which can be divided into two categories: ̀ put' options, 
which are financial instruments granting the party paying the deposit 
the right, and its counterparty the obligation to receive, or deliver 
the underlying instrument to the counterparty at a given price on a 
given date, and ̀ call' options, which give the party paying the 
deposit the right to receive and its counterparty the obligation to 
deliver the instrument concerned; and 
(iii) swaps31 - often refers to an exchange of cash flows that are 
calculated from a rate in a currency, or currencies, or two interest 
rates - often fixed and floating. Normally the net difference is the 






Walker, B. (1996), supra, note 24, at 90 etseq. and Rider, B. A. K. (1985), ̀ Protecting the 
Prudent Investor', Company Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2, at 54. 
Global Derivatives Study Group, Derivatives: Practice and Principles, Group of 30 [the G. 30 
Global Derivatives Group], July 1993, at 33 et seq.. 
See generally Fitzgerald, E. (1983), Financial Futures, London: IFR Publishing Ltd. 
G. 30 Global Derivatives Group (1993), supra, note 28, at 33. 
G. 30 Global Derivatives Group (1993), supra, note 28, at 31. 
7 
Financial markets have become of increasing importance in the part they play in 
providing financial and economic benefits to the societies that rely on them. 32 Yet, 
with the internationalisation of financial transactions it can be observed that a 
sacrifice has been made, for these very markets have become the victims of their own 
success. The technology that has assisted them has facilitated international market 
frauds of such magnitude that the enforcement laws and bodies used against these 
practices have seemed powerless to stop them. 33 Consequently, the majority of 
securities frauds that are unearthed today not only seem larger but more complex than 
those previously encountered. 34 Paperless transactions are purposely created and 
spun through a myriad of jurisdictions, especially where banking secrecy laws 




At the heart of any successful free enterprise economy there must 
be efficient capital 
and financial markets.... if the Stock Exchange had been 
left as it was, it is clear that it 
would not have been able to resist substantial erosion of its 
business from better 
capitalised U. S. and Japanese financial houses. (Therefore)... the 
Government has a 
clear responsibility to provide an adequate regulatory 
framework that will maintain the 
stability and integrity of the system without a degree of over-regulation that would 
drive 
business to centres with more liberal regimes... " 
; Mr Nigel Lawson, Financial Services Act 1986, Introduction and General Note, at 11. Also 
see House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee Third Report on Company 




Shapiro, S. P. (1990), `Collaring the Crime, not the Criminal', American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 55, at 353 and Reichman, N. (1993), Insider Trading, in Toney, M. and Reiss, A. J. Jr (eds. ), 
Bevoncl the Law, Crime in Complex Organisations, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, at 70 
et seq.. 
Reichman, N. (1993), op. cit., at 56 and Markham, K. (1989) `Front-Running-Insider Trading 
under the Commodity Exchange Act', Catholic University Law Review, Vol. 38, at 69 et seq.. 
The concept of fraudulent trading is not a new notion. Geis, G. and Edelhertz, H. have 
suggested that the biblical reference of Christ driving out the money-lenders from the temple 
represents an early "response of moral outrage against business cheating and indecency"; 
'Criminal Law and Consumer Fraud: A Socio-Legal View', (1973) American Criminal Law 
Review, at 990. Even in the times of Homer fraud that led to abuse of commercial market 
integrity, was particularly prominent; with such fraudsters referred to as "tricksters dealing in 
countless and worthless trinkets to the scandal of the market", Anderson, B. L. and Latham, 
A. J. H. (eds. ) (1986), The Afarket in History, Croom Helm: London. Indeed, insider dealing has 
been prevalent since the seventeenth century; Naylor, J. M. (1990(a)), `The Use of Criminal 
Sanctions by United Kingdom and United States Authorities for Insider Trading: How Can the 
Two Svstems Learn from Each Other? Part I', Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 3, at 54. 
Collins, T. (1986), `Banking Secrecy and the Enforcement of Securities Legislation', in Goode, 
R. M. (ed. ), Conflicts oflnterest in the Changing Financial World, Institute of Bankers: London, 
at 84 et seq.; Hurd, D. (1986), `Insider Trading and Foreign Bank Secrecy' American Business 
Law Journal, Vol. 24, at 26 et seq.; Suter, J. (1989), The Regulation of Insider Dealing in 
Britain, London: Butterworths, at 356 et seq.; Lucas, L. (1992), `Protection from International 
Fraud - Legal and Enforcement Developments: Part l', Company Lawyer, Vol. 13, at 206 et 
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1.2. Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation - Its Relationship with 
White-Collar Crime 
1.2.1. Sutherland's Definition of White-Collar Crime 
Insider dealing and market manipulation is often referred to as falling within the 
category of `white-collar crime'. 38 Yet, little is understood about this concept and 
how it relates to the aforementioned securities practices and so, consequently, little 
research has been attempted in this area. 39 The purpose of this section is to clarify 
how and why insider dealing and market manipulation fall under this heading and 
examines the controversy that surrounds this term and its inclusion in criminal 
studies. 
The meaning of white-collar crime has always been synonymous with the 
definition given by Sutherland, who defined it as: 
seq.; Fedders, J. M. (1985), 'Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities 
Markets: The Waiver by Conduct Concept -A Possible Alternative or Starting Point for 
Discussion', Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, at 487 et seq.; Pitt, 11. (1978), 
'Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market', University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Business Law, Vol. 9, at 405 et seq.; Charter, K. and Beck, 1. (1978), 
'Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market', University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Business Law, Vol. 9, at 469 et seq.; Meyer, L. (1978), 'Swiss Banking 
Secrecy and its Legal Implications in the United States', New England Law Review, Vol. 14, at 
20 et seq.. 
36 Rider, B. A. K. and Ffrench, H. L. (1979), The Regulation of Insider Dealing, London: 
Macmillan, at 419. 
37 
38 
See generally Robinson, J. (1994), The Laundrymen, New York: Simon and Schuster and 
Stewart, J. (1991), Den of Thieves, New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Stanley, C. (1992), ̀ Serious Money: Legimation of Deviancy in the Financial Markets', 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 20, at 44 et seq.; Clarke, M. (1990), 
Business Crime: Its Nature and Control, Cambridge, Polity Press, at 162 et seq. and Snider, L. 
(1991), ̀ The Regulatory Dance: Understanding Reform Processes in Corporate Crime', 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 19, at 209 et seq.. 
39 Levi, M. (1987), Regulating Fraud: White Collar Crime and the Crime Process, London: 
Tavistock, at xx-xxi. 
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"... a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status 
in the course of his occupation. "40 
Sutherland's approach sought to justify this assertion by focusing on class status, 
occupation, social organisation and differential association 41 This latter issue has 
been explained through behavioural tendencies, whether they are criminal or 
otherwise, being learned from social and environmental influences. 42 He argued that 
ordinary criminal behaviour did not satisfy these criteria and therefore was equated to 
personal and social pathologies. White-collar crime, he believed, was restricted to 
crime committed in the course of legitimate occupation. Sutherland described and 
analysed many forms of white-collar crime following this definition, including 
activities which were not, at the time, sanctioned by the criminal law, but which, 
being violations of civil or administrative law, were likely to lead to legal responses. 
However, this in conjunction with his stress on the social status of the offenders 
attracted considerable criticism43 leading to the assertion that his theory could be 
likened to `futile terminological disputes'44 or a `nebulous definition. '45 
Nevertheless, Sutherland's theory is still universally recognised as providing the 
fundamental basis for what amounts to white-collar crimes and cannot, therefore, be 
easily discounted. 46 






Durkheim, E. (1960), `The Dualism of Human Nature' in Wolff, E. (ed. ), Emile Durkheim et al: 
Writings on Sociology and Philosophy, London: Routledge. 
Coleman, J. W. (1992), ̀ The Theory of {White Collar Crime, fi°om Sutherland to the 1990s' in 
Schlegel, K. and Weisburd, D. (eds. ), White Collar Crime Reconsidered, Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, at 54. 
Coleman, J. W. (1992), op. cit., at 53 et seq.. 
Aubert, V. (1977), ̀ White Collar Crime and Social Structure' in Geis, G. and Meier, R. F. (eds. ), 
White Collar Crime: Offences in Business, Politics and the Professions-Classic and 
Contemporary Views, New York: The Free Press, at 88 and Tappen, P. W. (1947), ̀ Who is the 
Criminal? ', American Sociological Review, Vol. 12, at 99 et seq.. 
45 Geis, G., `White Collar Crime. What is it? ', in Schlegel, K. and Weisburd, D (1992), op. cit., at 
253 et seg.. 
46 Shapiro, S. P. (1989), ̀ Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White-Collar Crime', American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, at 357. 
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1.2.2. Subtle Differences and White-Collar Crime Today 
Despite the fact that Sutherland's definition also included reference to examples of 
practices that involved liability other than criminal law, many criminologists have 
debated what specific elements are needed to constitute white-collar crime. 
Consequently, many have offered opposing hypothesise. Quinney, 47 for instance, has 
concentrated on defining white-collar crime through notions of occupational crime, 
whilst Edelhartz48 has sought to'do the opposite, by removing the notion that white- 
collar crime can be committed in the workplace. Clinard and Yeager49 offer yet 
another' perspective, arguing that white-collar crime can be committed both in 
occupational and corporate roles. 50 However, it is Braithwaite who identified the 
position best. He suggested that defining crimes by the characteristics of the 
perpetrators results in: 
"... an unfortunate mixing of definition and explanation. "51 
However, more recently, modern criminologists such as Shiparo and Croall52 have 
tended to reformulate a more fluid definition of what white-collar crime amounts to. 
While Shiparo has tended to concentrate on defining white-collar crime through 
47 Quinney, R. (1964), ̀ The Study of White Collar Crime: Toward a Reorientation in Theory and 
Research', 55(2) Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, at 
63.. 
48 Edelhertz, H. (1970), The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, U. S. 
Government Printing Office: Washington, at 78. 
49 Clinard, M. B. and Yeager, P. C. (1980), Corporate Crime, New York: The Free Press, at 18 et 
seq.. 
50 Clinard, M. B. (1983) in a later study, clarified corporate crime as: 
"... illegal corporate behaviour which is a form of collective rule breaking in order to 
achieve the organisational goals... " 
51 
52 
; Corporate Ethics and Crime, New York: The New Press, at 17. 
Braithwaite, J. (1985), ̀ White Collar Crime', Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11, at 22. 
Croall, H. (1992), White Collar Crime, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, at 12 et seq. and 
Croall, H. (1989), ̀ Who is the White Collar Criminal? ', British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 29, 
No. 2, at 157 et seg.. 
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correlating general individual characteristics with how these relate to the betrayal of 
trust, Croall hypothesises that a number of factors are needed. These factors include: 
0 Low Visibility 
An essential feature of white-collar crime is that it usually takes place under the cover 
of normal occupational routines, and involves the exploitation of occupational 
expertise or organisational systems. They can therefore be readily disguised as: 
"... business offenders are legitimately present at the scene". 53 
All of this means that victims are often unaware that any offence has been committed 
at all. In addition, offences are generally `private' rather than public, leaving little 
discernible evidence of their commission. This relative invisibility means that 
offences are particularly resistant to detection, and, even when detected, are often not 
reported to public authorities. 
Complexity 
While many white-collar crimes can essentially be reduced to lying, cheating and 
stealing, many are extremely complex. The expertise that is being abused, which 
fonns the basis of the offender's occupational position, may be scientific, 
technological, financial or legal. Many are also highly organised, 54 involve many 
employees, and may have been going on for a considerable period. Organisational 
offences may involve a complex web of falsifications, cover ups, action and inaction. 
Many of the regulations and laws which are flouted are themselves exceedingly 
53 
54 
Clarke, M. (1990) Business Crime: Its Nature and Control, Cambridge: Polity, at 21 et seq.. 
Murphy, P. (1997), ̀ Investigators Play Numbers Game', The Guardian, 25/8/97 where it was 
reported that the Stock Exchange surveillance department was monitoring the ̀ Monaco Mob'. 
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complex, making it difficult to determine exactly what offences have been committed 
and who is responsible for them. 55 
Diffusion of Responsibility 
The division of labour within occupations and organisations, in which functions are 
separated and responsibilities delegated further compounds this complexity. 
Consequently, it is often difficult to determine who is immediately responsible for any 
offence. This is particularly the case with organisational offences that may involve 
neglect or deliberate flouting of the many regulations. Finding out whose actions 
have directly caused specific problems may be difficult enough, let alone determining 
who is morally or legally responsible. Individual employees may ignore regulations 
but their supervisors may be blamed for inadequately monitoring their performance. 
In turn, several levels of management may be blamed for employers responsible for 
instituting systems to ensure adequate compliance. At all levels of the chain of 
responsibility therefore individual employees can deny responsibility by claiming that 
they were only `following orders' or that their orders were ignored. 
This means that in practice it is often difficult to assign blame or to find the 
`guilty party'. In addition, many organisational offences do not result from any 
criminal intent. Neither the employees whose inattention to safety may directly cause 
an accident, nor the supervisors and company directors who have neglected their 
responsibilities, can normally be accused of intending to kill, injure or defraud 
employees or consumers. This means that many organisational offences are less 
likely to be defined as ̀ criminal', a definition that normally involves notions of 
individual blame and intent. 
55 Passas, N. and Nelken, D. (1993), ̀ The Thin Line Between Legitimate and Criminal Enterprise: 
Subsidy Frauds in the European Community', Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 19, at 223 et 
seq.. 
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0 Diffusion of Victimisation56 
Whereas in many conventional offences individual identifiable offenders harm 
individual identifiable victims, in many white-collar offences there is no single 
identifiable victim. 57 The victim may be an abstract entity such as the government or 
the company, or there may be victims who suffer only a minimum loss. Sutherland 
pointed out the `rippling effect' of white-collar crimes, many of which involve only a 
small loss to individual victims but enormous gains to the perpetrators. This makes 
many white-collar offences less readily definable as crime. This is aptly illustrated by 
Box's analogy that: 
`... the public understands more easily what it means for an old lady to 
have five pounds snatched from her purse than to grasp the financial 
significance of 25 million customers paying one penny more for orange 
juice diluted beyond the level permitted bylaw. The public tends to focus 
more on one penny than the quarter of a million pounds illegal profit and 
conclude that the incident is insignificant. But it is not... '58 
Difficulty in Detection and Prosecution59 
A major consequence of all these factors is that white-collar crime is particularly 
difficult to detect by victims, compliance officers or law enforcers. Therefore, 
enforcers must possess the same scientific and technical expertise as perpetrators and 
it may take weeks, months or even years of careful investigation to unravel the more 





Most securities violations are committed through faceless transactions therefore determining 
who is the victim in such cases causes problems; see post, chapter two. 
Levi, M. and Pithouse, A. (1992), `The Victims of Fraud', in Downes, D. (ed. ), Unravelling 
Criminal Justice - Eleven British Studies, London: Macmillan , at 
229 et seq.. 
Box, S. (1983), Power, Crime and Mystification, London: Tavistock, at 31 et seq.. 
See generally Levi, M. (1993), The Investigation, Prosecution, and Trial of Serious Fraud, The 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Research Study No. 14, London: HMSO. 
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consuming and costly. Effective enforcement often has to be proactive and 
preventative, rather than reactive, responding to the minority of offences that are 
discovered. However this is also costly, either for individual businesses or public 
agencies, and as will be seen, the high costs of detection leave many offences 
undiscovered. 
Even when offences are detected, it may be difficult to prove that an offence has 
been committed and to establish who is responsible for it. 60 The complexity of many 
offences creates difficulties for establishing legal proof, and key witnesses may be 
reluctant to divulge information to investigator particularly where it may incriminate 
them as well. 61 
Lenient Sanctions 
Even' when prosecuted, it is often argued that white-collar offenders are not dealt with 
severely. 62 Few are sent to prison and the vast majority are fined amounts that are 
reasonably described as derisory. 63 While this needs to be put in the context of the 
high status of offenders, it is also related to the offences themselves. Offenders who 
can credibly claim that they didn't intend to cause any harm and in any case are not 
directly responsible may well be seen as not really criminal. The absence of violence 
and the diffusion of victimisation also means that offenders are not likely to be seen 
as ̀ dangerous'. They are often first time offenders because this is the first time they 
have been caught and they can also claim that they have already been punished by 





Braithwaite, J. and Geis, G. (1982), `On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control', 
Crime and Delinquency, April, at 292 et seq.. 
See generally Mann, K. (1985), Defending White Collar Crime, New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
The general trend is that the majority of securities law violators tend to either receive little or no 
punishment for their acts; Hagan, J. and Parker, P. (1985), ̀ White-Collar Crime and 
Punishment: The Differential Sentencing of White Collar Offenders in Ten Federal Courts', 
American Sociological Review, at 312 et seq.. 
Levi, M. (1989), ̀ Suite Justice: Sentencing for Fraud', Criminal Law Review, at 420 et seq.. 
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0 Ambiguous Laws64 
The nature of offences also creates many legal problems. Their complexity means 
that it is often difficult to capture the essence of offences in legislation and to specify 
precisely the situations in which an offence has been committed, leaving many 
loopholes to be exploited. For some offences, as soon as one illegal practice is 
prohibited another practice is developed which evades the provisions of any particular 
statute. The law therefore has to keep pace with offenders whose very success 
depends on their ability to stay one step ahead of the law. For example, laws 
controlling tax evasion have to keep up with increasingly complex avoidance 
schemes, and laws attempting to regulate City fraud must take account of new 
technical and financial innovations. Moreover, the fine dividing line between legal 
and criminal, acceptable and unacceptable behaviour means that law must keep up 
with changing standards of public tolerance. The diffusion of responsibility in 
organisations also means that it is difficult to determine who is legally and criminally 
responsible, leading to problems in deciding who should be prosecuted, and whether a 
company can be legally `guilty' of an offence. 
Ambiguous Criminal Status. 65 
The narrow borderline between legality, illegality and criminality makes the criminal 
status of many offences ambiguous. For many, organisational offences the underlying 
rationale for the use of the criminal law, is not that the activities in question are 
morally wrong but that they must be regulated in order to protect the public. 
64 There is often a fine dividing line between city practices between what is regarded as standard 
practice and something which borders on attracting civil or criminal liability; Nelken, D. (1994), 
White Collar Crime' in Maguire, M., Morgan, R., and Reiner, R. (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook 
ofCriminologv, Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 375. Therefore, laws regulating against city fraud 
must keep track of newly evolving fraudulent techniques; Clarke, M. (1986), Regulating the 
City: Competition, Scandal and Reform, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, at chapter six 
and Hadden, T. (1983), `Fraud in the City: The Role of the Criminal Law', Criminal Law 
Review, at 501. 
65 With regard to arguments relating to how insider dealing and manipulative practices may be 
perceived as normal market practice, see post, chapters three and four. 
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Taking all these characteristics into account, it can be perceived that relatively 
few white-collar offences are detected, prosecuted and publicly punished. Clearly, 
some of these characteristics are more typical of some forms of white-collar crime 
than others. However, for many occupational offences, the borderline between what 
are acceptable ̀ perks' and outright fraudulent behaviour is difficult to determine. 
Similarly while the diffusion of responsibility and victimisation is taken to be a 
central feature of organisational crime, many occupational crimes involve many 
participants, some of whom may be less directly implicated than others, and they can 
also involve diffuse and impersonal victims. 
These characteristics also broadly distinguish white-collar crime from others, 
although this distinction can be overdrawn. The determination of some conventional 
offences also involves drawing a fine line between the legitimate and the criminal, 
and there are other offences whose criminal status is problematic. 
From the above critique therefore it seems that no one satisfactory definition of 
white-collar crime exists. However, from the recent research carried out by CroaJ166 
it seems that both insider dealing and market manipulation fall into what can be 
classed as white-collar crime. Therefore, the writer has adopted this approach in this 
thesis and accordingly will examine of all of the above fractural elements derived 
from the above definition. 
66 Post. 
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1.3. Regulatory Enforcement - Uncovering the Problems 
1.3.1. Market Productivity and Investor Confidence 
It has become apparent over the last decade that investment institutions in the United 
Kingdom have placed increased emphasis on the benefits that can be gained through 
private or institutional investment. 67 Yet, with the advent of wider share ownership 
and the proliferation of organisations providing financial services, 68 financial markets 
have created new opportunities for fraud through the exploitation of the weaknesses 
of existing regulatory structures; 69 a notion aptly summarised by Lord Roskill who 
noted that the Government of that era: 
"... [had] encouraged and continues to encourage ordinary families to 
invest their savings in the equity markets, particularly in the equities of 
former state-owned enterprises. If the Government cherishes the vision of 
an `equity-owning democracy', then it also faces an inescapable duty to 
ensure that financial markets are honestly managed, and that 
67 Page, A. C. and Ferguson, R. B. (1992), Investor Protection, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
at 9: 
"... Modern surveys of shareholdings in companies listed on the Stock Exchange indicate 
the growth in importance of institutional investors (and hence of indirect investment). 
Between 1963 and 1990 the proportion of shares held by unit trusts grew from 1.3 per 
cent to 6.1 per cent; by insurance companies from 10 per cent to 20.4 per cent; and by 
pension funds from 6.4 per cent to 31.4 per cent. In addition, institutional investors 
account for more than 40 per cent of market holdings of national debt and are the largest 
investors in commercial property... " 
Also see Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), Insider Trading, London: Fourmat Publishing, at 
6. The same trend is also mirrored in the United States; Loss, L. (1995), Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Boston: Little, Brown and Co, at 4 et seq.. 
68 Chandler, J. (1987), `Protecting Investors' Interest Comes First', Accountancy Age 12/3/87, at 
19 et seq.. 
69 Clarke, M. (1990), Business Crime: Its Nature and Control, Cambridge: Polity Press, at 183. 
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transgressors in these markets are swiftly and effectively discovered, 
convicted and punished... "70 
Thus, the notion that such financial markets are ̀ level' and faire has become an 
extremely important issue. Investors must have a belief in a system that operates a 
suitable degree of regulation that is adequately enforced72 in order to protect them 
from fraudulent and manipulative practices. 73 Can this be achieved? 
At the time of writing it has been argued that the United Kingdom's methods of 
enforcement against violators of securities law and regulations are weaker than in 
many other jurisdictions. 74 While all but the most naive investor must realise that 
securities transactions attract risk in that values rise or fall, there are other factors that 







Report of The Fraud Trial Committee, (1986), at paragraph 1. See also Staple, G. (1998), ̀ Time 
to Take Fraud Seriously', The Independent, 23/2/98 where it has been suggested that some of 
Roskill's recommendations are to be implemented. 
"... Yet law is basically about fairness; and law is also about the protection of persons 
from morally reprehensible activity, such as fraud... " 
; Breslin, J. (1995), ̀ Levels of Playing Field', Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 3, No. 1, at 92. 
Although it has been suggested that excessive regulation would be counter-productive to 
investors and the market alike; White Paper on Financial Services in the United Kingdom, 
(1985), Cmnd. 9432, at paragraph 1.5. 
Clark, H. (1997), ̀ JP Morgan Fined Over Price Rigging', The Times, 19/12/97. 
"... The United Kingdom's Regulatory structure is only ten years old, relatively young by 
the standards of some other countries. It is beginning to show its age, but it works and 
still has some life in it. But 1 sense it is beginning to run up against more serious legal 
obstacles... " 
; Richard Farrant, chief executive of the Securities and Futures Authority quoted in 'Regulation 
Under Threat Warns SFA Chief Executive', (1997) Company Lawyer, Vol. 18, No. 1, at 19. 
Additionally, see Fishman, J. L. (1993), 'A Comparison of Enforcement of Securities Law 
Violations in the United Kingdom and United States', Company Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 9, at 170 
cf. Rider, B. A. K. (1991), 'Policing Insider Dealing in Britain' in Hopt, K. J. and Wymeersch, 
E. (eds. ), European Insider Dealing, London: Butterworths, at 324. 
For instance, insider dealing is seen to interfere with the free distribution of market information; 
Company Law Reform, (1973), Cmnd. 5391, at paragraph 15: 
"... The efficient operation of the market.... (requires) that relevant information (to) be 
fairly' available... " 
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regime of securities regulation in the United Kingdom is to prevent those engaged in 
fraudulent activities76 functioning in the market place. This should facilitate both 
investor confidence77 and market liquidity. 78 Yet, regulation is a largely futile 
Lowery, M. (1990), `The International Approach to Insider Trading: The Council of European 
Convention', Journal of Business Law; Loss, L. (1970), `The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to 
Trading by Corporate 'Insiders' in the United States', Modern Law Review, Vol. 33, at 34; and 
Brudney, H. (1979), `Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal 
Securities Laws', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 93, at 322. 
76 Even before the advent of the FSA the adequacy of securities regulation had often been 
debatable: 
".... Regulation of the securities industry on a piecemeal basis was seen by many to be 
inadequate. This view had largely come about by the changing trends within the 
securities industry itself. At one time the City could be seen as a 'village' with easily 
controllable citizens. However, the trend towards internationalisation, new investment 
products, new types offinancial services businesses and changes in the securities 
industry itself demonstrated the need for a more comprehensive regulation of investment 
business than had previously been the case... " 
; Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), Insider Trading, London: Fourmat Publishing, at 51. In 
addition, see Rider, B. A. K. and French, H. L. (1979), The Regulation of Insider Dealing, 
London: Macmillan, at Chapter 6 and Rider, B. A. K. and Hew, E. J. (1979), `The Role of the City 
Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers in the Regulation of Insider Dealing', Malaya Law Review, 
Vol. 20, at 315. 
77 See ̀Confidence in the Market', (1995) Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, No. 7, at 194: 
"... If insiders know that the (U. K. ) government is not serious in its proclamations, 
overseas players may take the rhetoric at face value and stay away. This dilemma has 
become more acute in countries that seek to widen securities ownership as part of a neo- 
Durkheimian strategy of legitimating so- called popular capitalism in the United 
Kingdom, the proportion of the population that owns securities has increased to almost a 
fifth of the adult population, though most them own veryfew shares... " 
; Levi, M. (1993), White-Collar Crime: The British Scene, at 73, in Geis, G. and Jesilow, P. 
(ed. ) (1993), The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 525, 
January, Newbury Park, Ca: Sage. Also see Parliamentary Debates, 1979/80,1 Standing 
Committee `A', at column 610: 
"... We are trying to clean up and strengthen the markets, to make people who are 
dealing on the public market have more confidence in that market... " 
; Prentice, D. (1975), Insider Trading, Current Legal Problems, at 91, argues that investor 
confidence in the market is a product of complex psychological and economic factors and the 
fact that insider trading is taking place will only have a tangential, if any, bearing on it. In 
addition, Ashe, T. M. (1988) believes that far from undermining investor confidence the 
activities of insiders may in fact sustain confidence in the market. The reasons being that 
insiders are seen as leading indicators in the market and other market actors follow their lead. 
Also other market actors are led to respond to insiders investment activity in attempts to emulate 
the insiders' ̀ superior performance'; 'Insider Dealing', (1988) Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 
7, at 128. 
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exercise if it cannot be effectively enforced. 79 Therefore not only does it have to be 
effective in bringing to justice those who have committed such acts but also to deter 
others from carrying them out again in the future. 80 This can only be achieved if 
adequate regulatory enforcement is undertaken. According to Fishman, and upon 
which the parameters of this thesis are based, regulatory enforcement can be broken 
down into the following categories: 
" PREVENTION: through screening and elimination of fraudsters 
" INFORMATION GATHERING: through effective monitoring 
systems 
" DETERRENCE: through swift prosecution and sanctioning of 
violators. 
Thus, proactive and retroactive devices81 such as these have to be not only 
vigorously implemented from the very onset of these types of activities being 
suspected, but, more importantly, they must be wholly adequate in the function for 





Regulation of the United Kingdom Equity Markets: Report by the Securities and Investment 
Board, (1995), at paragraph 3.10 et seq. and Alcock, A. (1995), ̀ Insider Dealing-How Did We 
Get Here? ', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 3, at 67. 
Gower, L. C. B. (1982), Review of Investor Protection -A Discussion Document, at paragraph 
3.41. 
Rider, B. A. K. (1985), Combating International Commercial Crime, Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, Vol. 2, at 217. 
"... Most frauds are still investigated reactively, after the event, but intelligence sources 
(and, in the case of securities and revenue investigations, regular control visits) do 
sometimes throw up proactive enquiries. Such proactive enquiries do allow 
contemporaneous monitoring of responsibilityfor events- though if informants are 
involved, there is always a' ºltering' of information (and risk of disinformation) ... 
whereas reactive enquiries have to reconstruct events with hindsight... " 
, Levi, M. 
(1993), supra, note 59, at 22 et seq.. 
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impede unsuitable firms or unsavoury characters from infiltrating the market place 
and engaging in illegal activities. 82 
82 Tieman, R. (1996), ̀ Lang Outlines Updated Law to Tackle Cartels', The Times, 28/3/96. 
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1.3.2. The Growing Seeds of Evil 
The incentives to commit fraudulent crimes are all too clear, given that they 
concern the potential to make large profits whilst facing little risk of prosecution and 
even less of facing a prosecution that succeeds. 83 It is therefore understandable that 
these types of white-collar crime have continued to flourish. 84 Yet, of all those 
crimes that possess a fraudulent element, those that involve securities transactions as 
their medium tend to be the most difficult to investigate and prosecute. 85 Although 
an elaborate system for monitoring as well as investigating exists in the United 
Kingdom86 it has been repeatedly suggested that it is fundamentally flawed. 87 
Consequently, the use of the criminal law to enforce and deter these activities has 
drawn a significant proportion of the criticism relating to regulatory enforcement. 88 It 
is clear that the regulatory system has not produced the results that were originally 
envisaged. 89 
83 `When Will We Ever Learn? ', (1996) 17(3) Company Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 3, at 66. 
84 Atkinson, D. (1995), ̀ Record DTI Investigations', The Guardian, 28/9/95 and 'DTI in Fraud 
Blitz', The Independent, 8/9/95. 
85 Rider, B. A. K. (1995), ̀ Global Trends in Securities Regulation: The Changing Legal Climate', 
Dickinson Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, at 532: 
"... (The Criminal law) has not proven to be an efficient device in combating economic 
crime for a host of technical, practical, procedural, and institutional reasons... " 
86 
87 
Post, chapter five. 
Cohen, P. (1995), 'SFA Chief Calls for Streamlining', The Financial Times, 18/5/95; Hellier, D. 
(1995), ̀ Fraud Office to Escape the Axe', The Independent, 26/3/95; Marckus, M. (1995), 
`Shake-Up at Stock Exchange Under Way', The Times, 24/11/95; Miller, R. (1996), ̀ Exchange 
Could Lose Watchdog Powers', The Times, 14/3/96. 
88 Bourne, M. (1987), `Should Insiders End Up Inside? ' Company Law Digest, Vol. 5, No. 3, at 67 
et seq.. 
89 For an insight into the ̀ value' of the criminal law in this context (1990) Quality of Markets 
Quarterly Review, at 26; Commons Parliamentary Debates, 20/11/78, at column 995; The 
Times, 28/9/78, at 21 and The Times, 1/11/78, at 23. 
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Of all the different types of securities frauds that exist, those offences that have 
tended to prove the most elusive are insider dealing and manipulation. 90 This is 
illustrated by the following diagram displayed overleaf, which relates to the former 
practice: 
90 Atkinson, D. (1995), ̀ Trials Without End', The Times, 25/11/95. 
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1990- 1991- 1992- 1993- 1994- 1995- 1996- 1997 
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 




Cases in hand at 16 9 4 2 6 5 10 18 
the beginning of 
the year 
Appointment of 4 3 1 5 6 13 21 22 
Inspectors 
Final report 11 8 3 1 7 7 13 17 
Submitted by 
Inspectors 
Cases in hand at the 9 4 2 6 5 10 18 23 
end of the year 
Convictions' 
Following section N/A 3 4* 2 N/A 1 N/A N/A 
177 enquiry 
Total N/A 3 5** 2 N/A 1 2 N/A 
Acquittals 
Following section N/A 2 2 5 N/A N/A 2 N/A 
177 enquiry 
Total N/A 5 2 6 N/A N/A 2 N/A 
Fig 1.1. 
:0 Includes 3 convictions acquitted on appeal in 1994/95 
Includes I conviction acquitted on appeal in 1993/94 
The Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 was repealed by part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 which came into force on 1/3/94. Thus far there have been 
no convictions under the Criminal Justice Act 1993,92 
Source: 91 
t 
91 DTI Report, Companies in 1994-95, at 14; DTI Report, Companies in 1995-96, at 13; DTI 
Report, Companies in 1996-97, at 14 and DTI Report, Companies in 1997-98, at 14. 
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Paradoxically, although a wealth of academic material exists on insider 
dealing93 and manipulative practices94 little is understood as to the true nature of both 
offences. 95 Indeed, it has been suggested the true number of those involved in 
relation to insider dealing activities will never be known. 96 Interestingly, this type of 
activity has not only enticed primary and secondary insiders97 involved in either 
92 Although Douglas Swinden was brought to court for allegedly committing insider dealing, the 
case collapsed and a retrial was abandoned; `Eastern Insider Trial Collapses', The Times, 
4/12/96. 




Post, chapter four. 
Although it has been suggested that in relation to insider dealing most of these activities will 
probably take place in relation to take-over operations and other subsequent acquisitions, when 
a premium value is place on information and the potential profits form insider dealing are 
greatest; Rider, B. A. K. (1983), Insider Trading, London: Jordans, at 180 and Gower, L. C. B. 
(1988), "Big Bang' and City Regulation', (1988) Modern Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, at 16- 
17. In addition, it has also been suggested that there are three main types of insiders - 
opportunists, professionals and the organised groups; Naylor, J. M. (1990(a)), `The Use of 
Criminal Sanctions by United Kingdom and United States Authorities for Insider Trading: How 
Can the Two Systems Learn form Each Other? Part 1, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 3, at 54 
and Fagan, A. (1995), `Aran Rejects £160 million Bid from Acquisitive Arco', The Independent, 
22/8/95. 
Little seems to have changed in the City during the 1970's, 80's and 90's as can be viewed from 
the following examples. 
"... Ten or twenty years ago, there was a fabulous amount of insider dealing in the City. 
It was part of the ethos of the Stock Market in those days... " 
; statement made by Mr Hopkinson, M and G Fund Management Group, The Times, 1/11/78. 
In a survey amongst the Chairmen of the top 1,000 companies in the United Kingdom in 
the Autumn of 1987,42% thought insider dealing often occurred, 32% thought that it did 
occasionally and only 13% that it never did; Farmery, E. (1987), `Towards a Tougher Regime 
Against Insider Dealing', (1987) Business Law Review, at 283. In 1990 the Insider Dealing 
Group believed that several insider dealing rings were at work dealing through offshore 
nominees and frequently brought securities months in advance before a deal was announced so 
as to cover their tracks; The Independent, 24/1/90. Indeed, although frequent reference is made, 
by the media, regarding the existence of insider rings such articles are usually negative in 
context; see Ashworth, J. and Miller, R. (1996), 'SE Sleuths on the Trail of Big Insider Dealing 
Rings', The Times, 9/9/96. 
97 In the United States the number of secondary insiders, in other words those who have gained 
price sensitive information through another party, being prosecuted has increased. Such insiders 
have ranged from printers to psychotherapists; see United States v. Willis [ 1990] 737 F. Supp. 
269 (SDNY) and Corrigan, G. (1996), `The America: Insider Trading Cases Increasing: The 
Odds are High that Dirty Dealers will be Caught', The Financial Times, 20/9/96. 
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direct or indirect trading but has also attracted the attention of organised criminal 
fraternities 98 
In recent years, with the advent of many high profile cases involving fraud99 
and its investigation one may assume that this problem rather than diminishing has 
become more prevalent. 100 Indeed, the fact that most of these cases have resulted in 
most of the defendants being acquitted101 or receiving light sentences and/or fines, 102 
suggests that the use of the criminal law103 may be inappropriate, 104 are in fact right 
98 Rider, B. A. K. and Ffrench, H. L. (1979) noted: 
"... Perhaps even more disturbing is the evidence that organised crime has been active 
in recent years in the field of securities frauds. There have been suspected Mafia 
involvement with stock market manipulation and insider dealing, and in the Far East 
there are many indications that Chinese 'triads' have been similarly attracted to the 
securities markets of Hong Kong and the Philippines. The employment of conventional 






; The Regulating oflnsider Trading, (1979), at 419. Instances of organised gangs infiltrating the 
market place are uncommon even today. In 1992, for example, the Sokaiya, the white collar 
crime branch of the yakusa, was investigated by the National Criminal Intelligence Service; The 
Guardian, 28'h September 1992. Also see Rider, B. A. K. (1989), 'Policing the City -A Crime of 
Our Time? ', Current Legal Problems, at 86 and generally Rider, B. A. K. (1993), Organised 
Crime in Britain, Home Affairs Committee, London: HMSO. In addition, see 'Crime and 
Fraud in a New League', (1994) Business Insurance, Vol. 28, No. 53, at 39 et seq.. 
For example, the United Kingdom has had market scandals involving Barlow Clowes, Blue 
Arrow, and Guinness. While, of even greater magnitude, the United States has encountered 
Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken and Dennis Levine. Interestingly, large fraud cases as well as 
generating formal reports have also spawned readable accounts of what such affairs; see, for 
example, Lever, L. (1992), The Barlow Clowes Affair, London: Macmillan cf. Ziman, M. and 
Hoffman, J. (1995), DTI Report, James Ferguson Moldings Plc Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers 
Limited - Investigations Under Section 432(2) and Section 442 of the Companies Act 1985, 
London, HMSO. 
For instance, it has been generally observed that since 1981 City fraud has risen by 42%, and 
has risen ever since; Chapman, C. (1986), 'How the New Stock Exchange Works', London: 
Macmillan, at 145. 
Barnett, E. (1996), 'Seeboard Man Cleared of Inside Deals Charge', The Observer, 8/12/96. 
Post, Chapter 6; Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), supra, note 67, at 179; Fearnley, K. 
(1990), 'The Victimless Crime Becomes the Convictionless Crime', Financial Weekly, 23/2 - 
1/3/90, at 14; Farrel ly, A. (1999), 'New Insider Trading Law 'Toothless ", The Observer 7/11/99 
and House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee (1990), supra, note 32, at xxx. 
Hadden, T. (1983), supra, note 64, at 500; Naylor, J. M. (1990(a)), ' The Use of Criminal 
Sanctions by the United Kingdom and United States Authorities for Insider Trading: How Can 
the Two Systems Learn from Each Other? ', (1990) 11(5) Company Lawyer, at 58; Rider, 
B. A. K. (1990), 'Policing the International Financial Markets: An English Perspective', 
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for the purpose for which they were designed to serve; for only when the correct tools 
are present and used in their most productive manner can any desirable result be 
achieved. 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, at 179 et seq.; McVea, H. (1996), `Fashioning a System 
of Civil Penalties for Insider Dealing: Section 61 and 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986', 
Journal of Business Law, at 344; and Rider, B. A. K. (1995), `Civilising the Law - The Use of 
Civil and Administrative Proceedings to Enforce Financial Service Law', Journal of Financial 
Crime, Vol. 3, No. 1, at 11. 
104 Levi, M. (1993), supra, note 59, at 82: 
"... It is generally assumed that the regulatory system will work a great deal quicker 
than the criminal justice one.... Tribunals normally do not operate any hearsay rules, and 
admit documents readily without the need formally to 'prove' their contents... " 
Ibid., at 85: 
"... The fact that U. K. (insider dealing) prosecutions have produced nothing of an even 
remotely comparable status may show that the U. K. system is badly designed, that such 
offences are inherently unprosecutable, or that no such elite figures are involved in 
Britain... " 
, and Rider, B. A. K. (1996), ̀ Day of the Civil Sanction? ', Company Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 9, at 257: 
"... the sledgehammer of the criminal law cannot be expected to deliver the sort of results 
that are needed for protecting confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the capital 
markets... " 
28 
1.3.3. A Time for Change - The American Way? 
Public concern is often an important factor in determining legal changes. 
Therefore if public confidence in the system is at a low ebb, a political drive for 
change is likely. Unfortunately, this is not the only requirement needed for change to 
come about. Adequate resource is vital. All too often though, it has been argued that 
both these features are lacking in this country. As Lord Justice Roskill, who was 
appointed by the former Government to review the prosecution of fraud, noted: 
"... the public no longer believes that the legal system in England and 
Wales is capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds 
expeditiously and effectively to book The overwhelming weight of the 
evidence laid before us suggests that the public is right. " 105 
Given the facts it may be perceived that the enforcement procedures used in 
regulating insider dealing and manipulative practices have failed to achieve the 
objectives set out in the previous decade. 106 This was to ensure: 
"... 
that the financial services sector is, and is seen to be, a `clean' place 
to do business. "107 
The apparent failure to achieve this goal has led to the analogy that capital 
markets have become little more than casinos. 108 Indeed, given the amount of 
criticism that has been levelled it is surprising that recent legislative changes have 
105 Roskill (1986), Committee Report on Serious and Complex Fraud, London: HMSO, at 
paragraph 1. 
106 See generally Review of Investor Protection -A Discussion Document, (1982) and Review of 
Investor Protection, (1984), Report Part 1, Cmnd. 9125. 
107 Supra, note 72, Cmnd. 9432, at paragraph 3.1. This view has been made on a number of 
previous occasions; Mr B. George, Companies Bill, 22/10/79, at column 96: 
"... The City not only has to be clean but has to show itself to be perfectly clean... " 
108 Gower, L. C. B. (1988), supra, note 95, at 1. 
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failed to strengthen perceived weaknesses in tackling these types of offences. 109 
Although alternative provisions exist for a civil suit to be brought] 10 they are 
typically expensive, evidentially complex and time consuming. Consequently they 
are rarely utilised by the people who need them most. ' 1] 
Over the past decade and a half the United States has had far more success in 
investigating and prosecuting insider and manipulative activities than the United 
Kingdom. 112 This success cannot be put down to a single factor but the United States 
has developed a variety of novel approaches to deal with and deter market frauds. It 
is far more flexible in its approach than the United Kingdom, a trait that typifies many 
of the laws and bodies used in the fight against these offences and accounts for many 
of its successes. 
Although Constitutional, 113 cultural 114 and structural 115 differences now 
clearly exist between the United States and the United Kingdom this was not always 
109 Post, chapter's three - five. 
110 Sections 61 and 62 FSA and chapter five. 
111 Post, chapter's three and five. 
112 See generally ̀ Criminal Prosecutions under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes - 
The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases', (1971) 39 George Washington Law 
Review, at 901; cf. Markham, K. (1987), who observed: 
"... cases involving manipulative claims require many years to reach trial and 
tremendous expense to investigate. Most CEA and CFTC manipulation cases have lasted 
eight years or more, and have consumed thousands of man hours of the agencies' scare 
resources. Private lawsuits have had no better results. This, of course, discourages the 
. 
filing of manipulation cases and virtually eliminates their deterrent effect... " 
Commodities, Regulation, Fraud, Manipulation and other Claims, Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co, at paragraph 15.02. 
1 13 In the United States laws are classified as either being State or Federal. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis will only be confined in examining only federal or `blue -sky' laws. 
114 Cultural developments are often influenced by historic, economic and policy developments. 
Therefore, while such developments offer other jurisdictions jurisprudential understanding into 
such a particular area it is often impossible to attach their laws to other jurisdictions due to such 
individualism. For a further discussion on the limitations of comparative analysis see Rider, 
B. A. K. (1988), `Policing the City-Combating Fraud and Other Abuses in the Corporate 
Securities lndusty', Current Legal Problems, at 51, who comments: 
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so. Both have at various times encountered similar endemically proportioned share 
scandals, 116 have adopted similar attitudes to manipulative practices117 and have 
recognised the need for a investor protection. IS 
"... Sadly, there are many examples throughout the world were inappropriate legislation 
or regulatory models have been simply 'borrowed' from other countries without due 





This refers to the structural differences that exist in relation to how both jurisdictions combine 
commercial and investment banking activities. For a perspective on the United Kingdom's 
position pre- and post- `Big Bang'; see generally Kay, M. (1986), The Big Bang, London: 
Macmillan. For comment on the Glass Steagall Act in the United States see Kelly, L. (1985), 
'Legislative History of the Glass Steagall Act', in Walter, P. (ed. ), Deregulating Wall Street, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Co (1985). Although it can be noted that there is evidence that this 
wall of separation between investment and commercial activities by banks is eroding; see 
'American Banking: With a Wimper', The Economist, 2/11/96; Lanni, 1. (1983), "Security' 
under the Glass Steagall Act and the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: The Direction 
of the Supreme Court's Analysis', Banking Law Journal, Vol. 100, at 100. In addition it has 
been noted that the Securities Act 1933 was drafted on the English Companies Act 1929; Landis, 
F. (1959-60), 'The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933', George Washington Law 
Review, Vol. 28, at 34. 
Bearle, H. (1947), Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 56, at 508; 
and the Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in support of Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984, (1984), H. R., Rep. No. 355,99th Cong., 2d, Sess. 21. 
Manne, H. (1966), Insider Trading and the Stock Market, New York: The Free Press, at 1. 
In Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder [1976] 425 U. S., 195, the Supreme Court stated that the 
Securities Act 1933 was: 
"... to protect investors against fraud and... to promote ethical standards of honesty and 
fair dealing... " 
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1.3.4. The Use of the Criminal Law - Antiquated Relic? 
The United States and United Kingdom can been seen to have a variety of sanctioning 
powers at their disposal to use against insider dealing and manipulative practices. 119 
There is clear evidence that the United States has greater impetus not only to utilise 
those rules of law which seek to either punish or enforce compliance but also the 
political will to do so. 120 That said, most forms of sanction could be viewed as 
falling into one of two broad categories. They may be either inherent in their form (a 
person who contravenes a regulatory standard commits a punishable offence) or 
ancillary to it (any unauthorised person who enters into a transaction with another will 
commit a punishable offence). Most regulation is, therefore, underpinned by the use 
of the criminal law. 121 
Yet, the identification of regulation with the criminal law has nevertheless 
proven problematic. ] 22 Any investigation that undertakes an international dimension 
will invariably find it harder to enforce criminal sanctions because of the different 
legal constraints imposed by different jurisdictions. Regulatory offences are also not 
easily reconciled with the popular notion of criminal activity. Indeed, it is commonly 
espoused by criminologists that such offences do not correlate with the possession of 
moral delinquency as their basis. 123 Although a clear distinction between what is 
ma/a in se ('wrongful in itself and therefore `criminal' conduct) and mala prohibita, 




Rider, l3. A. K. and Ashe, T. M. (1993), supra, note 10, at 88 et seq.. 
English and American criminal law have been viewed as having similar aims. Smith, J. C. and 
Hogan, B. (1992), refer to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code when defining what 
the criminal law is to achieve; Criminal Law, London: Butterworths, at 17. 
Williams, 1. (1955), `The Definition of Crime', Current Legal Problems, at 107; Kadish, T. 
(1963), `Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic 
Regulation', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 30, at 432; and Ball, H. and Friedman, L. 
(1965), `The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A 
Sociological View', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 17, at 197. 
123 Cohen, E. (1981), `Footprints on the Sand: A Further Report on Criminology and the Sociology 
of Deviance in Britain' in Fitzgerald, E. (ed. ) (1981), Crime and Society, London: Macmillan, at 
chapter thirteen. 
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(wrongful in the eyes of the law only) 124 exists, many in the City believe that insider 
dealing and market manipulation belong in the latter rather than former category. 125 
While the moral basis of mainstream criminal law is reflected in the 
requirements that the prosecution must prove not only the wrongful act (aclus reus) 
but also some degree of mental responsibility (mens rea), this does not always suit 
offences related to securities dealing. 126 The perception is that there is often a very 
thin, if not blurred, line between activities that may amount to being criminal and/or 
acceptable market practice. 127 
Generally, it may be surmised that the criminal law is neither appropriate nor 
successful in bringing all those who commit regulatory offences effectively to 
book. 128 Regulatory offences, some judges believe are `not criminal in any real 
sense' 129 or even `quasi-criminal'. 130 It has been stated that: 
"... [ajithough enforced as penal laws through the utilisation of the 
machinery of the criminal law, the(se) offences are in substance of a civil 
nature and might well be regarded as a branch of administrative law to 
which traditional principles of criminal law have but limited 
application... "] 31 









Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), ̀ Insider Trading', at 198. 
Clarke, M. (1990), Business Crime: Its Nature and Control, at 16 et seq.. 
Post, chapter four. 
'A Policeman's Lot... ', (1994) Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 8, at 226. Also see Clarke, M. 
(1987) ̀ Prosecutorial and Administrative Strategies to Control Business Crime', in Shearing, C. 
and Stenning, P. (Eds), Private Policing, London: Sage, at 273 et seq.. 
Sherras v. De Rutzen [ 1895] 1 QB, at 922, per Wright J.; see also Provincial Motor Cab 
Company v. Dunning [ 1909] 2 KB, at 602, per Lord Alverstone C. J.. 
Pearks, Gutson and Tee v. Ward [1902] 2 KB, at 11, per Channell J.. 
Dickson J. in R v. City of Sault Ste. Marie [1978] 40 CCC (2d), at 357. See, to similar effect, 
Lord Scarman in Wings Ltd. v. Ellis [1985] AC, at 293. 
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Some commentators argue that the use of the language and the processes of traditional 
criminal law for regulatory purposes devalues their significance in relation to 
mainstream crime. 132 Others hold that regulation is not morally neutral and that it is 
symbolically and instrumentally valuable to stigmatise areas of it as genuinely 
6criminal'. 133 
Given the above arguments it is not surprising to find that support for the use of 
the civil law134 to enforce compliance has grown. While the use of this law to 
enforce compliance is not a new idea its popularity in the United Kingdom, at least, to 
achieve this aim has not drawn significant attention from Parliament although other 
members of the English legal system can be seen favour in utilising it. Rider, for 
instance, suggests: 
"... To the extent that such [civil] procedures do provide compensation 
for those who have been harmed by the abuse in questioning and, thus, at 
least part of the wrongdoer's illicit profit has been removed, those 
concerned with policing the markets should be well-disposed to private 
suits. Indeed, it is hard to see why such should not be facilitated and 
assisted in appropriate circumstances, and the courts have certainly not 
opposed this. "135 
132 Williams, 1. (1955), supra, note 122, at 114 etseq.; and Kadish, T. (1963), supra, note 122, at 
443 et seq.. 
133 
134 
Wells, C. (1993), supra, note 124, at 29 et seq.. 
`Fraud and the Civil Law: Further Development', (1997) Company Lawyer, Vol. 18, No. 1, at 1 
and chapter five. 
135 Rider, B. A. K. (1995), `Civilising the Law-The Use of Civil and Administrative Proceedings to 
En force Financial Service Law', Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 3, No. 1, at 24 and Rider, 
B. A. K. (1998), `Civilising the Criminal Law', Company Lawyer, Vol. 19, No. 6, at 161. 
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1.3.5. ' The Significance of this Thesis 
The purpose of this research is not only to evaluate, through comparative 
analysis, 136 those enforcement mechanisms presently used in the United Kingdom137 
with those of the United States, 138 but more importantly to assess whether anything 
can be gained from an examination of the use of those legal means which are not 
significantly utilised in the United Kingdom, yet are used to great effect in the United 
States. Thus, emphasis will be placed on examining the role of independent 
tribunals139 and the use of the civil law140 as opposed to the criminal justice system 
136 The successful use of the civil law in the United States as an enforcement mechanism against 
unwarranted market practices has led to the assertion being made in the United Kingdom that if 
one is to achieve the same success it is surely essential to 'mimic' that system. This issue was 
broached by Gower, L. C. B. (1984): 
"... Some respondents to the Discussion Document ... suggest that all that is needed to 
solve the enforcement problem is expressly to provide for civil remedies and to make 
some minor adjustments.... While I agree with this view to the extent of suggesting that 
statutory provisions and regulations intended for the protection of investors should 
provided a civil remedy.... I do not share the optimism that this would solve the 
enforcement problems... " 
; Review of Investor Protection, Report: Part 1, supra, note 79, at paragraph 10.29, See also 
Alistair Darling, Annual Labour Conference, 8/5/96: 
".... it is not possible, nor is it desirable to import other country's solutions to the 
regulatory problems we see... " 
137 
138 
Cf. Kiralfy, A. (1948-49), `The Persuasive Authority ofAmerican Rulings in England', Tulane 
Law Review, Vol. 23, at 209; on the individualism of jurisdictional rulings. 
"... Law enforcement is a complex topic, to which, as a topic of study and discussion, we 
give far too little attention... " 
; Rider, B. A. K. (1996), ̀ Day of the Civil Sanction? ', Company Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 9, at 257. 
While the value of comparative analysis has often been over-looked it can play an appreciative 
role in areas of law where there is a distinct nexus between opposing jurisdictions. 
"... There seems to be a widespread feeling both in Britain and America that it 
(comparative analysis) has ceased to be fruitful because of the rapid and independent 
growth of case law and legislation in the two countries... (T)his feeling is misguided; that 
in reality each country can still learn much from the other. This thesis is hardly 
surprising, for both legal systems deal with similar problems resulting from economic 
and social conditions which are still largely the same... " 
Gower, L. C. B. (1969), ̀ Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law', Harvard 
Law Review, Vol. 69, at 1369-70. 
139 Llewellyn-Jones Q. C., ̀ What of the Future? ', New Law Journal, 19`h July 1996, at 1059, who 
suggests that: 
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in investigating these types of practices as a more appropriate and effective means of 
redress in such instances in conjunction with assessing the feasibility of a SEC-like 
structure being introduced141 and radical changes to the way in which serious 
securities fraud cases should be tried. 
"... The insider dealer could probably be more successfully investigated by an 
independent tribunal (provided there is trust in the system) than prosecuted... " 
140 Traditionally, in the United Kingdom insider dealing and manipulative practices have always 
been viewed as criminal offences. However, this attitude has been questioned: 
"... Under a criminal system, the hurdle to be cleared in mounting a successful 
prosecution through the courts in understandingly high.... It seems to me that there are 
lessons we can learn from those countries which have chosen to adopt non criminal 
remedies as part of their overall approach to clealing with cases of market abuse. 
This is not to say that we should decriminalise market abuse. Not at all. There will 
always be cases which, on any view, merit criminal prosecution. But I do think that we 
should consider seriously the possibility of introducing civil powers, whether exercised 
administratively or through the courts. 
This would enable the regulators to deal with all of those cases which do not merit 
criminal prosecution. This might include the use of civil penalties, disgorgement of 
profits and restitution to the victims of market abuse... " (emphasis added) 
; Large, A. (1996), Chairman of the SIB, speech given to the CSFI/Cityforum Conference, 
Glaziers' Hall, London, 3`d July 1996. 




The City is undoubtedly one of the most important financial institutions in the world, 
assisting national economic stability whist providing a vehicle for individual 
investor's to safeguard their futures. However, as can be seen from a consideration of 
the last decade, when City fraud was discovered to be rapidly growing, this reliance 
on the City can lead to a lack of proper market regulation. With the implementation 
of new, more complicated forms of securities and the reliance on information 
technology, this situation has been exacerbated even further with potentially new 
effective forms of market fraud being developed and used. Yet, investigations always 
seem to be one step behind the fraudster and even when he or she is caught, there is 
nearly always a failure in prosecuting them. So why has the system failed? 
In this chapter the outlines of the major problems with regulatory enforcement 
in the United Kingdom has been uncovered. Briefly, these relate to: 
(i) the difficulties in detecting insider dealing and market manipulative 
crimes; 
(ii) the inadequacies in resources and the attitude of those given the task 
of investigating and prosecuting such fraudsters; 142 
(iii) the inadequacies found in the relevant legislation and the problems 
associated with the burden of proof and trial by jury through the use 
of the criminal law; and 
(iv) jurisdictional difficulties. 
142 Harding, K. (1990), ̀ An Attitude Problem to Fraud Resistant Systems', Accountancy Age, 
26/6/90, at 10. 
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Chapter Two 
Justifyiug Market Regulation 
Overview 
The general acceptance that today's securities markets need to be regulated has 
facilitated the implementation of the essential elements of investor confidence and 
market integrity. I Yet given that genuine counter-arguments exist relating to the 
restrictive nature regulation has on competition, can such an assertion be wholly 
justified72 The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to not only determine the 
appropriateness of current regulatory measures but also to determine whether it 
should be applied to insider dealing and market manipulation. This is achieved by 
examining the common theoretical aspects underpinning the regulation of the 
financial markets of the United Kingdom and United States to assess whether 
regulation is, indeed, a justifiable trait in governing market activities. 
I 
2 
House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Financial Services Bill, 14/1/86, at column 939 and 
Pit, T. and Hardinson, 1. (1992), `Games without Frontiers: Trends in the International 
Response to Insider Trading', Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 55, at 200 et seq.. 
Large, A. (1993), `Financial Services Regulation: Making the Two Tier System Work', at 
paragraph 1.16. Also see Commons Parliamentary Debates, Standing Committee `D', 29/6/89, 
at columns 598-599 and Fox, D. (1992) `Insider Trading in a Clobalizing Market: Who Should 
Regulate What? ', Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 55, at 263 et seq.. 
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2.1. Common Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Market Regulation 
Given that the large number of conflicting variables exist which have collectively had 
a profound effect on overall behavioural traits, defining what exactly amounts to 
regulation has seldom proven easy. Thus, it is not surprising that a large aggregate of 
varied definitions has evolved epitomising individual theories as to its general 
functionality. If one looks to Ogus, for instance, he argues that most regulatory 
systems are commonly styled on what can be perceived as 'command-and-control' 
principles seeking to dictate albeit in a flexible manner how markets should behave 
and react. 3 By contrast, Hawkins believes regulatory measures are developed to 
enhance the public good .4 Rider and 
French also generally follow in this vein 
arguing that financial regulation is essential for the predisposition of every member of 
the public. 5 Yet while the majority of generated definitions have tended to 
concentrate on particular aspects in explaining how and why regulation is needed very 
few have collectively sought to explain why they have evolved in the manner they 
have. The research carried out by Mitnick has sought to rectify this by offering the 
general hypothesis that regulatory systems evolve to rectify past and present abuses. 6 
Stenning7 and Mansfield8 can also be perceived to have built upon this premise by 
arguing that regulation is primarily applied to alter the demeanour (which has become 







Ogus, A. (1994), Regulation-Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 79. 
Hawkins, K. (1984), Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of 
Pollution, Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 16 et seq.. The possibility exists that when a party enters 
into a bargaining position under extreme duress, an economic justification exists for regulation; 
Burrows, E. (1995), `Contract Discipline: In Search of Principles in the Control of Contracting 
Power', European Journal of law and Economics, Vol. 2, at 134 et seq.. 
Rider, B. A. K. and Ffrench, H. L. (1979), The Regulation of Insider Trading, London: 
Macmillan, at 6 et seq.. 
Mitnick, B. M. (1980), The Political Economy of Regulation, New York: Columbia University 
Press, at 204 et seq.. 
Stenning, P. C., Shearing, C. D., Addario, S. M. and Cordon, M. G. (1990), ̀ Controlling Interests: 
Two Conceptions of Order in Regulating a Financial Market', in Friedland, M. L. (ed. ) (1992), 
Securing Compliance: Seven Case Studies, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, at 102 et seq.. 




future behavioural traits are change for the better. Fundamentally, the use of rules can 
be perceived to have three significant purposes. While some can be directed towards 
crucial matters affecting the structure of the market itself, others are either concerned 
with the operational aspects of the market or seek to deter fraudulent or manipulative 
trading practices. 9 Hence, rules can be viewed as being used to permit, prescribe or 
prohibit specific forms of conduct. 10 Another common feature is that not all of these 
rules are statutory in nature or enforced by law. For example, where take-overs are 
involved, self-regulation prevails. It is argued that in these instances this form of 
regulation has proven more effective than statutory measures. I > Yet, given that most 
Western financial markets employ a mixture of statutory as well as non-statutory 
regulation each has not only positive but also negative attributes. 
There are a number of distinct advantages associated with self-regulation. It is 
said, for instance, that it is capable of generating and maintaining higher standards' 
than is attainable via statutory intervention because obligations are usually voluntary 
rather than rigidly imposed. 12 These can be expressed as a broad mixture of general 





See generally Levi, M. (1987), Regulating Fraud: White Collar Crime and the Criminal 
Process, London: Tavistock; Clarke, M. (1986), Regulating the City: Competition, Scandal and 
Reform, Milton Keynes: Open University and Clarke, M. (1987), `Prosecutorial and 
Administrative Strategies in the Control of Business Crime: Private and Public Policing' in 
Shearing, C. and Stenning, M. (eds. ) (1987), Private Policing, London: Sage Publications. 
Rules that permit certain conduct can be illustrated by those that allow stabilising activities, 
those that are prescriptive by the minimum capital rule and prohibitory by those that outlaw 
market abuse such as insider dealing or market manipulation. 
For example, before 1980 the Take-over Panel was as successful as any other regulatory body in 
controlling abusive practices; Rider, B. A. K. and Ffrench, ILL. (1979), supra, note 5, at chapter 
six. Indeed, much praise has been made of the flexible way the panel operates; Calcutt, J. 
(1990) 'Company Law Lecture - the Work of the Takeover Panel', Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, 
at 206 and Tridimas, T. (1991), 'Self-Regulation and Investor Protection in the United 
Kingdom: the Take-Over Panel and the Market for Corporate Control', Civil Journal Quarterly, 
Vol. 10, at 26 et seq.. Presumably then, self-regulation applies when, in the given circumstances, 
government activity would be unjustifiable; Black, J. (1996), 'Constitutionalising Self- 
Regulation', Modern Law Review, Vol. 59, at 27. 
Rider, B. A. K. and Hew, E. J. (1977), `The Regulation of Corporate and Securities Law in 
Britain - The Beginning of the Real Debate', Malaya Law Review, Vol. 1, No 19, at 159 et seq.. 
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complex laws, which firms are expected to strictly comply with. 13 Self-regulation' 
can also be seen to offer flexibility in the application of rules, keeping pace with 
activities that previously were lawful but now are not. 14 Systems that rely on 
statutory regulation can also lead to any conduct being regarded as permissible so 
long as it satisfies the legal requirements. 15 The adaptability of self-regulation means 
that rules can be changed quickly and less formally than statutory regulation and 
consequentially can be directly applied to individual cases in a pragmatic manner. 16 
Self-regulation is also less likely to be challenged by the courts and is therefore less 
conceivable that it will be utilised to form the testing ground for potential litigation. 17 
Indeed, the courts have generally observed that: 
"... [they] will not second guess the informed judgement of responsible 
regulators steeped in knowledge of their particular market. "18 
However, it is questionable whether statutory regulation verily possesses some 
of the disadvantages often expressed, for self regulation can, itself, be seen to have a 
number of inherent weaknesses. Self-regulation is thus only practicable where 
regulators control benefits on the basis of which firms may be either induced or 
compelled to submit to regulation. To be an effective substitute for legal coercion, the 
benefits offered, or the denial of which is threatened, must be exclusive. In other 
13 
14 
Fisse, B. and Braithwaite, J. (1993), Corporations, Crime and Accountability, Cambridge: 
Cambridge Universtiy Press, at 164. 
Cabinet Office and Treasury Report, Non Departmental Public Bodies: A Guide for 
Departments, (1985), at paragraph 5.8 and Wilson Report on the Review of the Functioning of 
Financial Institutions, (1980), Cmnd. 7937, Second Stage Evidence, Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers, London: HMSO; Morse, G. (1991), `The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers - Self 
Regulation or Self Protection', Journal of Business Law, at 512 and Karmel, A. (1988), 
`Securities Industry Regulation - Tested by the Crash', Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 
45, at 1306 et seq.. 
15 Op. cit., at paragraph 23. 
16 Braithwaite, J. and Fisse, B. (1987), ̀ Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime', in 
Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. (eds. ) (1987), supra, note 9, at 221 et seq.. 
17 Up. cit., at paragraph 70 et seq.. 






words, they must be unobtainable in any other way. Moreover, they must exceed the 
costs entailed by submission, otherwise firms may simply decline to submit; and the 
benefits must continue to exceed the costs, otherwise firms may simply defect. 19 
Regulators, however, seldom control benefits that meet such requirements. 
Consequently, the practical scope for self-regulation can thus be viewed as limited. 
By contrast, statutory regulation can be universally applied as a matter of direct 
legal obligation. Firms have no choice but to submit to regulation, whether statutory 
or non-statutory, if they are to avoid the penalties for acting illegally. Using the threat 
of legal sanctions to force firms to submit to regulation may mean, however, that the 
advantages associated with non-statutory regulation are forgone: firms may exploit 
loopholes in the rules in preference to complying with their spirit; regulation may lag 
behind current practices; innovation may be stifled by the rigid and mechanistic 
application of the rules 20 and regulators may find themselves untrammelled in 
questions of vires. Thus, regulators have sought to make strenuous efforts to avoid 
these consequences. But if the only way in which regulation can be applied to firms is 
by invoking the threat of legal penalties, they may be unavoidable. 
In the United Kingdom the ̀ old' regulatory regime was achieved by a mixture 
of: 
"... statutory regulation monitored by self-regulatory organisations 
recognised by, and under the surveillance of, a self-standing 
Commission. " (See diagram overleaf); 21 
19 See generally Georgakopoulos, G. (1993), ̀ Insider Trading as a Transaction Cost: A Market 
Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation', Connecticut Law 
Review, Vol. 26, at I et seq.. 
20 Gower, L. C. B. (1982), Review of Investor Protection: A Discussion Document, London: IIMSO, 
at paragraph 6.02. 
21 Gower, L. C. B. (1988), "Big Bang' and City Regulation', Modern Law Review, Vol. 51, at 6, 
Gower, L. C. B. (1984), Review of Investor Protection Report: Part /, Cmnd. 9215, at paragraph 
2.03; Whittaker, M. (1990), ̀ Legal Techniques in City Regulation', Current Legal Problems, at 
40. However, it has been argued that such a regime should more accurately be described as an 
example of `co-regulation', that is to say, a system that combines self-regulation by industry 
members with monitoring and ratification by Government; Miller, M. 11. (1985), `Self- 
42 
the latter being the long preferred form by the City22 due to the autonomy that can 
derived from it. 23 
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Although self-regulation possesses a number of positive features such as: 
Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination', Washington and Lee Review, 
Vol. 42, at 859 et seq.. 
22 Page, A. C. and Ferguson, R. B. (1992), Investor Protection, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
at 82. 
23 Op. cit., at 83. 
24 Adapted from Gore-Browne on Companies, (1993), chapter twelve, at paragraph 12.2. 
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"... high standards, compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the 
rules adaptability and flexibility in their formation and application, and 
speed and finality in regulatory decision-making... "25 
all too often it has been criticised for allowing those in the City to manage their own 
affairs 26 Indeed, given some of the observations made in subsequent chapters it is 
easy to comprehend why this belief of `practitioner-based regulation' has developed 
and explains why the City has sought not to develop an alternative measures of 
regulation. 27 
It can be observed that the old regulatory structure was largely made up of self- 
regulatory organisations (the 'SRO's')28 although these are accordingly recognised29 
by and under the ultimate surveillance of an overall regulator - the Securities and 
Investment Board (the ̀ , 51B')30 that is now known as the Financial Services Authority 
(the ̀ Authority'). Each SRO has its own set of rules from which the basis of its 
25 
26 
Op cit., at paragraph 12.3. 
Joel Joffe, ex-Deputy Chairman, Allied Dunbar typified this attitude when he stated: 
"... how can you expect the same people who had been exploiting the public for decades 
to suddenly be put in charge of protecting them., in principle it's like ... putting the mafra 
in charge of law enforcement in Italv... " 
, Naked 
City, BBC 2,6/11/96. 
27 Post, chapters three and five. 
28 Sections 7-21 FSA'86. 
29 Schedule 2 FSA'86. 
30 Rather than follow a regulatory system which derives its powers in detail from legislation the 
Government decided to: 
"... set out principles and objectives enshrined in the statute... [so asJ to allow a fair 
measure of discretion... by the designated agency, so that... an up-to-date and accurately 
targeted regulatory system [can be achieved]... " 
; Mr A. Howarth, Commons Parliamentary Debates, Standing Committee `E'. 28 January 1986, 
at column 39. See also Large, A. (1993), Financial Services Regulation - Making the Two Per 
System Work, Securities and Investment Board Release, at paragraphs 8.2 et seq.. 
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enforcement powers is derived. 31 However, these are not statutory in scope but 
contractual in nature, 32 although SRO's can request the SIB (now the Authority) to 
use its powers under the Financial Services Act 1986 (the `FSA'86'). 33 
The FSA'86 provides each SRO (of which there are three principally responsible 
for dealing with insider dealing and market manipulation34) with powers to regulate 
their members carrying out investment business activities. In this respect, SRO's can 
be perceived as the primary force of detection and enforcement against what may be 
regarded as market irregularities. 35 Likewise, boards consisting of representatives of 
their membership and outsiders representing the public interest govern them 
themselves. In addition, all SRO's were accountable to the SIB (now Authority), 
whose primary responsibility it is to ensure that SRO's complies with all FSA'86 
provisions. 36 Accordingly, it (the Authority) has the power to revoke all or part of 
any SRO if it fails to comply with those obligations imposed under the FSA'86.37 
However, in practice such provisions are rarely utilised and therefore only serves as a 
deterrent effect. 38 Realistically, if an SRO fails to comply with a provision under 
31 
32 
See, for example, the SFA's Conduct of Business Rulebook Rule 5.46 and the PIA's Rulebook 
Rule 7.2. (4). 
Such as the SFA's Conduct of Business Rulebook. 
:j 
33 Section 61 and 62 FSA'86. 





In determining what may or may not be unlawful practices is usually determined under statute, 
Rulebook reference or guidance notification; see, for example, `Guidance on the Dissemination 
of Price Sensitive Information', London Stock Exchange, July 1996 and `Advice Under Section 
206 
of the Financial Services Act/986: Equity-related Derivatives: Use of Inside Information', 
The Securities and Investment Board Guidance Release, December 1996. 
Large, A. (1996), ̀ Taylor the Rules to Reward the Good and Punish the Bad', The Times, 
24/8/96. Moreover, there have been calls for the Authority to have more extensive powers to 
deal with market abuse. This emphasises the growing feeling in the City that new laws are 
needed due to the inadequate results produced by the present ones; Parker, D. (1997), ̀ Davis 
Calls for New Powers', The Financial Times, 13/10/97. 
Section 11 FSA. 
38 Gore Browne (1993), supra, at paragraph 12.4.1. 
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FSA'86 it is more likely that the Authority will order the SRO to alter its rules or apply 
to the courts to force the SRO into compliance. 39 
Although the use of self-regulation was brought into effect to increase investor 
confidence the criticisms regarding this arrangement have been continuous. 40 Most 
have revolved around the premise that regulation is too fragmentary 41 resulting in a 
breakdown in communication between regulatory bodies, 42 although lack of 
responsibility, compliance costs and investor confidence have all played a part 43 
This is not surprising, given the change of government radical, that reform has 
materialised 44 Thus, the Bank of England is to lose its supervisory role to the 
Authority. 45 This is to be followed by the absorption of the specific SRO's into the 
Authority so that it can carry out a more unified (and less confusing) approach in the 
regulation of banking, securities, and in due course, insurance trading which, it is 
argued, have now become blurred46 (see diagram). Moreover, this apparent 
amalgamation should lead to the blending of `distinctive cultures and approaches' 






it has been commented upon that the United kingdom has a long tradition of self-regulation; 
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(1990), at xxii and Mercer, A. (1993), `Financial Services Update', Business Law Review, at 
75. 
Mackay, A. (1992), 'IAIRO Attacked for Maxwell Funds Failure', The Times, 10/7/92; 
Bosworth-Davies, R. (1994), 'Powers Granted to the SIB under FSA 1986, section 59', 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 4, at 119. In particular, see 'How Many Regulators? ', (1996) 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 2, at 34 and 'The Power of Fear', (1993) Company Lawyer, 
Vol. 14, No. 1, at 2, for arguments regarding the suitability of the SIB as an enforcement 
agency. 
Gowers, P. (1997), `City Watchdog Urges Wide Reform: Proposals to Merge SIB and Self- 
Regulatory Bodies', The Financial Times, 19/5/97 and Gowers, P. (1997), "Planning Blight' in 
the Citv', The Financial Times, 20/5/97. 
Sarker, R. (1998), ̀ Reform of the Financial Regulatory System', Company Lawyer, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, at 11 et seq.. 
45 Jones, E. and Northedge, B. (1997), ̀ Super Watchdogfor City in New Shake-Up', The Duily 
Telegraph, 21/5/97. 
46 
that in the past had caused problems with regulatory enforcement 47 This should 
theoretically, at least, actively improve the general role of regulation through the 
prevention of turf wars, duplication and bureaucracy. Indeed, such reform reflects the 
underlying ideology to enact change in City practices that has been long been adopted 
as standard Labour policy. 48 The impact this move has had on the City has, not 
surprisingly, been ambivalent although for the most part sanguine. 49 Indeed, radical 
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See generally Large, A. (1997) Report on `Reform of the Financial Regulatory System', 
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3', London Markets Newsletter, at 7 et seq.. 
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A common but misconceived notion is that these are no role for self-regulation 
in the United States. Like the United Kingdom, demand for regulation is carried out 
on both a formal regulatory and self-regulatory basis. This latter regime is achieved 
through the utilisation of the number of exchanges, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange ('NYSE'), 52 the American Stock Exchange (`Amex'), the Over-The-Counter 
Market ('OTC') and the National Association of Securities Dealers ('NASD'). Like 




The Securities and Investment Board became the 'Financial Services Authority' under the 
Financial Services (Change of Name of Designated Agency) Rules 1997 on 28/10/97. 
House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee (1990), supra, note 41, at 138. 
For a general overview of how the SEC has developed see generally Douglas, L. and Bates, A. 
(1933), ̀ The Federal Securities Act of 1933', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 43, at 171; Johnson, P. and 
Jackson, M. (1937), ̀ The SEC - Its Organisation and Functions Under the Securities Act of 
1933', Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 4, at 3; Landis, E. (1959), ̀ The Legislative 
History of the Securities Act of 1933', George Washington Law Review, Vol. 28, at 29 and 
Cary, 11. (1964), ̀ Administrative Agencies and the SEC', (1964) Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol. 29, at 653. 
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the function of exercising overall supervision of the markets and their regulation. 
Established in 1934, this non-partisan agency is unlike the Authority in that it has 
more extensive powers which not only extend to the formal regulating of SRO's but 
also take-overs (see diagram). 54 
Department of Justice 
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The SEC is one of the most important agencies in the United States and is able to 
command resources that are beyond the reach of the Authority. It possesses both 
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers that are used to administer those federal 
securities laws granted under various securities Acts. For the purpose of this thesis 
only the Securities Act of 1933 (the `SA) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the `SEA')55 are directly applicable, although it can be acknowledged that others are 
highly relevant. Using the SEA in conjunction with other pieces of legislation, the 
SEC is empowered to deal with frauds connected with the manipulation and the 
purchase or sale of securities. 56 
54 
55 
The original idea of Congress was that the SEC would act as an additional level of regulation to 
SRO's; Jennings, K. (1964), ̀ Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: the Role of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission', Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 29, at 667 et 
seq.. 
Burk, 1. (1976), ̀ The Origins of Federal Securities Regulation: A Case Study in the Social 
Control of Finance', Social Forces, Vol. 63, at 1010. 
56 Post, chapter three. 
49 
Insider dealing and market manipulations are not only civil offences in the 
United States, as they may additionally attract criminal liability. Although unlike the 
United Kingdom only the most serious of these types of offences are pursued in the 
criminal courts, and only after prior investigation by the SEC. 57 As the SEC is only 
limited to investigating and prosecuting civil proceedings the Department of Justice is 
only utilised when the offence committed is serious enough to warrant the initiation of 
criminal proceedings against the perpetrator(s). 58 At this stage, all the evidence 
gained by the SEC is then passed over to the Department of Justice to assist its case. 
Moreover, evidence obtained by the SEC may be used for ancillary remedies, 59 such 
as disgorgement60 or restitution in conjunction with any private civil action brought 
by investors against an insider or manipulator. 
As a direct result of the growth of organised insider trading, by the likes of Ivan 
Boesky and Michael Milken, 61 and the distortion it had on these marketS62 during the 
1980's new legislation in the form of the Insider Trading Act 1984 (the 'ITA') and tile 
Insider Trading and Securities Act 1988 (the `ITSA') have also been developed and 
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Regulation Law Journal, Vol. 15, at 138 et seq.. 
Farrand, R. (1976), ̀ Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits', l larvard Law Review, 
Vol. 89, at 1802 et seq.. Also see SEC v. Texas Gu/fSulphur Co. [S. D. N. Y. 1970] 312 F. Supp 
77 affirmed [2d Cir. 1971] 446 F. 2d 1301,1307 - 1308 and SEC v. Golconda Mining Co. 
[S. D. N. Y. 1971] 327 F. Supp 257. 
See Texas Gulf [1971] , op. cit.; Mills v. 
Electric Auto-Lite Co. [1970] 396 U. S. 375,391; SEC 
v. Commonwealth Chemicals Sec. Inc. [2d Cir. 1978] 574 F. 2d 90,120; SEC v. MacDonald [ Ist 
Cir. en banc 1983] 699 F. 2d 47,52-55, on remand, [D. R. I. 1983] 568 F. Supp. 111, aJ%'d per 
curiam, [Ist Cir. 1984] 725 F. 2d 9; SEC V. Dennis Levine et a!. 86 Civ. 3726 [RO] [SDNY 
1986] and SEC v. Kidder, Peabody and Co Inc. 87 Civ. 3869 [RO] [SDNY 1987]. 
`Judge Rules on Ivan Boesky Insider Trading Scandal', The Independent, 11 /2/97; Comment, 
`Insider Trading in Junk Bonds', (1990) Harvard Law Review, at 1720 and ̀ Who Dares Wins 
Wall Street', The Independent, 16/4/95 and Macintyre, A. (1993), ̀ King ofJunk Bonds Pays 
Campus Dues', The Times, 9/10/93. 
Clarke, M. (1990), Business Crime: Its Nature and Control, Cambridge: Polity Press, at 179. 
50 
3 
the profit made or loss avoided by insider activities. 63 The ITSA64 extends this 
liability allowing the SEC to increase fines to a maximum of $1 million for 
individuals or $2.5 million for corporations committing insider activities. The ITSA 
also provides a `bounty' reward of up to 10% of the penalties to be collected to those" 
who identify or `blow the whistle' on insider dealing. 65 
Apart from prosecuting insiders under these two pieces of legislation the SEC 
has also pursued individuals under statutes that were originally not devised to regulate 
insider dealing. Thus, the use of the Federal mail fraud66 and wire fraud67 statutes 
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act 1970 (the `RICO') have 
been successfully used on numerous occasions by the SEC to prosecute insider 
dealing. The RICO allows the SEC to implement triple damages68 and/ or the use of 
imprisonment as well as allowing them to bring civil actions against syndicates of 
organised rings of insiders. 
The adoption of what some have referred to as a `super SIB' has prompted many 
to speculate that a regime not unlike that of that used in the United States will be 








The ITA is specifically aimed at the trading of persons with advanced knowledge of take-over 
attempts of market information, such as in the Chiarella [ 1980]; see ̀ A Critique of the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984', (1985) 71 Virginia Law Review, at 470 et seq.. 
Friedman, D. (1990), The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988', 
North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, at 465 et seq.. 
Section 21 A(e). Also see Loss, L. and Seligman, J. (1993), Securities Regulation (3a edition), 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, at 3758-3761. 
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18 U. S. C. § 1343. Also see Janvey, M. (1987), supra, note 58, at 140 et seq.. 
18 U. S. C. §§ 1954(c) and 1964(c). 
Commentary, ̀Regulators Back in the Melting Pot', The Times, 21/5/97. Certain academics 
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Kingdom before the advent of the Financial Services Authority; Posner, R. A. (1991), 
International Securities Regulation, at 112 et seq. and Fishman, J. L. (1993), The Transformation 
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made, total reliance on the American system is unlikely or even desirable. 70 
Therefore, while structural changes in the United Kingdom are likely to be influenced 
by the American experience fundamental changes regarding funding, attitude and 
bureaucratic matters are likely to remain quiescent. 
Many of those interviewed for this research mirrored these opinions although 
some were more forthcoming than others in what they believed would be likely to 
change and what they would like to see changed. 71 Interestingly, of those involved 
with the extensive penalisation of insider dealing and market manipulation 
commended some of the novel approaches adopted by the United States. In 
particular, the use of plea-bargaining and the effective use of disgorgement remedies 
mentioned as beneficial attributes that should where possible be implemented in this 
country. However, the idea of adopting procedural and substantive changes 
exclusively modelled on the United States were substantially frowned upon as being 
totally out of place and unworkable in the present United Kingdom market 
environment. Indeed, ideas such as combining the role of the civil and criminal law 
against market abusers72 and bounty payments to informers were scathingly criticised, 
a view echoed by other academics. 73 
70 Rider, B. A. K. (1988), ̀ Policing the City-Combating Fraud and Other Abuses in the Corporate 
Securities Industry', Current Legal Problems, at 51. 
71 A full account of the each interview undertaken and the methods used to facilitate the flow of 
information gain can be found in appendix one. 
72 
73 
Op cit. The implementation of this idea was not favoured by the majority of respondents 
interviewed how saw the use of both forms of law in `double jeopardy' manner to be less than 
productive and a waste of time and resources. Indeed, some showed concerned that certain civil 
liberties may be infringe if such a system was adopted. See also chapter five. 
Rider, B. A. K. and Ashe, T. M. (1993), Insider Crime - The New Law, London: Jordans, at 1. 
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2.2. The Notion of Disclosure 
In their barest form, any financial market can be perceived as a market of information 
that is continually influenced by the trading and predictions made by market forces. 
Investments in these markets are what economists term public or experience goods, as 
their quality cannot be assessed in advance. 74 This is due to such forces altering the 
supply or demand quotation allocated towards a particular security through the 
application of information that relates to that security. Insider dealing and market 
manipulation also relies on this assumption although both derive a distinct trading 
advantage on either undisclosed information or interfering with the market 
information available. 75 Consequently, the principle of disclosure is used to make 
sure that traders and investors alike have the same information and hence the same 
chance of making the same decisions. 76 
The principle of disclosure forms a cornerstone of English and American 
securities regulation. 77 Generally, disclosure is used as a device to advance three 







Nelson, D. (1970), `Information and Consumer Behaviour', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
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Cmnd. 7937, London: Macmillan, at paragraph 2.01. 
Boyle, T. (1992), ̀ A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and 
insider Trading', California Law Review, Vol. 80, at 1429 et seq.. 
Baiman, E., Stanley, N. and Verrecchia, R. (1996), `The Relation among Capital Markets, 
Financial Disclosure, Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading', Journal of Accounting 
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In particular, the United States has a vast amount of legal literature on this area, see, for 
example, Gorden, G. and Kornhauser, 1. (1985), 'Efficient Markets, Costly Information and 
Securities Research', New York University Law Review, Vol. 60, at 761 et seq.. 
`Disclosure as a Legislative Device', (1962-63) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 76, at 1273. 
This is especially true in the United States were the disclosure principle was used to great affect 
in forging the SA and SEA. 
"... To the proponents of the 1933 and 1931 securities laws, prevention of excessive 
insider or underwriter compensation was nearly as important a justification for these 
acts as the prevention offraud insider conflicts of interest, self-dealing, waste or unfair 
transactions, it was argued, were less likely to occur if the insider realised that the 
material details of such transactions would have to be disclosed... " 
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used to discourage particular forms of conduct by invoking public disapproval of such 
conduct. 80 Thirdly, it may be used simply for its informative effect. 81 Thus, while 
some of the provisions of securities laws are designed to have an enforcement effect, 
most of the provisions are geared towards informing intended recipients. 82 
In the United States, the SEC has been empowered under the SA with the duty to 
police the use of disclosure obligations relating to public companies that wish to sell 
their securities. Under the SA these types of companies must comply with the SEC's 
disclosure regulations regarding registration of classes of securities, the filing of 
periodic reports, the solicitation of proxies and the contents of tender offer 
documents. 83 Through these securities rules and laws the SEC determines what 
disclosures publicly held corporations must make in the registration and disclosure 
; Seligman, J. (1983), 'The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System', 
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615 et seq.. 
"... If market forces are to operate properly it is essential that ... as much information as 
possible is disclosed about the investments and services on offer to the customer... " 
; FSA White Paper, at paragraph 3.2(1) and Company Law Reform, (1973), Cmnd. 5391, at 
paragraph 15. 
The term ̀ sunlight effect' is used to describe the philosophy of disclosure. The originator of this 
phrase was Brandeis, B. (1963), Other People's Money, (1963), at 62: 
"... Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
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disclosure obligations: 
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Such compliance also applies to corporations that publicly traded shares that have assets of $5 
million or more and have a class of equity securities held by 500 or more persons. U. S. stock 
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to alter these rules so that they conform with U. S. securities legislation; Lipton, S. (1983), The 
SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory 
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process. 84 Additionally, officers, directors and 10% shareholders of public companies 
are all subject to reporting requirements. 85 
By comparison, the United Kingdom position regarding disclosure principles is 
primarily dealt with by the Stock Exchange under obligations derived from the FSA. 86 
Thus, where a company seeks to raise capital by a direct offer of securities to the 
public, over and above the obligation to comply in detail with the listing particulars, 
the FSA imposes a general duty referring to what must be contained in such a 
listing, 87 a duty for which the Stock Exchange is responsible. The requirements for 
listing that must be compiled with are set out in the Listing Rules, commonly referred 
to as the `Yellow Book'. 88 The Stock Exchange, through the Listing Rules, requires 
that an issuer of listed securities must make full and timely disclosure about itself and 
Responsibilities for Securities Markets', University of California at Davis Law Review, Vol. 15, 
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hnfra. Although other disclosure requirements are required under sections 251 and 329 and 
Schedule 7 (Miscellaneous), paragraph 6 of the Companies Act 1985. However, such disclosure 
obligations have not gone uncriticised: 
"... There is far more myth than truth in the law's perennial assumption that those who 
deal with limited companies get any real protection or help from information which a 
search of the registers will yield for them... " 
. Sealy, L. (1984), Company Law and Commercial Reality, London: Butterworths, at 25 et seq.. 
87 Sections 146 - 147 FSA'86. 
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its listed companies, at the time of listing and subsequently. 89 Initial disclosure is 
therefore required, which must be comprehensive and, secondly, continuing 
obligations will apply following admission to listing. These obligations are 
specifically relevant to listed securities and are therefore designed to erode 
informational advantages at the earliest possible time, theoretically reducing the 
chances of fraudulent activity involving such securities90, although this has not been 
conclusively proven. 91 Thus, it can be noted that both the United Kingdom and 
United States rely on disclosure principles enacted under statute to make sure that an 
even playing field is provided. 92 Yet, can this be justified given that there are those 
who believe that market forces themselves can and should adequately determine what 
optimum level information ought to be disclosed at? 
Many of those who argue against mandatory disclosure believe that the market 
provides enough incentives for the production of relevant information. 93 This is 
based on the belief that investors desire information because it provides them with the 
only medium by which they can increase the monetary value of their investments and 
therefore creates a demand for such information. Firms also benefit from such 
disclosure as the more information a company provides the more likely investors will 
89 See Yellow Book, at chapters one, five, six and nine. 
90 Benston, E. (1973), ̀ Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities 
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trade upon them. Therefore, companies and investors alike can derive benefit94 from' 
this situation by mutual. agreement. 95 
However, if voluntary disclosure is to work investors must have initial 
confidence in the firms they invest in. Therefore, in order to allay any suspicions a 
firm must be able to show any potential investor that it is bone fide. This may be 
achieved through the use of external parties such as accountants to audit corporate 
accounts to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the company and 
present it in a clear and precise form. 96 Management could further enhance its 
credibility by taking substantial positions in the companies stock by way of stock 
options or otherwise. 97 This would give the management an incentive to enhance the 
value of the companies stock, thereby aligning its interest with those of the investors. 
However, given that predictions generated by accountants tend to be conservative 
estimates based on past performance and asset levels any financial information 
relating to securities in that company, which wishes to attract investors, may well give 
a false indication as to that companies future performance. 98 Such conservatism on 
the part of accountants in estimating a company's profit or loss is often attributed to 
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Under a system of voluntary disclosure any individual may benefit from the use 
of such information, even if he has not paid for acquiring it. Therefore, the original 
producer of the information will not be able to capture all the benefits that may be 
derived by disclosure. 100 This may result in information not being forthcoming due to 
the absence of incentive. In addition, if the company producing the information has a 
dominant market position it will be less than forthcoming in the production of 
information if this will undermine its position unless it is legally required to do so. 
Sole reliance on the market to provide the optimum disclosure of information is 
also inappropriate, based as it is on the presumption that the market does not afford 
equal access to all users or potential users of the information. Therefore, in the 
absence of a rule compelling the disclosure of information, companies or individuals 
might make selective disclosures to favoured or more important customers. Another 
problem associated with voluntary disclosure relates to the notion that the information 
disclosed might be selective in nature. Thus, it may be in management's self interest 
to disclose only favourable information and suppress unfavourable information 
because of the adverse impact it might have on the market varlue of its shares. It can 
be generally observed that it is common to find firms with nothing important to 
disclose comply quickly with requirements of disclosure. 
Another criticism of voluntary disclosure relates to the premise that companies 
know what is good for their shareholders. 101 This view assumes that the interests of 
shareholders and management coincide. Managers who wish to profit from trading on 
inside information will have an incentive to withhold important information. A 
similar incentive would also exist if the management has an interest in buying out its 
shareholders. 102 An additional consideration is the notion that a firm will be 
Management Earnings Forecasts', Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 20, at 3 
et seq.. 
100 Bearles, T. (1981), ̀ The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information', Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 24, at 512 et seq.. 
101 ßenston, E. (1979) himself recognised these limitations; supra, note 95, at 1476-7. 
102 According to Coffee, H. (1984), ̀ Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System', Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, at 741, the absence of a mandatory 
disclosure system is likely to increase the popularity of leveraged buyouts by the management. 
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compelled to disclose bad news because it may induce the belief in investors that the 
management has something even worse to hide is not entirely plausible. An investor 
cannot judge whether a piece of news is good or bad without first knowing what the 
news is. While a company may not be in a position to disclose good news all the 
time, it does not always have to disclose bad news whenever there is any. It could be 
selective about the revelation of bad news. Management may even falsely perpetuate, 
for its own advantage, the belief that something worse is being hidden. It may 
withhold information with a view to acquiring securities at a lower price. The 
information ultimately disclosed might in fact be good news for the investors but the 
management would have achieved its objective of purchasing the shares at a bargain 
price. 
A system of voluntary disclosure may also lead to inefficiency in the market for 
information. 103 The inefficiency may take the form of wasteful or excessive 
expenditure in gathering information, because investors are likely to duplicate their 
efforts in gathering the same information. Mandatory disclosure substantially reduces 
this wasteful expenditure of investor resources by creating a centralised depository for 
information. 
The incentive for non-disclosure arises because the withholding of information may prevent an 
appreciation of the share price. To achieve its result, the management might also be induced to 
provide false information that will have the effect of depressing the share prices. 
103 Mahoney, E. (1992), ̀ Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud on Interpersonal Markets', 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, at 631 et seq.. 
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2.3. Regulation, Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
Historically, insider practices have incited controversy due to the lack of universal 
acceptance as to the harmful effect they may have upon financial markets. 104 
Accordingly, two opposing schools of thought, those that seek to oppose or propose 
the need for regulating these practices, have developed. Alternatively, these academic 
opinions can be further sub-categorised in relation to their legalistic, 105 economic106 
or jurisprudential standing. The view adopted both in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, as with most other developed financial markets, is that these practices 
should be regulated. Accordingly appropriate legislative measures have been enacted. 
Yet, can such views and actions be wholly justified given that opposing arguments 
exist? 
Over the years many arguments have been advanced relating to the belief that 
insider dealing should not be regulated. 107 The main thrust of such a general 
consensus centres on the notion that insider dealing and manipulative practices can 
generate more benefits than harm. 108 
104 Contrast the historical observation made by Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), Insider 
Trading, (1993), London: Fourmat Publishing, at 5: 
"... in the late 1800s and well into this century such insider trading in shares was 
perceived by many as a perk of the job in a system often regarded as fair game and 
always in season... " 
, with the observation made 
in programme Naked City, BBC 2, November 1996 and Cox, E. 
(1986), `Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence', 
Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 64, at 476 et seq.. 
105 Post. 
106 See generally Haddock, J. and Macey, K. (1987), `Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest 
Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation', Journal of Law and Economics. 
107 Post. 
108 See generally Manne, H. (1966(a)), Insider Trading and the Stock Market, (1966(a)), Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co; Manne, H. (1966(b)) 'In Defence ofInsider Trading', Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 6, at 113; Manne, H. (1967), `What's so bad about Insider Trading', 
Challenge, Vol. 15, at 14; Manne, H. (1970), `Insider Trading and the Law Professors', 
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 23, at 547; Kay, M. (1973), 'The Justice Report on Insider 
Trading', Modern Law Review, Vol. 36, at 185; Manne, H. (1974), 'Economic Aspects of 
Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws' in Wall Street in Transition: The 
Emerging System and its Impact on the Economy, Boston: Little Brown and Co; Dooley, C. 
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Opponents to the regulation of insider dealing believe that this practice benefits 
financial markets by enhancing the value of securities through the elimination of 
market distortion, thereby enhancing fluidity in market prices. 109 Consequently, 
dealings by an insider connected with a listed company may be perceived as a 
barometer as to that company's financial health. Thus, any dealings in that company 
by such an insider may invariably aid securities prices to reach higher levels which 
ordinarily would not materialise if such inside information were to have been made 
more freely available. 110 Outsiders, therefore, through this argument, are seen to 
benefit from the disclosure of everything known about the company, public or not, via 
insider dealing111 since such dealings indirectly reduce speculation. 112 Contextually, 
any laws that seek to prohibit insider dealing would severely curtail any legitimate 
information gathering activities taken by those individuals, such as market analysts, in 
providing an informed and efficient securities market. Indeed, the existence of 
informational variances serves as an incentive for market analysts to discover new 
informnation. 113 
(1980), 'Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions', Virginia Law Review, Vol. 66, at 1; 
Carlton, K. and Fischel, H. (1983), 'The Regulation of Insider Trading', Stanford Law Review, 
Vol. 35, at 857; Seligman, J. (1983), 'An Economic Defence of Insider Trading', Fortune, Vol. 
108, at 47 and Cottrell, E. (1986), 'Insider Dealing in the United States', New Law Journal, Vol. 
14, at I50. 
109 Manne (1966(a)), op. cit., at 77 et seq.. 
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Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. 13, at 349 etseq.; Corgill, 
K. (1996), 
'Insider Trading, Price Signals, and Noisy Information', Indiana Law Review, Vol. 71, at 356 et 
seq.; Damodaran, P. and Liu, D. (1993), 'Insider Trading as a Signal of Private Information', 
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Efficiency', Journal of Finance, Vol. 31, at 1145 et seq.; Kerr, T. (1980), 'The Battle of Insider 
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A. (1992), 'Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices', Rand Journal of Economics, at 
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However, there are shortcomings in the validity of this argument for even if 
insiders trade secretly they cannot effectively eliminate all market distortion. 114 
Therefore, the insider is the only one who ultimately profits from such activities. 
Disclosure of inside information by insiders at an extremely early stage seems the 
only way of preventing such individuals making any profit and at the same time 
allowing the market to benefit. 115 Yet, in order to do this the market must initially 
know who the insiders are. 116 Insiders, though, are rarely honest enough to admit 
their identity and usually can find ways of concealing it. 117 Therefore, the market 
must not only be able to identify the insider but also react accordingly in order for the 
securities price to be truly represented. However, not all insider dealing activities will 
reflect the insiders' true intentions. Accordingly, as dealing possesses incentives for 
insiders to manipulate the substance as well as the timing of corporate information to 
their own advantage they may induce the market to follow a bogus lead by purchasing 
securities initially and then selling them in the resulting rising market. 118 
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information for mutual benefit, the supposed advantages caused by insider dealing are 
negligible. 119 
While it must be acknowledged that some of the arguments put forward by 
those that seek not to regulate these activities are convincing, the credibility of such 
beliefs rests on the premise that fundamental questions can firstly be convincingly 
answered. This, it seems, has not been accomplished. Thus, it may be perceived, that 
this school of thought fails not only to adequately explain why an insider, rather than 
the company with which he may be associated, usually profits from the price sensitive 
information he uses, but also fails to provide a credible explanation for the situation 
where an insider may effect the market by way of having in his possession 
information which, when used, will have a derogatory effect on the market. It has 
been suggested that in this regard an insider would trade at the market price of the 
securities or at a price nearest to it rather than offering to sell at a price that reflects 
the value of the undisclosed information. 120 If this is the case, insider dealing will 
send false signals to the market rather than bring the price of securities to their current 
levels. Yet, the culmination of all these arguments may be of little significance given 
the effects technological advancements have had on spontaneity of market 
transactions. Hence, 
"... it is argued that in the modern market insider dealing will hardly 
affect the price of an actively traded stock at all. " 121 
Conventionally, a company can usually make a profit from any price sensitive 
information generated by either dealing in its own shares or by selling such 
119 Garten, S. (1987), `Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest', Wisconsin Law Review, at 574 et 
seq. and Fried, W. (1997), `Towards Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading', 
Southern California Law Review, Vol. 70, at 376 et seq.. 
120 An isman, P. (1986), Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of Issues and 
Alternatives, Canberra: Australian Government Publications, at 8 et seq.. 
121 Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), supra, note 104, at 25. 
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information to outsiders. ] 22 Yet, as is often the case, the company may have 
legitimate business reasons for keeping information confidential so that dealing by 
insiders may not only be prejudicial, at that moment, to the company's interests but 
also hinder the disclosure of information by that company in the future. 
The practice of market manipulation can be extremely difficult to define in 
terms of legitimacy. While it is widely acknowledged that well-known practices such 
as ̀ matched orders' and `wash trading' amount to manipulation, confusion is often 
encountered when new forms of alleged manipulation are detected. Thus, if an 
individual trades on the belief or premonition that his trading activities will cause a 
marked rise in the security he is trading upon and actually does, will this amount to a 
manipulative practice? The answer is `yes' as his activities have had the same end 
result as those classed as definite manipulative practices, even though in the latter 
example the individual involved did not have a dishonest intent. Therefore, given this 
ambiguity it is surely too broad to regulate market manipulation given the problems 
that may be encountered in defining such behaviour. 
Yet, if this line of thought is applied to insider dealing, especially to the laws 
that govern this area in the United Kingdom, the opposite assumption can be made. 
Reichnian, for instance, argues that given insider activities tends to evolve with 
technological advancement it has become more difficult to identify clearly. Therefore 
the resulting imprecision may stifle the effective enforcement of such rules. Thus, a 
more fluid approach needs to be adopted by the United Kingdom if it is to overcome 
this. 123 
It is generally accepted by this school of thought that since insider dealing 
usually takes place through the medium of impersonal exchanges, it is impossible to 
122 
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identify the victims involved, 124 let alone the insider. 125 Outsiders who enter the 
market do so voluntarily, without inducement by insiders and regardless as to their 
activities. Therefore, if distortions in the market already existed, it is argued that they 
would have been caused by the non-disclosure by the company in the first place 
regardless as to the fact that an insider may be in possession of confidential 
information. 126 Following on from this argument, an outsider's loss is, in essence, 
124 Douglas, L. (1988), `Insider Trading: The Case Against the 'Victimless Crime ", Financial 
Review, Vol. 23, at 128 etseq.; Manne, 11. (1966(a)), supra, note 108, at 110 et seq.; Manne, 11. 
(1985) suggests: 
"... the most fundamental economic proposition in the whole topic of insider trading is 
that no shareholder is harmed... " 
, supra, note 108, at 933. In addition, Manne, II. (1985) goes on to make the assumption that: 
"... the modern academic literature now recognises that there is no significant economic 
harm to any identifiable group of investors from insider trading... " 
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caused by his own ignorance in not knowing the market as well as he should have. 127 
However even if this is so losses will always have a tendency to remain `invisible', as 
the fear of unwanted publicity by investors128 or loss of face by companies who are 
aware of the trading activities of an insider are reluctant to raise the issue with the 
relevant authorities. 129 Therefore, although it seems apparent that no one definite 
victim can be identified, if insider dealing and market manipulations are allowed to 
infest, investors, market-makers130 and the market itself131 will become their 
unwilling victims. 
"... if the market price is currently ffty dollars and insiders know that the true value is 
fifty=five dollars and trade on information, the price will rise. Non-insiders who sell 
during this period will receive less than the true value, but they sold voluntarily and 
would have only received ffty, if not for insider trading. Thus, insider trading actually 
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Yet proponents of insider dealing advocate that it forms a necessary part for 
compensating individuals who through their `skills' at becoming an insider should 
therefore receive a reward for their entrepreneurial exploits. 132 The crux of this 
argument focuses on the notion that managers and executives will settle for a lower 
level of compensation in the forms of salaries, bonuses and other explicit rewards if 
they are also allowed to use their position to benefit from dealing and profiting from 
the use of inside information. If this is allowed, it is argued, shareholders will directly 
benefit from the lower salaries and bonuses companies usually pay such individuals, 
and consequently there will be a reduced chance that salaries will therefore need 
renegotiating. 133 Additionally, the prospect of making profits from inside 
information will act as an incentive for those who possess such entrepreneurial skills 
to seek positions in companies and as a result will act as a natural `sifling' process 
sorting out those managers who have superior skills from those that inferior ones in 
the company. 
This line of argument, although elaborate, has a number of weaknesses. Firstly, 
it assumes that all insiders are blessed with entrepreneurial skills. 134 Yet, this 
assumption can be seen as wrong since such activities can be carried out by those 
people deemed tippees , such as secretaries or printers, who through the very nature of 
their position come across such price sensitive information and act upon it. Secondly, 
the entrepreneurial argument also ignores the reality that the managers themselves 
determine compensation schemes offered to managers as they are the ones in a 
position of controlling such companies. It therefore seems that the idea of rewards for 
entrepreneurs enables insiders to share in the gains of the enterprise irrespective of 
whether they contributed to its gains or not. Thus, the benefit and the amount of the 
gains arc unpredictable. In addition, there is no assurance that an insider alone will 
132 Manne, If. (1966(a)), supra, note 108, at 131 et seq. and Manne, H. (1966(b)), supra, note 108, 
at III et sey.. 
133 Manne, 11. (1970), supra, note 108, at 547 and Carlton, K. and Fischel, H. (1983), supra, note 
108, at 871 el seq.. 
134 Scott, E. (1980), 'Insider Trading, Rule IOb-S, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy', Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 9, at 808 et seq. and Lorie, 1. (1980), 'Insider Trading: Rule /Ob-5, 
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy: A Comment', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, at 819 et 
seq.. 
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benefit from the reward, as when he tips information to a third party for example. 135 
Thirdly, the belief that a person with entrepreneurial skills who is not allowed to trade 
on inside information will join another profession does not accord with reality. 
Finally, the company of which he is an insider does not reward an insider but by the 
shareholders and others who trade with him and at whose expense an insider would 
make a profit. Therefore if this is left unregulated, it will cause a lack of confidence 
by the public, who will be unwilling to invest as minority shareholders in public 
companies. 
The role of regulation can be viewed as a means of control. However, in 
justifying its use it must be proven that it facilitates the common good in providing a 
stable and structured environment that is free from hindrance. Only then can further 
provisions be used to enforce such aims. During the last three decades there has been 
an increased movement towards prohibiting insider dealing and manipulative 
practices by harmonising securities laws in a bid to establish a common international 
commercial morality. However, there are those who believe that this orthodox view is 
wrong. This poses the question as to which is of the ̀ right' opinion. 
One of strongest views put forward against insider dealing and manipulative 
practices is that they discourage investment. The main thrust of this argument is that 
if investors perceive that they are being unfairly treated they will lose confidence136 
in the integrity of the market. 137 This is of paramount importance since confidence in 
135 
136 
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"... We are trying to clean up and strengthen the markets, to make people who go and 
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137 
, Parliamentary 
Debates 1979/80,1 Standing Committee ̀A', at column 610. 
"... [TJhe main (f not onl)) convincing justification for controlling insider dealing is that 
it has a perceived, adverse impact on confidence... " 
, Rider, 
l3. A. K. and Ashe, T. M. (1993), supra, note 73, at 5 et seq.. 
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a market increases trade and investment that in turn provides economic stability138 at 
both a national and international level. 139 Good business ethics therefore need to be 
supported and reinforced by legal regulation for this reason. 140 
Insider and manipulative activities has been perceived as being inherently 
unfair, 141 as insiders have an unfair advantage, concentrating their activities around 
information that is not freely available to others. 142 Manipulative practices seek to 
"... We are trying to clean tip and strengthen the markets, to make people who go and 
deal in quoted securities or securities that are available for dealing on the public market 
have more confidence in that market... " 
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undermine the free flowing of market information by placing inaccurate information 
in it that can be used to the manipulator's advantage. In the past such practices have 
gone unchallenged, given that lower ethical standards existed. 143 However moral 
concern can be seen to have played a part in the forging of laws used against such 
practices. 144 Generally, both practices go against the principles of market 
egalitarianism. 145 Thus, in order to make such markets fair these practices must be 
eradicated in order to allow all the parties connected with a transaction to have equal 
access to information146 that is material to any investment decision made. 147 
Consequentially, if the same information is available to all it prevents the exploitation 
of unearned information. 
Yet, these concepts have been criticised on a number of grounds. 148 Firstly, it 
ignores the fact that obtaining market information can be an expensive exercise. 
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if any, should be set to provide such a service. 149 Secondly, the concept of fairness 
also presupposes that all market participants will be placed on an even footing, 
discounting those who possess superior market trading instincts and/or an ability to 
accurately analyse market information. 150 Interestingly, the concept of fairness is 
often subdivided into two categories: one is procedural, which encompasses the 
methods which market participants use to negotiate and formulate transactions, 151 and 
substantive fairness, which relates to the outcome, or substantive content, of 
transactions. 152 Finally, there are some that believe that this argument also fails to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate exploitation of market information. 153 
From an economic standpoint, the object of regulation is seen to impose limits 
upon the variety of actions individuals or institutions can pursue. Thus, by limiting 
these actions through regulation, different outcomes emerge than would nonnally be 
achieved through the operation of unregulated, spontaneous market forces. 154 The 
crux of this argument in promoting regulation centres upon the belief that it curbs any 
'una! Iractive characteristics' that a spontaneous market may produce, such as the 
149 Carlton, K. and Fishel, 11. (1983), supra, note 108, noted: 
"... If it known that insiders cannot trade, the gains from discovering non-public 
information would be high and brokers would have an incentive to expend resources to 
uncover it. In fact the only effect a ban on insider trading might have is that brokers 
rather than insiders reap the gains from inside information. While this may be inefficient 
because brokers can only become informed at a high cost, the informed/uninformed 
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susceptibility of a free financial market to fraud, manipulation and deception. 155 and 
acts as a device influencing economic activity and bringing about an acceptable and 
desired outcome from that generated by a spontaneous market. Posner156 draws upon 
two theories to explain economic regulation. These relate to both public and private 
interest theories. The former purports that regulation is supplied in response to public 
demand to correct inefficient or inequitable markets. 157 Regulation is seen as being 
for the benefit and protection of the public as a whole rather than for the benefit of 
sectional interests. The latter theory rejects this on the grounds that correction of 
market imperfection is the goal of regulation. 158 Regulation, in this context, can be 
viewed as part of an economic/political process in which competing groups seek to 
promote their own interests. 
155 Op. cit., at 169. 
156 See generally Posner, N. (1974), ̀ Theories of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal or Economics 
and Management Science, Vol. 5, at 546. 
157 Beck-Dudley, C. A., Caryn, R. and Stephens, M. (1989), 'The Efficient Market Theory and 
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Brown and Co, at 22. He suggests that: 
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2.4. Summary 
This chapter draws attention to a number of important areas that underpin the 
structural, legal and theoretical aspects of market regulation. The structural issues 
exemplify the similarities and differences in the ways both the United Kingdom and 
United States have sought to regulate their own markets. In this respect, it can be 
observed that the present structure of financial regulation adopted in the United 
Kingdom is to evolve into a regulatory framework not unlike that used in the United 
States. The underlying reasoning behind this can be identified with the general failure 
of the City to adequately police itself effectively and the possibility of conflicts of 
interest arising out of the present structure imposed. Yet it can be perceived that by 
superimposing other ideas derived from the latter jurisdiction, potential problems 
rather than successes are likely to result in effectively combating these types market 
abuse. 
While it can be acknowledged that the notion of disclosure is needed if any form 
of regulation is to be implemented, the degree to which it is to be enforced is disputed. 
Some advocate that a liberal regime of voluntary disclosure based on market forces is 
desirable while others argue that such a regime needs to be mandatory. Both 
viewpoints present positive and negative aspects. The same can be said to apply to 
those who seek to oppose or propose regulating insider dealing and market 
manipulation. Yet, given the validity of all the arguments presented, it needs to be 
said that both these types of market abuse need to be successfully regulated. 
Therefore, the arguments that propose mandatory disclosure and the need for 
regulating against insider dealing and market manipulation provide the strongest 
arguments in favour of encouraging the primary goal of market growth through 
facilitating investor confidence and market integrity. 
73 
Section Two 
The aims of this section, which incorporates chapters three and four, is to critically 
examine the appropriateness of the legislative and common law approaches used in 
the United Kingdom that deal with insider dealing and market manipulation. This is 
achieved through comparative analysis predominantly with the United States, 
although other jurisdictions are used to a lesser extent, to assess whether the types of 
law utilised in this country can be made more effective in combating and deterring 
these types of market abuse. To this end, the criminal law will be examined to assess 
its appropriateness for penalising both. The possibility of more suitable and of ective 
remedies in the form of the civil law is evaluated in conjunction with the possible 
problems that may be encountered if implemented. 
Chapter Three 
Regulating Insider Dealing 
Overview 
The consensus that can be drawn from the previous chapter is that insider dealing 
needs to be regulated. Yet, what are the best ways of achieving this desirable goal? 
This chapter argues that using comparative analysis the legislative and common law 
approaches adopted in the United Kingdom are inappropriate in effectively 
penalising this activity. 
The aims of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, to briefly examine the conflicting 
reasoning behind the introduction of insider dealing legislation and identify the 
difficulties faced in determining its true extent. Secondly, through the use of 
comparative analysis, to examine the legal mechanisms used to regulate insider 
dealing in this country and the United States to assess whether the latter can offer any 
guidance to the former. Finally, to propose that the use of the civil and the 
administrative law would provide more appropriate forms of penalty and deterrence 
in conjunction with an examination of the possible problems this type of law may 
encounter, if implemented. 
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3.1. Conflicting Ideas, Statistics and Insider Dealing 
Although anecdotal evidence exists suggesting that insider dealing is widespread 
there is little positive evidence to provide a truly realistic picture. Since insider 
dealing did not become a criminal offence in the United Kingdom until 1980,2 it 
would be reasonable to expect references to such activities before this time to be 
commonplace. In fact, this was not the case, for the detection, 3 let alone the 
publication, of such incidences has been sporadic at best. Nineteen years on the 
picture is still far from clear, although media attention now seems tame compared to 
the 1980s, 4 when capitalist attitudes enmeshed with the ideals of insider dealing, 
sensationalising and bringing to the public's attention ideas of a mysterious and often 
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although Parliament in the 1970s was blatantly oblivious as to the extent of insider 
dealing. 6 The general belief was that it was frequent: 
"... it is hard to determine the extent of insider dealing. There are those 
who would argue ... that if there were much closer scrutiny it could open a 
can of worms... "7 
However, because of intensified public debate and City concern during this period the 
City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers was established. The reason for implementing 
the regulation of take-overs was justified because it had long been accepted that 
insider activities had taken place during such ventures, as the value of price sensitive 
information was at it highest. 8 The enactment of the Panel represented the first, albeit 
ineffective, 9 step of what was to become the formal regulation of the United 
Kingdom's market place. 
While it can be generally asserted that a Pandora's box exists regarding today's 





House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 1973/74, volume 867, at columns 925 (Mr Peter 
Walker), 967 (Mr Emlyn flooson), 969 (Mr David Mitchell) and 983 - 984 (Mr Nicholas 
Ridley) and Suter, J. (1989), The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, London: 
ßutterworths, at 374. 
Companies Bill, 22/10/79, at column 94 (Mr Bruce George). 
Keown, J. and Pinkerton, 1. (1981), `Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An 
Empirical Investigation', Journal of Finance, Vol. 36,857 et seq.; Rider, B. A. K. (1983), Insider 
Trading, London: Jordans, at 179 et seq.; Gupta, P. and Misra, 11. (1988), `Illegal Insider 
Trading: Is It Rampant before Corporate Takeovers', Financial Review, Vol. 23, at 454; Gupta, 
P. and Misra, 11. (1989), `Public Information and Pre- Announcement Trading in Takeover 
Stocks', Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 41, at 225 et seq.; John, G., John, P. and 
Mishra, T. (1990), 'Information Content of Insider Trading around Corporate Announcements: 
The Case of Capital 
Expenditures', Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, at 836 et seq.; Rosenbaum, L. 
and Bainbridge, P. (1988), 'The Corporate Takeover Game and Recent Legislative Attempts to 
Define Insider Trading', American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 26, at 229 et seq. and Elliot, I., 
Morse, G. and Richardson, D. (1984), 'The Association Between Insider Trading and 
Information Announcements', Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 1S, at 522 et seq.. See also 
Department of Trade and Industry, 'Government Ends Advance Notice to Monopolists Named in 
MAIC Reports', 21/12/98; Competition Act 1998 s. 69; Competition Act 1998 (Commencement 
No. 2) Order 1998 and Edgecliffe-Johnson, N. (1998), Takeover Panel Curbs Adviser Share- 
Buying', The Financial Times, 22/7/98. 
This was largely because the City Code that was adopted by the Panel was implemented through 
voluntary agreement; Rider, B. A. K. (1983), supra, note 8, at 181 et seq.. 
76 
determined as statistical evidence is thin on the ground. This problem is further 
exacerbated by the fact that surveys made into this area have tended to be conducted 
over short time periods using only small samples. Therefore how significant these 
figures are is debatable given that rumours or market speculation, which may have 
interfered with the data interpretation, may have distorted them. 10 
Yet, insider dealing is not a new phenomenon. Naylor makes note of its 
existence as far back as the seventeenth century. 11 Rider has commented on 
numerous occasions of its existence during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 12 
Indeed it was noted in the 1940s under the Cohen Committee Report on Company Law 
Amendment that insider dealing was widespread in the Stock Exchange. 13 Moreover, 
it was often seen as a `fringe benefit' for those in the City offering a bonus for what 
many perceived as mundane duties. 14 Interestingly, the type of individual who trades 
or has traded on inside information has not necessarily been directly associated with 
the markets themselves. 15 
10 Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L (1993), supra, note 4, at 25 and Rider, B. A. K. (1983), supra, note 
8, at 1. Brannon suggests that: 
"... the truth is that neither the Department of Trade, nor the Stock Exchange, nor the 
American SEC, nor the most well-versed stockbroker knows just how frequently or 
infrequently insider trades do take place... " 
; `Insider Trading- The British Regulation in the Light of the American Experience'; (1982) 
Journal of Business Law, at 344. 
II 
12 
Naylor, J. M. (I990(a)), supra, note 5, at 55. 
Rider, B. A. K. and Ffrench, H. L. (1979), The Regulation ofInsider Trading, London: 
Macmillan, at 190 et seq.; Rider, B. A. K. (1991), `Policing Insider Dealing in Britain', at 313 et 
seq. in Itopt, K. and Wymeersch, E. (eds. ) (1991), European Insider Dealing, London: 
Butterworths, and Rider, B. A. K. (1988), `Policing the City - Combating Fraud and Other 
Abuses in the Corporate Securities Industry', Current Law Review, at 63 et seq.. 




Fishman, L. J. (1993), 'A Comparison of Enforcement of Securities Law Violations in the United 
Kingdom and the United States', (1993) 14 Company Lawyer, at 169. 
Naylor, J. M. (1990(a)), supra, note 5 at 54; Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), supra, note 4, 
at 5; Robb, G. (1992), While-Collar Crime in Modern England. Financial Fraud and Business 
Morality, 1845 -1929, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at 45 et seq. and `Company 
News in Brief, The Independent, 27/2/97. 
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Until 1980 insider dealing was deemed by many as an acceptable market 
practice both here16 and in the United States. 17 The underlying reason for this lay in 
multitude of factors. These included the ambivalent attitude of those engaged in 
market affairs; lack of political will to force change because of market resentment; the 
ambiguity associated with the nature of insider dealing being perceived as a true 
`criminal' offence and uncertainty as to its prevalence and how best to penalise and 
deter it. 
The 1970s were turbulent times for the political fortunes of the Labour and 
Conservative parties with their opposing dogmas on company law reform. 18 This 
essentially had a vast impact on the shape and direction which insider dealing should 
take. While the capitalist ideals by the Conservatives were used to underpin the 
Companies Bill of 197319 this was viewed by the opposition as merely a ̀ public 
relations' exercise designed to win the forthcoming election 20 By contrast, the 
Labour party sought to implement socialist polices to reform what they perceived as 
weak areas of company law in the Companies Bill of 1978.21 
16 In the programme Naked City, BBC 2,6/11/96, a former investment banker, Linda Davies, made 
the following observations: 
"... In 1987 [1] was involved in a routine negotiation with a number merchant 
banks... the senior banker present suggested a course of action which was blatant Insider 
trading. I suggested that.... we were insiders and seventeen pairs of eyes glared at me, 
the senior banker who suggested it gave me a huge smile and said your right we can't 
do that' and a lot of people in that room ... 
disliked what I had done ... 
because I had 
broken ranks... " 
17 Rakoff, J. and Eaton, E. (1996), ̀ Now Effective is United States Enforcement in Deterring 





The 1973 Bill outlined the Conservative government's aim of facilitating free enterprise through 
the proliferation of wider share ownership; House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 1973/74, 
supra, note 5, at columns 1015 (Mr Bruce Gardyne) and 1041 (Sir Geoffrey Howe). 
It was proposed that insider dealing should be made a criminal offence because of the unfair 
advantage it gave and the despondence xpressed by some regulatory bodies in its sanctioning, 
White Paper on Company Law Reform (1973), Cmnd 5391, at paragraph 15 et seq.. 
House of'Commons Parliamentary Debates 1973/74, supra, note 5, at columns 964 (Mr Emlyn 
liooson), 985 (Mr Michael Meacher), 997 (Mr William Rodgers) and 1014 (Mr Tom Dalyell). 
Commons Parliamentary Debates 1978, volume 958, at columns 928 et seq. (The late John 
Smith). 
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Opposing ideology was not the only problem. The most effective means for 
dealing with insider dealing was also debatable. The Cohen Committee22 had 
recommended the use of disclosure requirements. 23 The Jenkins Committee24 
recommended the use of the civil law in situations where a director who used inside 
information should be liable to his company for any profit made and for damage 
suffered to the company. 25 While the Justice Report suggested that insider dealing 
should be made a criminal offence. 26 
The United States, with its establishment of the SEC, SEA and EA, did not 
encounter the same conflict as experienced in the United Kingdom. However, it too 
had to rethink its strategy towards dealing with insiders. For many years, the 
sanctions available to the SEC for insider dealing were limited to injunctions and the 
disgorgement of profits in civil court actions and, in the case of a violation by a 
registered broker or dealer, SEC administrative disciplinary hearings. While criminal 
prosecution was a theoretical possibility, the difficulties of establishing intent beyond 
a reasonable doubt in such cases were considerable, and indeed, the first criminal 
prosecution of insider dealing in violations of the securities laws was not brought until 
1978. Consequently, the amount of insider dealing until this period continued 
relentlessly. It was not until the sheer magnitude of such trading scandals was realised 
that specific legislation was enacted to increase the sanctions for both I Ob-5 and 14e-3 
violations, imposed affirmative oversight obligations on the securities industry, 
expanded the derivative liability of employers, and broadened the SEC's powers of 
enforcement. 
1) 2 1) Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, (1945) Cmnd 6659. 




Report of the Company Law Committee, (1962) Cmnd 1749. 
Op. cit.., at paragraph 90 at seq. and White, K. (1974), 'Towards a Policy Basis for the 
Regulation of Insider Dealing', Law Quarterly Reports, Vol. 90, at 502. 
Justice Report, Insider Trading, (1972), at paragraph 35 and Kay, M. (1973), ̀ The Justice 
Report on Insider Trading', Modern Law Review, Vol. 36, at 190. 
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3.2. Comparative Legislative Approaches to Insider Dealing 
3.2.1. The United States' Approach to Insider Dealing 
Insider dealing regulation in the United States is primarily based upon statute law, 27 
this being achieved mainly through the provisions contained in the SEA. However, 
apart from prohibiting insiders from profiting by short swing dealings, the SEA neither 
originally prohibited nor defined insider dealing. 28 Nevertheless, insider dealing is 
generally identified as one of the many abuses that the SEA is designed to regulate. 29 
The primary mechanism for insider dealing regulation in the United States can 
be found in section lOb SEA, through which rule l Ob-5 was promulgated by the SEC 
in 1942.30 These general anti-fraud provisions were principally designed to prohibit 
manipulative or deceptive practices, yet because of the general wording embodied in 
both section l Ob-5 and rule l Ob-5, the task of defining the parameters of each has 
largely been left to judicial innovation. 3 ' Thus, both parts have indirectly become the 






Although common law actions were evident before the implementation of the SEA; Loss, L. 
(1995), Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Boston: Little, Brown and Co, at 768-771 and 
Bauman, U. (1984), `Comment: Insider Trading at Common Law', University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 51, at 838 et seq.. 
Section 16 SEA was the first attempt by the United States to regulate insider dealing; Painter, N. 
(1967), ̀ Insider Trading and the Banker Director', Banker's Magazine, Vol. 150, at 31 c't seq. 
and Agrawal, K. and Jaffe, J. (1995), ̀ Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target 
Managers? ', Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 39, at 295 et seq.. 
Bainbridge, P. (1986), ̀ The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigrna', 
University of Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, at 36 et seq.. Also see Ward La France Truck Corp. 
[ 1943] 13 SEC 373; Kardon v. National Cl psum Co. [ 1947] 73 F. Supp. 798; Speed v. 
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U. S. 375. 




much of the jurisprudence relating to insider dealing in this country, has been 
fashioned by the courts rather than the legislature. 32 
While the United Kingdom has not had any difficulty in defining insider 
dealing, due to the enactment of specific statutory measures, the United States has had 
problems in determining when insider dealing has occurred. Indeed, although the SEC 
has requested on numerous occasions that such a definition be formulated, Congress 
has always refused, on the grounds that it prevents the courts from using flexibility33 
in determining whether insider dealing has occurred or not. 34 Consequently, the SEC 
and judicial interpretation have produced working definitions of what amounts to 
insider dealing. 35 The courts, particularly in the 1980's, relied upon possession, 
fiduciary duty or abstention disclosure and misappropriation theories set in landmark 
cases to determine civil liability. 
Early cases of insider dealing can be seen to have utilised the possession theory 
to determine insider liability. In such circumstances an insider's liability would be 
determined by the fact that he was in possession of material, non-public information 
and failed to either disclose it to other parties or abstain from dealing altogether. This 





Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), supra, note 1, at 29. 
Although Congress did recognise in 1984 that: 
"... the last few years have seen a dramatic increase in insider trading cases... " 
Consequently, Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 1984 which added this power 
to section 21(d)(2) SEA; H. R. Rep. No. 100-910,100th Cong., 2d Sess 11 (1988). See also 
Bainbridge, P. (1985), ̀ Note: A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984', Virginia 
Law Review, Vol. 71, at 455 et seq.. 
McVea, H. (1988), `A Compromise Proposal for the Regulation of Insider Trading', Business 
Law Review, at 239 and Loss, L. (1995), supra, note 27, at 13 - 14,27, and 31 - 33 cf. Report of 
the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading. Part I: Regulation under the Antifraud 
Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, (1985) 41 Business Lawyer, at 223 et seq. and 
253 et seq.. 
Naylor, J. M. (1990(a)), supra, note 5, at 83. 
36 [ 1961 ] 40 SEC 907. 
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subsequently approved in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur. 37 The former case was 
concerned with a broker who had received inside information about a company's 
dividend from a fellow employee who was also a director of that company and used it. 
In the latter case officers and employees of a company made substantial purchases of 
that company's stock after learning that exploratory drilling on one of the company's 
properties showed promise of an extraordinary ore discovery. It can be derived from 
these cases that fairness or parity of information among market participants appeared 
to be the principle underlying the adoption of this theory. 
Because the possession theory provided only a limited basis for defining insider 
dealing, later cases by the Supreme Court sought to redefine insider liability in more 
capacious ways, expanding liability to those not directly connected with inside 
information. Such an evolutionary step also marked a change of attitude for the 
Supreme Court as it had been up until this point wary to expanding the construction of 
securities laws, an antipathy born out of reaction to abusive lawsuits brought under 
rule lOb-5 by private litigants. Thus, in Chiarella v. United Stales38 the Supreme 
Court rejected the possession theory and suggested that the duty to disclose or abstain 
existed only if it could be shown that: 
"... a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to the 
transaction... " 
existed. Chiarella concerned a financial printer's employee who purchased stock of a 
company that was about to become the target of a hostile take-over by a company that 
was using the financial printer to prepare the secret tender offer documents. It was 
argued that even though the defendant was essentially an outsider this did not affect 
37 
38 
[1968] 401 F. 2d 833 (2d. Cir. ) cert. denied [1969] 394 U. S. 976. Also see Investors 
Management Co. [1971] 44 SEC 633; U. S. v. Teicher, [1993] 987 F. 2d 112 (2d. Cir. ) and John, 
G. John, P. and Lang, P. ̀ Insider Trading around Dividend Announcements: Theory and 
Evidence', (1991) 46 Journal of Finance, at 1361 et seq.. 
[ 1980] 445 U. S. 222. See also Jarrell, K. and Poulsen, D. (1989), 'Stuck Trading Before the 
Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation? ', Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, Vol. 5, at 226 et seq.. 
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the nature or basis of his liability as an insider. 39 In Dirks v. SEC40 a case involving a 
tippee, the scope of liability was drawn in even narrower terms. This case revolved 
around an investment analyst, who having been informed by a company 
`whistleblower' that the company was engaged in fraudulent accounting practices, 
advised his investment clients to dispose of the company stock. The Supreme Court 
decided that a tippee automatically inherited the tipper's duty for the reason that the 
adoption of this proposition would advance the market egalitarianism theory. "The 
Court made the tippee's duty dependent on whether the tipper himself breached his 
duty to the company. Therefore, under this theory ascertaining an insider's liability 
depended upon the purpose for which the information was passed on, and whether or 
not he benefited directly or indirectly from such a disclosure. 
A principal shortcoming of the fiduciary theory is that it might enable persons 
lacking any special relationship to profit from the use of inside information. 
Nevertheless, the SEC has since pursued these individuals by relying on the 
misappropriation theory of rule lOb-5 liability, which up until recently solved a 




Barry, N. (1981), ̀ The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-S', University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 129, at 1308 et seq.. 
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The misappropriation theory, as'stated by Burger C. J. 41 in Chiarella, applies in 
making an individual liable for insider dealing if he steals or misappropriates inside 
information from anyone to whom he owes a fiduciary duty also thereby commits a 
fraud by not disclosing the theft. The establishment of the fiduciary-type relationship 
requires a relationship of trust and confidence between the defendant and the source of 
the information. 42 If he thereafter trades in securities on the basis of this inside 
information, he is guilty of a securities fraud, even if the `victim' of the trading is not 
the victim of the theft of information, since all that is required of section 10(b) is that 
the fraud is `in connection with' the purchase or sale of the security. It can be 
observed that this theory is more flexible than the abstention or disclosure one as it 
provides a slightly broader tippee liability in circumstances where an insider fails to 
breach a fiduciary duty. 
While the misappropriation theory has, up until recently, received support from 
many of the Federal court of appeals for the Second, Third, Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, 43 the Supreme Court has doubted its validity. 44 This position was originally 
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[1985]; United States v. Newnan, 664m F. 2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), affirmed after remand, 722 F . 2d 729 (2d Cir. ), cert. Denied, 464 US 863 [1983]; SEC v. A9usella, 578 F. Supp. 425 [SDNY 
1984]. 
United States v. Carpenter, 484 US 19 [1987]. 
45 58F3d933. 
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However, it can now be regarded as suspect given the Supreme Court ruling in 
O'Hagan. 47 Its ruling effectively reverses the previous appeal courts verdict 
upholding the misappropriation theory as complementary to the fiduciary theory in 
forming the basis for convictions under Rule I Ob-5. In addition, liability for insider 
dealing under Rule 14e-3, which deals with take-overs, was also seen as a legitimate 
use of the SEC's Rule making power under section 14(e). This essentially restores 
and clarifies what laws can be used to impose liability for insider trading 48 
47 
48 
Trading', National Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 25, at 85 et seq.; Zirin, E. (1996), `When is 
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3.2.2. The United Kingdom's Approach to Insider Dealing and the Effects of 
Europe 
The law on insider dealing in the United Kingdom has now been remodelled by Part V 
of the Criminal Justice Act 199349 (the `CJA' ). The provisions in the CJA repealed 
those previously contained in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (the 
1CSA')50 and ensures that the United Kingdom complies with its obligations under 
European Community Law and, in particular, the 1989 EC Insider Dealing Directive 
(EEC 891592). 51 
The Directive was adopted on 13`h November 1989 by the Council of Ministers 
of the European Community for the purpose of co-ordinating regulations on insider 
dealing. The object of the Directive was to provide a minimum standard for the 
development of insider dealing laws throughout the Community. 52 While identical 
laws were not required to be re-enacted by each Member State each was required to 
take adequate steps to comply with the Directive. 
The underlying purpose of the Directive, which had been originally set out in the 
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approaches adopted by Member States to provide a semi-unified approach in dealing 
with insider activities. Thus one of the key notions of the Directive related to the 
notion that improvements in the co-ordination of market standards and efficiency of 
corporate disclosure had to be ensured; 55 ideas that had been previously re-iterated. 
However, due to the complex nature of the problem of devising an all composing 
strategy against insider activities and the repercussions that substantive regulation 
might have throughout the field of corporate law implementation of the Directive was 
slow. Consequently, the implemented Directive bore little resemblance to the original 
one proposed. Therefore, restrictions relating to how insiders should be defined, what 
amounted to confidential information and how insider dealing should be enforced had 
to be clearly put in place before the Directive was implemented. 
The Directive has had a vast impact on the moulding of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993. For example, although other more flexible definitions exist as to what 
constitutes inside information, the United Kingdom has sought to closely follow that 
given in the Directive. 56 Likewise, it has followed a similar route when defining 
primary57 and secondary insiders, 58 the range of activities that constitute insider 
dealing59 and the range of securities affected by insider dealing. 60 Moreover, the 
United Kingdom has also sought to follow what defences a potential insider may have 
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Companies, European Communities Bulletin, Supplement 4/75 and also Employee Participation 
and Company Structures, European Communities Bulletin, Supplement 8/75. 
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for many other member states, as they have not until fairly recently, compared to the 
United States, taken action against such activities. France was the first with a 
Ordinance in 196762 - Germany only had a self-regulatory system of control over 
insider dealing; this being introduced in 1970 - and Britain introduced legislation in 
1980. Likewise the Netherlands only criminalized insider dealing in 1989 tinder 
section 266a of the Penal Code on 16/2/89.63 However, despite the publicity 
surrounding the new legislation, it took Dutch authorities five years to launch their 
first prosecution in March 1994.64 
Of all the European jurisdictions the one with the closest links to the United 
Kingdom is the Republic of Ireland, whose principal companies have traditionally 
sought listing on the London Stock Exchange and have submitted to its regulatory 
requirements. However, the Irish Parliament passed the Central Banks Act 1989 and 
the Companies Act 1990, which have increased the self-regulatory capacity of Irish 
markets under delegated central bank supervision. Under part V of the 1990 Act, 
section 111, insider dealing gives rise to criminal liability, with maximum penalties 
under summary conviction of 12 months imprisonment and a fine of Irish £1,000; 
conviction on indictment can lead to 10 years imprisonment and a fine of Irish 
£200,000. More importantly though is the fact that Ireland has had the determination 
those in the United Kingdom do not and implemented civil liability for insider dealing 
under section 109 of the 1990 Act. However, despite the seeming flexibility of this 
enforcement regime there have not yet been any successful prosecutions for insider 
dealing in Ireland. 
Italy has also signalled a recent change in enforcement attitude against insider 
dealing by passing on 7/5/91 Law 157 of the Insider Dealing Act which makes ̀... 
62 Although this has recently been redefined. See McQuillan, S. (1996), ̀ Council Directive 93/22 
on Investment Services in the Securities Field Law 96 - 597 of 2 Jul), 1996 on investment 
Services', International Company and Commercial Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 11, at 214 et seq.. 
63 Van den Bergh, E. (1997), ̀ The Netherlands', International Financial Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 
7, at 96 et seq.. 
64 Oerlemans, H. (1996), ̀ Case Comment on Re Van Den Nieuwenhuyzen and Effects of Criminal Code Art. 336a', International Banking and Financial Law, Vol. 14, No. 10, at 115 et seq.. 
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equality of information for investors the objective. ' Previously there had not been any 
specific provisions against insider dealing but prosecutors had made a handful of 
unsuccessful prosecutions against insider sunder the general rule of Article 501 of the 
Criminal Code, which proscribed spreading false information regarding merchandise' 
including listed securities. Maximum penalties under the 1991 Act are fines up to 
900,000,000 Italian lira and two years imprisonment. CONSOB, the country's 
companies and stock market watchdog, is the authority designed by Parliament to 
regulate against insider dealing but it has experienced difficulties in changing 
traditional Italian antipathy towards strict regulatory observance. Although insider 
dealing is acknowledged as widespread in Italy the first prosecution did not occur until 
March 1994. However, slow progress and corruption is entrenched in commerce and 
public life. Like recent judicial moves against the Mafia in Sicily and public 
corruption in Milan and Rome the 1991 Act should be seen as a positive development 
on a difficult law enforcement programme. 
As aforementioned Germany did not implement an insider dealing programme 
until 1970. The underlying reason for this was during the 1960's there were several 
insider dealing scandals that led to the introduction of voluntary guidelines in 1971. 
However, these guidelines proved `very ineffective' and there has been strong 
international criticism, especially from the United States concerning `... the lax 
reputation of German Stock Exchanges. ' These were brought to a head by the well- 
publicised Steikuhlur scandal, which highlighted the deficiencies of the Voluntary 
Insider Dealing Guidelines. It also strengthened the arguments for the Securities 
Trading Act 1994 (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), which came into effect on 1/8/94.65 
Under its provisions convicted insider dealers face maximum penalties of up to five 
years imprisonment and large fines. 66 The Act places no upper limits on fines, but it 
does not provide for civil remedies and only individuals, not legal persons, can be 
65 Mahlich, F. (1997), ̀ Tackling Insider Trading in Germany', International Commercial 
Litigation, November, at 26 et seq. and Mennicke, H. (1997), ̀ Insider Regulation in Germany: 
Inside Information, Insider Status and Enforcement', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, 
No. 3, at 81 et seq.. 
66 So Far only fines have been levied, the largest being DMIm; Fisher, E. (1997), ̀ Insider Dealing 
Probe at Germanys SAP', The Financial Times, 6/5/97. 
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held liable for insider trading. The urgent need for the legislation has been 
highlighted by recent revelations alleging a ̀ stock exchange mafia' operating insider 
dealing rings on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Two dozen brokers are currently 
under investigation and co-operating with regulatory and tax authorities far having 
allegedly conspired in `front-running', but under current regulations the most severe 
sanction they face is cancellation of a broker's trading licence. 
Former Eastern-bloc countries are also taking steps against insider dealing in 
their fledging financial markets. 67 In February 1994 Hungary instituted strict 
penalties against insider dealing up to a maximum of three years imprisonment and 
the state securities supervisor has pledged to increase its investigative efforts. Russia 
is potentially the most important market in Eastern Europe. However, despite having 
privatised over half of its industry in the last two years its financial sector is in 
disarray. This disarray was dramatically illustrated by the collapse of the `pyramid 
selling' investment group MMM. Russia has the largest number of stock exchanges 
of any nation but it has the smallest number of shares traded on them. The MMM 
scandal has forced the Russian Government to address the problem of securities 
regulation, but there are no specific proposals for insider dealing regulation and it may 
take several years to produce a stable system of financial services regulation in Russia. 
It can be seen that different European jurisdictions have taken varying 
approaches to tackling insider dealing. 68 United Kingdom and Irish law try to 
67 
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Securities Law', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No's. 11 and 12, at 296 et seq.; 
Valentin, C. (1995), `Denmark: Supreme Courts First Insider Trading Judgment', European 
Financial Services Law, Vol. 2, No. 9, at 262 et seq.; Bieger, 1. and De Rojas, F. (1997), 
`Council Directive 89/592 Co - ordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing Law 9/1991 of 22 
March 1991 Amending the Securities Markets Law', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, 
No's. 7 and 8, at 204 et seq.; Avgouleas, V. (1997), `The Implementation of the Insider Dealing 
Directive in Greece', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No. 4, at 131 et seq. Dalian, K. 
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enumerate several offences while many European countries opt for a single offence 
whose elements are detailed in a single paragraph. France, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Denmark are examples of the latter style. The European Community has sought to co- 
ordinate regulations and enforcement on insider dealing in different Member States 
through the Directive that combines English and French law. 
The Directive is based on Article 100A of the Treaty of Rome, which is 
concerned with `.., the appropriation of laws. ' The Preamble to the Directive states 
its objectives as ̀ ... fairness and confidence in the market', and shifts the basis of the 
insider dealing `wrong' from `abuse of confidence' to `inequality of information'. Its 
definitions are sufficiently broad to accommodate the divergences of Member States' 
laws and it lays the foundation for future co-operation in other fields of securities 
frauds. I 
However, European Union Directives can only represent a standard and levels 
of implementation may vary between Member States. Also, remedies are a matter of 
national law so there is an innate sense of abstention in the Directive. The case for 
legal persons being insiders and for civil liability, were put in debate in the European 
Parliament but they do not form part of the Directive and most Member States rely 
heavily on the Criminal law. However, there are potentially serious problems within 
the European Union regarding the Directive as the single market becomes more 
established and the regulatory differences between Member States more pronounced. 
These are issues for the future but to date it is clear, even allowing for the efforts of 
the European Union, no European jurisdiction has been as proactive against insider 
dealing as the United States. 
(1997), `The Impact of the 1989 EU Directive on Insider Dealing in France: Latest 
Developments', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No's. 7 and 8, at 194 et seq. and 
Serio, F. (1997), `Insider Dealing in Italy', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No's. 7 
and 8, at 201 et seq.. 
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3.2.3. The Criminal Justice Act 1993 - Operation and Limitations 
The effect of Part V of the CJA is to widen the potential scope of this type of offence, 
criminalizing those who either deal, 69 encourage70 or disclose7l inside information, 
while at the same time clarifying a number of disputed points that existed under the 
old law. One of the most important aspects of the CJA was that it relinquished the 
need for the alleged insider to be `knowingly connected with the company', which was 
a prerequisite for conviction under the CSA. Unfortunately, this was often 
successfully used by defence counsel to undermine a prosecution. The CJA also 
covers a wider range of securities, markets and persons who may be enmeshed in 
criminal liability. 72 These and other changes can be summarised as follows: 
(a) the extension of `inside information'73 to information that is price- 












Section 56. It has argued that the reliance on inside information casts a very wide net which 
could result in analysts who have detailed knowledge of a firm being ensnared under the CJA; 
Alcock, A. (1994), 'Insider Dealing - How Did We Get Here? ', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 
3, at 70 et seq.. and Graham, G. (1998), 'Private Analyst Briefing may be Banned', The 
Financial Times, 29/6/98 cf House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee 'l3', 
10/6/93, at columns 197 et seq..; Ham, H. (1995), 'City has the Last Word on Insider Dealing', 
The Sunday Times, 18/6/95; Jennings, P. and Smith, B. (1976), 'Insider Trading and the 
Analyst', Institutional Securities Regulation, Vol. 5, at 261 et seq. and Goldberg, T. (1998), 
'Dealing from Within', Company Secretary's Review, Vol. 22, No. 9, at 65 et seq.. 
Section 56(2). 
Inside information therefore ceases to be so as soon as it is made public; see generally section 
58. However, it has been suggested that such wording used in the CJA is advantageous to 
insiders as the information may not have been fully absorbed by investors and therefore insiders 
will have a `head start'; White, M. (1995), `Insider Dealing and the Criminal Justice Act /993' 
in Rider, B. A. K. and Ashe, T. M. (eds. ) (1995), supra, note 3, at 62. 
76 Schedule 2. 
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(b) the extension of the scope of the definition of `securities' to include 
new instruments; 77 
(c) the extension of the scope of `regulated markets', subject to the 
legislation; 
(d) the extension of the scope of the territorial scope of the 
legislation; 78 
(e) the extension of liability to include off-market dealings relying on a 
professional intermediary; 79 and 
(f) the re-defining of defences80 
These issues will now be dealt will in more detail. 
77 In order to be caught, the securities must satisfy conditions laid down in the Insider Dealing 




Section 62 CJA states that there must be some connection with the United Kingdom in order for 
dealings to be caught. New powers under the CJA have come into force since June 1,1999 
making it possible for some offences to be prosecuted where an act or omission contributing to 
the commission of an offence takes place in England and Wales. 
Section 59(1). 
Section 53 and Schedule 1. 
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3.2.3.1. Inside information 
In order for an individual to be classed as an insider they must use information that is 
none public, is in their possession and is price-sensitive. Inside information, 
therefore, must be information that relates to particular securities or issues of 
securities81 that are issued to an individual, public body or company. 82 In addition, 
the information must also be specific or precise83 and not mere rumour. 84 It must 
also not have been made public85 but if it were to be made public it must be shown to 
have a significant effect on the price or value86 of those securities being traded 
upon. 87 The requirement that information used is inside information is the central 










Sections 60(3)(a) and (b) and section 60(4). 
Section 56(1)(b) and House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee ̀B', 10/6/93, at 
column 175. 
House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee ̀B', 10/6/93, at column 173. 
Sections 56(l)(c) and 58. 
Section 56(3). 
Section 56(1)(d) and House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee 'B', 10/6/93, at 
column 178. 
House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee 'B' (1993), op. cit., at column 172. 
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3.2.3.2. Types of Securities 
Whereas the CSA covered only corporate securities and related derivatives the CJA 
covers a large number of previously unlisted securities, 89 which if need be can be 
amended. 90 These include all shares, 91 debt securities92 including gilts and local 
authority stocks. Moreover, many other forms of derivatives are covered for the first 
time, including warrants, 93 depository receipts, 94 options, 95 futures96 and contracts 
for differences97 linked to shares or debt securities. 98 
The issue of whether insider dealing actually occurs when `contracts for 
differences' are involved has recently been intensively scrutinised, given Trafalgar 
House's £1.2 billion bid for Northern Electric. 99 Trafalgar effectively bet that 
Northern's share price would rise by striking a series of `contracts for differences' 
with its investment banker, Swiss Bank Corporation. These derivative contracts 





Sections 54(2), 64(1)-(3) and the Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order, 
S. I. No. 187/1994. 
Schedule 2. paragraph 1. 
92 Schedule 2, paragraph. 2. 
93 Schedule 2, paragraph 3. 






Schedule 2, paragraph 5. 
Schedule 2, paragraph 6(1). 
Schedule 2, paragraph 7(l). In addition, see City Index v. Leslie [1992] 1 Q. B. 98 (C. A. ) and 
Mercer. K. and Shilling, T. (1995), `Pre-Offer Moves: Contracts for Differences', Corporate 
Briefing, Vol. 9, No. 6, at 2 et seq.. 
Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order, S. I. No. 187/1994, at article 8(a) 
and (b). 
Milner, M. (1995), ̀ Regulators to Look into £1.2 Billion Northern Electricity Take-over Bid', 
The Guardian, 13/1/95 and Beavis, S. (1995), ̀Labour Queries Hostile Trafalgar Bid', The 
Guardian, 12/1/95. 
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by buying the actual shares. Under schedule 2 of the CJA entering into `contracts for 
differences' is treated in the same manner as buying underlying shares. But 
companies about to make a bid are not caught by the insider dealing rules if they deal 
in securities `with a view to facilitating the accomplishment of the acquisition. ' This 
clause was introduced into the original insider dealing regulations in 1980 to allow the 
normal practice of bidders buying small stakes in their target ahead of an offer. 
Although the debate whether Trafalgar House did actually commit insider dealing has 
been settled in their favour100 there are many in the City who have contrary beliefs. 101 
Interestingly, the Trafalgar House incident not only highlights the ambiguous nature of 
insider dealing laws when applied to secondary share trading102 but also the 
difficulties and political pressures faced by the multitude of regulators investigating 
such matters-103 It also illustrates the ineffectiveness of the general retroactive 






Beavis, S. and Whitebloom, S. (1995), `Swiss Bank Cleared of Rule Breach', The Guardian, 
19/1/95. The Swiss Bank Corporation were eventually fined by the SFA for failure to properly 
implement or control Chinese walls procedures in relation to take-over bids; Hunt, T. (1998) 
`Insider Trading', Amicus Curiae, Vol. 5, at 20 et seq.. See also Bolkiah v. KPAIG [ 199911 
WLR. 215 and `The Hen who Walk Through Walls', (1999) Compliance Monitor, Vol. 11, No. 
9, at 145 et seg.. 
Wighton, E. (1995), ̀ Insider 'Loophole' in Trafalgar Bid, The Financial Times, 11/1/95. 
Owen, E. (1996), 'Insider Dealing and Charges Over Securities', International Business and 
Financial Law, Vol. 15, No. 2, at 15 et seq.; Gapper, J. (1997), 'Banks Warned Over Secondary 
Trading of Loans', The Financial Times, 22/1/97; Peaton, T. and Wighton, E. (1995), 'SBC 
May have Breached Insider Dealing Rules ", The Financial Times, 13/2/95 and 
'Gobbledygook, Chinese Walls and the SIB', The Independent, 14/6/96. For comparative 
analysis on how insider dealing legislation (fails to) deals with derivatives see Malan, P. (1996), 
'South Africa: Regulation on Insider Trading in Derivatives in South Africa', Futures and 
Derivatives Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 19 et seq.. 
Goodway, N. (1995), 'DT1 Urged to Rule Soon on Swiss Bank', The Observer, 22/1/95; Poston, 
R. and Wighton, E. (1995) 'DT1 Scans Swiss Bank Derivatives Dealings', The Financial Times, 
20/1/95 and Wighton, E. and Cohen, N. (1995), 'SIB Warns on Special Derivatives', The 
Financial Times, 14/2/95. 
Wighton, E. (1995), 'SE Might Change Rules Following Trafalgar Bid', The Financial Times, 
14/1/95; Miller, R. (1996), ̀ SIB Acts to Close Takeover Loopholes', The Times, 14/6/96 and 
Graham, G. (1996) 'City Watchdogs Curb Use of Derivatives in Takeover Bids', The Financial 
Times, 14/6/96. 
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3.2.3.3. Regulated Markets 
In order to be caught, the securities must satisfy conditions laid down in the Insider 
Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Orders. 105 This states that a security' ' 
must be officially listed in a state within the European Economic Area or admitted to 
dealing on, or have its price quoted on or under the rules of, a regulated market. ] 06 In 
the case of derivatives, the underlying shares or debt securities to which they relate 
must be dealt on a regulated market instead. 107 
105 
106 
Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order, S. I. No. 187/1994 and Insider 
Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) (Amendment) Order. S. I. No. 1561/1996. 
Section 60(1); Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order, S. I. No. 187/1994, at 
articles 2 and 4. House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee ' B', 10/6/93, at 
column 166. 
107 Insider Deuling (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order, S. 1. No. 187/1994, at articles'5 - 8. 
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3.2.3.4. Territorial Scope 
The 1994 Order identifies which markets are `regulated in the United Kingdom' for 
the purposes of the territorial scope of the offence. These are markets established 
under the rules of the London Stock Exchange, LIFFE and OMLX. 108 There must be 
some connection with the United Kingdom to be caught109 - either they take place on 
such a market, 110 or the individuals s1 or professional intermediary112 is in the United 
Kingdom at the time. 
3.2.3.5. Off-market Trading and Professional Intermediaries 
Any deal that takes place off-market may well be caught under the CJA if the person 
dealing relies on a professional intermediary, or is himself acting as one. 113 Under 
the CJA a professional intermediary is defined as any person who carries on a business 
or is employed in a business114 consisting of a particular activity and who holds 
himself out to the public or to any section of the public 115 as being willing to engage 
in any such business. 116 The activities in question are the disposing and acquiring of 
108 Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order, S. 1. No. 187/1994, at art. 10 and 
Schedule as amended by Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) (Amendment) 
Order, S. I. No. 1561/1996, at articles 3-4. 









House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee'B', 10/6/93, at column 192 et seq.. 
Section 59(1)(b). 
115 Section 59 and House of Commons Ofcia! Report of Standing Committee ̀ß', 10/6/93, at 
column 192. 
116 Section 59(I)(a). 
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securities, 117 either through acting as principal or as an agent, or acting as an 
intermediary between persons taking part in any dealing in securities. 118 
1 17 Section 54 and Schedule 2. 
118 Section 59(2)(a) and (b). 
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3.2.3.6. , Scope of Defences . 
Under the CJA there are two broad types of defence- those that relate to behaviour that 
may be construed as insider trading and those that through market conditions may be 
classed as a insiders. 
Under section 53 four defences are available to a defendant, each of which 
relates to the defendant's mentality when trading. Therefore, if the defendant can 
show that at the trading he had no expectation of profit or avoidance of loss, 119 
believed that the information which he had relied upon was had already been freely 
distributed, 120 was doing what he would have done anyway121 or did not believe any 
one would deal in the securities because of the disclosure of the inside information, 122 
he will not have committed an offence under the CJA. 
Other defences are available under Schedule I the CJA although these relate 
specifically to market conditions as opposed to potential insider dealing. Under the 
Schedule, market-makers123 are granted special consideration given that by virtue of 
their position they may come into contact with inside information. 124 A market- 




Section 53 (6). This defence applies equally to the offences of dealing; section 53(1)(a), 
encouraging; section 53(2)(a) and disclosing; section 53(2)(b). 
Sections 53(1)(b) and 53(2)(b). This defence only applies to the offences of dealing and 
encouraging. 
Sections 53(l)(c) and 53(2)(c). Again these defences only apply to the offences of dealing and 
encouraging. Also see House of Commons Official Report of Standing Committee 'B', 10/6/93, 
at column 159. 
122 Section 53(3)(a). 
123 Schedule I paragraph I (2)(a) and (b). 
124 Although how they come into possession of such information is immaterial; per the Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury, Mr A. Nelson, Standing Committee 'B', 15/6/93, at col. 216. This 
position dramatically contrasts with that taken under the CSA which required market-makers to 
obtained information by virtue of their position. This created a dilemma for the market-maker in 
that if he obtained inside information other than in the course of business and dealt on it he could 
attract criminal liability under the CSA, alternatively if he withdrew from dealing then this could 
draw notice to his movements; Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), supra, note 1, at 112. 
100 
with the rules of a regulated market125 or approved organisation126 when disposing 
or 
acquiring of securities of which he had inside price-sensitive knowledge. Hence, a 
market-maker will not be held liable of insider dealing through dealing insecurities or, 
encouraging another to deal if he can show that he acted in all honesty and good 
faith127 in the course of his business as a market-maker or his employment in the 
business of the market-maker. 
)I 
125 Schedule I paragraph 1(2). 'Regu/aced markets' are markets designated by Treasury Order; 
section 60(I) and the insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) (Amendment) Order. 
S. I. No. 1561/1996. 
126 Schedule I paragraph 25ß FSA'86. 
127 What will be determined by the courts as'goodfaith' will be assessed on the facts and 
surrounding circumstances. 
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3.3. The Appropriateness of Using the Criminal Law in Insider Dealing 
Cases 
The sole use of the criminal law to prosecute insider dealing has been long advocated 
as the central reason for the ineffectiveness of the CJA. The rigid adherence to 
criminalizing insider dealing is a reflection of the former Governments staunch belief 
that it not only protected investors, facilitating market integrity128 but also projected 
the notion of deterrence. 129 Yet, with its high burden of proof130 intertwined with the 
need to show a causative nexus between the use of inside information and the damage 
caused, 131 which given that most securities transactions are `faceless' or 
6victimless', 132 further emphasises its unsuitability. 133 In the seventeen years since its 
implementation the criminal law on a purely cost/bcnefit basis has sustained a very 
poor performance record, 134 with the vast proportion of those pursued under it either 
being acquitted or given lenient sentences or fines. 135 Indeed, given that a large 




Ashe, T. M. and Counsell, L. (1993), supra, note 1, at 131. 
Mcßarnet, 11. and Whelan, 1. (1991), ̀ The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the 
Struggle for Legal Control', Modern Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 6, at 848 et seq.. 
Alcock, A. (1994), ̀ Insider Dealing - How Did We Get here? ', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 
3, at 67. 




Ante, chapter two, section three and Miller, R. (1996), 'Insider Dealing Under Notice', The 
Times, 9/9/96 and Bourne, J. (1989), 'Insider Dealing', Business Law Review, at 230 cat seq.. 
See generally, Rider, B. A. K. (1985), ̀  Combating International Commercial Crime', Lloyd's 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Vol. 2, at 217; Rider, B. A. K. (1988), `Policing the 
City - Combating Fraud and Other Abuses in the 
Corporate Securities Industry', Current Legal 
Problems, at 66; Rider, B. A. K. (1997), `Does Insider Dealing Deserve the Regulatory Attention 
it Receives? ', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No. 3, at 74 and Dine, J. (1997), 
`Insider Trading: The Why? And How? ', (1997) 4(3) European Financial Services Law, at 75 et 
seq.. 
134 Ante, chapter one, section three. 
135 See generally Geis, G. and Meier, R. F. (eds. ) (1977), White Collar Crime: Offences in Britain. 
Politics and the Professions - Classic and Contemporary Views, New York: The Free Press and 
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to diffuse their activities through a myriad of trading transactions the chances of being 
detected, let alone prosecuted, are highly unlikely. 136 Consequently, given this and 
the fact that it is often utilised as a political scapegoat displacing accountable 
blameworthiness to other agencies or departments, 137 it is not surprising to find that 
many of those involved in prosecution of such activities believe that it should only be 
treated as a regulatory offence. 138 
Yet, the failings of the criminal law cannot be solely attributed to its total ±,, 
unsuitability. Factors such as inadequate resources; attitude differences between , 
prosecution and regulatory agencies involved; political pressures; lack of co-operation, 
and evidential difficulties procured by the working parameters imposed by the CJA 
have all contributed to the failure of the criminal law. 139 The culmination of 
problems associated with this type of punishment explains why support for alternative 
forms of sanctioning in this area has grown. 140 
Before the enactment of the FSA'86 the only means from which civil redress for 
insider dealing could be had was through reliance on general common law principles. 
Braithwaite, J. and Geis, G. (1982), 'On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control', 






'Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating Criminal Behaviour Through 
Criminal Sanctions', (1979) 1 larvard Law Review, Vol. 92, at 1365 et seq.; Ashworth, A. and 
Miller, R. (1996), 'Stock Exchange Sleuths on the Trail of Big Insider Dealing Rings', The 
Times, 9/9/96 and Farrelly, J. (1997), 'Insider Probe Looks at Alpha Deals', The Independent, 
16/2/97. 
Lcvi, M. (1987), Regulating Fraud: White Collar Crime and the Criminal Process, London: 
Tavistock. at 48 et seq.. 
Long, J. (1994), 'Policing the Markets', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 3, at 83. 
The same problems in developing legislation that effectively tackles insider dealing head on 
seem to be repeated upon every new statutory enactment: 
"... [the] offence of insider trading displays all the worst features of British Legislation in 
this sphere: very great complexity and specifically linked with numerous defences and 
loopholes, through which all but the most careless might expect to escape... " 
Bennett, P. (1994), What's Wrong with Insider Dealing? ', International Company and 
Commercial Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 9, at 299 etseq.; Clarke, M. (1990), Business Crime: Its 
Nature and Control, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, at 16 et seq. and Ashe, T. M. 
(1990), I3utterworths Journal of International Banking and Fiscal Law, Vol. 5, No. 7, at 291 et 
Seq. 
103 
These principles remain important because of the narrowness of section 61 and 
section 62 of the FSA'86 that, in theory, provides a statutory remedy in case of an 
infringement of the Authority's rulebook. 141 Since the Authority's rulebook applies 
only to a limited range of circumstances - confined to the regulation of financial 
intermediaries in the financial sector - the common law must still be looked at in 
order to gain the broader perspective of the law as it currently stands. In this respect 
the common law position in regard to face-to-face transactions must necessarily be 
considered first before going on to consider the position in relation to impersonal 
stock market transactions. 
There are two main grounds at common law that may attract civil liability for 
anyone indulging in insider dealing. These relate to a breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of confidence. Although various remedies for breach of fiduciary duties do 
exist, many uncertainties and difficulties lie in the path of a successful shareholder 
action, making it unlikely that this route will ever be used. 142 In the case of a 
shareholder that wishes to sue a director who has inside information in breach of his 
fiduciary duties for example, Percival v. WVright143 operates as a major obstacle. In 





Financial Services Authority's Conduct of Business Core Rule 28 Financial Services 
(Dedesignation) Rules and Regulations 1994. Since the Authority has come in being there have 
been calls for new powers to combat insider dealing although its seems destined that these will 
largely materialise in the future; Graham, G. (1998), 'FSA to Get More Power to Tackle Insider 
Dealing', The Financial Times, 7/5/98; Peston, R. and Eaglesham, T. (1998), 'FSA Faces Two 
Year Wait for Full Regulatory Powers', The Financial Times, 1/6/98 and Miles, If. (1998), 'FSA 
to Target Firms Over Insider Trading', The Times, 6/6/98. 
Indeed, the term as to what is meant by fiduciary has equally been debated, it being suggested 
that it is one of the worst described terms in English law; Rider. B. A. K. (1983) supra, note 8, at 
67. However, numerous definitions have been postulated; Brav v. Ford [1896] A. C. 44, at 51, 
per Lord Nesthell; Reading v. Attorney General [ 1951 ] A. C. 507, at 516, per Lord Porter; 
Boardman v. Phipps [ 1967] 2 A. C. 46, at 123, per Lord Upjohn; Diamond v. Oreuºnuno 24 
N. Y. 2d 494 [1969], at 496, per Chief Judge Fuld; English v. Dedham Vale Properties Ltd. 
[ 1978] 1 W. L. R. 93, at I10, per Slade J.; Schein v. Chasen 313 Sold 739 (1975) and Freeman 
v. Decio 584 F2 d 186 (1978) 
[1901] 2 Ch 421 cf. Coleman v. Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 225, at 324, per I Voodhouse J. and Finn, 
Fiducia'y Obligation, (1977), at 67. 
Foss v. Hat-bottle [ 1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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not its shareholders. 145 Although a ̀ special circumstances' doctrine exists which 
provides an exception to the principle laid down in Percival v. Wright, it only covers 
insider dealing in face to face transactions and consequentially provides no remedy for 
those dealing in public markets. 146 Similarly, any action brought by the company 
against an insider is also beset with problems. For example, it is not entirely clear 
whether an insider who sells shares based on inside information that he has acquired 
by virtue ot'his position is liable to account if he sells in order to avoid a loss. A 
question mark also hangs over the issue of whether it is possible to ratify branches of 
fiduciary duty, and if so, by what means the ratification is to be secured. In any case. 
there has been a distinct reluctance on the part of directors147 to initiate actions on 
behalfofthe company by suing fellow directors. 148 
Finally, an action in the name of the company in the context of insider dealing 
means that any profits recouped go to the company and not directly to aggrieved 




Re, lZal (Ilastings) v. Gulliver [ 1967] 2 A. C. 134; Industrial Development Consultants v. Coolev 
[ 1972) 1 W. L. R. 443 and Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and 
Petrochemical Services Limited [ 1983] 2 All E. R. 563, at 585, per Dillon L. J. Although note 
that a director may owe a duty to shareholders were he is appointed by the shareholders to act as 
their agent of an of lerce company; Allen v. llyatt [ 1922] 30 T. L. R. 444 and Gething v. Kelner 
[ 1972] I All E. R. 1166. Also see Prentice, D. (1975), ̀ Insider Trading', (1975) Current Legal 
Problems, at 83. 
I lannigan, 13. (1994), Insider Dealing, London: Kluwer, at 126. 
Although a director may pursue a business opportunity if. 
(i) the powers prescribed in the articles of association permit it (article 70 in 
Table A, Companies Actl985); 
(ii) the members of the company give consent after full and frank disclosure of the 
facts (New Zealand Netherland Society 'Oranje' Incorporated v. Kuys 
[ 1974 ]); or, 
if the board decides not to pursue a venture then individual directors may 
pursue it (Queensland Mines Lid. v. Hudson ( 1978) 52 A. L. J. R. 399). 
148 Usually the company will have to change ownership before directors will embark on such an line 
oraction. 
149 Sutcr, J. (1980. '7/ Regulation of insider Dealing in Britain', London: Butterworths, at 145. 
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indirectly benefit from the action against him. 150 Some of the problems, and others - 
most particularly the degree of knowledge required of `tippees' - additionally to 
actions by the company against third parties (tippees) as constructive trustees. 151 
Likewise, a derivative action by a minority shareholder would face the formidable 
difficulty of showing that insider dealing was a fraud on the minority and that there 
existed wrongdoer control. Furthermore, problems regarding the cost of such 
litigation are enough to put all but the most dedicated shareholder from pursuing an 
action through the courts, 152 although the use of contingency fee schemes may offer 
support for derivative actions. 153 
It can also be noted that such a course of action on the part of the claimant has 
not received much in the way of support from the courts because such a claimant has 
to displace any evidential burden himself unless there has been a prior criminal 
prosecution. Thus, the onus of proof rests on the claimant to establish whether or not 
a breach of duty occurs. 154 It would seem that whilst a breach of a fiduciary duty in 
150 Justice Report on Insider Trading, (1972), at paragraph 32 and Kay, M. (1973), 'The Justice 
Report on Insider Dealing', Modern Law Review, Vol. 36, at 19 1. 
151 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Craddock (No. 3) [196 8]1W. L. R. 1555; Belmont 
Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. [ 1979] Ch 250; Baden v. Societe General 
du Commerce SA [ 1983] B. C. L. C. 325; Naus Asia Co. Inc. v. Standard Churted Bunk [ 1990] 1 
11. K. L. R. 296; Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1991] Ch 547; Sumitomo Bank Ltd v. Kartika 
Ratna Thahir [1993] 1 S. L. R. 735; Eagle Trust plc. v. S. B. C. Securities Ltd [ 1993] 1 V. L. R. 
484 and Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid [1994] 1 A. C. 324. 
152 Suter, J. (1989), supra, note 6, at 160. 
153 {Val/esteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] 1 All E. R., at 862, per Lord Denning. 
154 
... it is well settled 
by authority of this House in Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Lid 
[ 1949] AC 398, that the question whether legislation which makes the doing or omitting 
to do a particular act a criminal offence renders the person guilty of such an offence 
liable also in a civil action for damages at the suit of any person who thereby suffers loss 
or damage in a question of construction of the legislation... " 
, Lord 
Diplock in Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. [198112 ALL ER, 456 at 460d. 
Buckley, L. (1984), has also argued that: 
"... the fiction that liability depends exclusively upon legislative intention should finally 
be abandoned. The courts should recognise that the decision whether or not to grant a 
civil action is ultimately one of policy for them... " 
`Liability in Tort jor Breach of Statutory Duty', Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 100, at 232. 
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company law is not without precedent155, and may be applicable in certain investor 
legislation156 it is doubtful whether the courts possess the impetus to pursue this 
matter any further than they have already ventured. 
Alternatively, a civil common law action based upon breach of confidence may 
be brought against any one who is allegedly an insider. 157 However, in order for such 
an action to arise an obligation of confidence must exist, through confidential 
information158 being divulged159 or through the existence of an expressed or implied 
contractual agreement. Once this has been established it must be proven that this 
information was used in an unauthorised manner by one or more parties160 to the 
detriment of the communicating party, 161 although this point is still to be clearly' 
decided. 162 
Contextually, the use of unauthorised information means ̀ used or 




Re: South of England Natural Gas and Petroleum Co Ltd [ 1911 ], 1 Ch 573 and Woods v. 
U'inskill [1913] 2 Ch 303. 
The I'reventiurt of Fraud (investments) Act 1958 and the Banking Act 1979. 
Ste generally Law Commission Report on Breach of Confidence, (1981), Cmnd. 8338. 







Lamb v. Evans [ 1893] 1 Ch 218 and Thomas Marshall (Ecporters) Ltd v. Guinle [ 1978] 3 All 
C. R. 193. 
Although if large numbers of individuals are given access to such information at the same time 
the clement of conf identiality may be lost: Dunfvrd and Elliott Ltd v. Johnson and Firth Brown 
Lid. (197711 Lloyd's Rep. 505. 
Cocos,. A. N. Clark Engineers Ltd. (1969] R. P. C. 41, at 48, per Afegarr), J.. 
Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. ?) [1988] 3 All E. R. 545. 
Sir/tman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd [ 1963] 3 All E. R. 413, at 414, 
per Lord Greene ALR; Seager v. Capvdex Ltd. (1967] 2 All E. R. 415. 
Although this will have n baring on the final proscribed remedy; Attorney General v. Guardian 
Neu-spapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988], at 639.640, per Lord Keith; at 650, per Lord Grif Iihs and at 
6 39, per Lord G(! Ij: 
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third parties, these being prohibited from using confidential information because it is 
probable that they will already be aware of the circumstances surrounding the value of 
such information. 165 However, in situations where an innocent recipient overhears or 
stumbles across information that he uses to his benefit it is highly unlikely that 
liability for breach of confidence will result. 166 
Under the present regime, governing insider dealing there is a distinct lack of an 
effective and accessible civil remedy. 167 The civil law is unlikely to be utilised by 
investors as a means for redress as they are either insufficiently familiar as to their 
rights in such situations, because they lack the necessary resources and determination 
with which to pursue the legal remedies available to them168 or because of the 
difficulty caused by complex market transactions, which hinders the recuperation of 
pecuniary loss. 169 Consequently, civil actions by individual investors are not 
commonly regarded as an effective means of protecting the majority of investors given 
the expense of litigation. 170 However, the difficulties that stand in the way of 
individual civil enforcement do not necessarily affect all investors to the same extent. 
Implicit in the restrictions of a `professional investor's' right of action under the 
FSA'86 is the assumption that they will be less inhibited about pursuing civil remedies 
165 Malone v. Commissioner of Police (No. 2) [1979] Ch 344, at 360. Also see generally Ridcr, 




Fracome v. Mirror Group Newspapers[ 1984] 1 W. L. R. 892. 
Cohen, N. (1996), ̀ SFA Seeks Swifter Punishment for City Wrongdoers', The Financial Times, 
20/6/96. 
According to Suter, J. (1989): 
"... Controversy surrounds both the principles upon which [civil] liability may be based 
and the formation of the remedies themselves... " 
; supra, note 6, at 122. 
169 Berg, K. (1988), ̀ Section 62: The Full Extent of Exposure', International Financial Law Review, 
at 29. 
170 Seligman, J. (1983), 'The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System', 
Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 9, at 56; and Gower, L. C. B. (1982), Review of Investor 
Protection: A Discussion Document, London: HMSO, at paragraph 3.41. 
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than their private counterparts whose right is left undisturbed. 171 Similarly, where 
several investors have all suffered the same wrong at the hands of a particular firm, a 
class action or some other form of representative proceedings may provide an 
individually less daunting means of seeking redress. 172 
One of the main problems faced in allowing victims of insider dealing to act and 
seek civil redress centres around the issue of privity. 173 Similar to criminal cases, the 
issue of proving that a causative nexus between the insider actions and victim's loss 
existed at the time the alleged insider dealing took place has long acted as the major 
stumbling block both common law and statutory actions. 174 Indeed, given the relative 
complexity created by today's market transactions it is all but impossible to prove: 
"... the moral objection is that the matching of vendor and purchaser is 
entirely random and there is no obvious justification for giving a vendor 
ºi ho happens to have sold shares to an insider a remedy which is not 
available to the vendors who sold similar shares at the same time at the 
saute price to outsiders... "175 
Even miscellaneous provisions176 have only proven to be effective in the clearest of 
cases. 177 
171 Section 62A F'SA 'S6. 





Ashc. T. M. and Counsel I, L. (1993), supra, note 1, at chapter twelve. 
Rider, ILA, K. (1988), supra, note 12, at 66 and MacNeil, B. (1994), ̀ FSA /956: Dods section 
62 Provide an Effective Remedy for Breaches of Conduct of Business Rules? ', Company 
Lnwycr. Vol. 15, at 173. 
Justice Report on Insider Trading, (1972), at paragraph 34. See also Company Law Reform 
(1973), Cmnd 5391, London: IIMSO, at paragraph 19 and Suter, J. (1989) supra, note 6, at 373; 
and The Conduct of Company Directors, Cmnd 7037, London: HMSO, at paragraph 31. 
Section 35 of the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973. 
177 R v. lmºvud (19731 G0 Cr. App. R., at 73 e1 seq,, per Scarman L. J.. 
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While the United States has utilised this strategy, with some relevant success, it 
has not been as effective as some believe. 178 Indeed, although the United States has 
utilised novel approaches to `iron out' many of the problems highlighted by the United 
Kingdom's experience whether or not these are desirable or suitable to be imposed 
over here is highly suspect. 179 However, the United States must be commended in its 
approach to problematic areas. This is illustrated if one looks at section 5 of the ITSA 
where an insider is deemed to owe a duty of disclosure to contemporaneous 
investors180 for any transaction undertaken based on inside information. It is 
presupposed that since the information on which the insider trades is material, any 
investor who would have relied upon it would have altered their conduct accordingly 
had the information been disclosed. Therefore, the nexus between the insider and the 
loss sustained by the investor is presumed and the loss is deemed to be sufficiently 
proximate. The need for privity is thus abolished. The United Kingdom may be well 
to take heed in learning from such approaches. 
Although doubts have been cast regarding the ability of the civil law as an 
effective deterrent such assertions can all but be dismissed given the fact that an 
178 Rakoff, J. and Eaton, E. (1996), ̀ How Effective is United States Enforcement in Deterring, ' 
insider Trading', Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 3, No. 3, at 283. 
179 `Day of the Civil Sanction? ', (1996) 17(9) Company Lawyer, at 257: 
"... The Treasury must appreciate that the legal environment within which civil 
enforcement developed in the United States are not necessarily as convincing as some 
academics and even the odd politician have made out. The New Zealand /'urliament 
stumbled into civil enforcement, of a rather ineffectual kind, as a means of curtailing 
insider abuse. This was also on the back of a studv of what was thought to happen in the 
United States and in particular the economic benefits! It certainly has not worked in 
New Zealand and in developing alternative weapons for the twenty-first century 
considerable thought and some imagination would not go amiss... " 
See also Cox, W. (1990), `An Economic Perspective of Insider Trading Regulation and 
Enforcement in New Zealand, Canterbury Law Review, Vol. 4, at 268 et seq. and Fitzsimons, R. 
(1995), `Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws by Shareholders in New Zealand: An Analysis 
and Proposals for Reform', Waikato Law Review, Vol. 3, at 101 et seq.. 
180 That is, those investors that trade at the same time and on the same security as the insider; see 
Shapiro v. Merril Lynch, Pierce Fenner and Smith Inc 495 F. 2d., at 241 [2d Cir. 1974]; Wilson 
v. Cointech Telecommunications Corp. 648 F. 2d., at 94 et seq. [2d Cir. 1981] and O'Connor 
and Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc 559 F. Supp., at 803 [SDYN 1983]. 
no 
insider will be forced to compensate the victim181 thus striking at the motive of 
profit. 182 However determining who is a credible plaintiff183 and then placing a 
compensatory value on their loss184 may cause subsequent problems. If one looks to 
the United States for guidance this may be remedied by limiting the damages payable 
to the profit made or loss avoided by the insider. 
Given the relative success the United States has had in proving civil liability 
many generally assume that the type of law is far easier to prove in court than the 
criminal law. 18S However, moving to a civil standard of proof is unlikely to have the 
impact one would imagine. This is because for cases involving serious allegations of 
wrongdoing, the United Kingdom's civil standard of proof is different from that of the 
United States. In the United States, the case must be proved `by a preponderance of 
the evidence. ' In other words, the civil prosecuting authority must demonstrate merely 
that it is more likely than not that the offence occurred - that there is a 51% 
probability of guilt. However, English courts apply a sliding scale approach to the 
civil standard of proof: the degree of probability required varies from case to case, and 
depends on the nature and gravity of the allegation. Thus, the worse the alleged 
conduct. the harder it is to prove. 186 Other differences between the two jurisdictions 
mean that the United States may be given a distorted view as to its effectiveness. 
181 Anderson, A. (I982), `Fraud. Fiduciaries and Insider Trading', I-lofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, 
at 371 cal seq. and Commons Parliamentary Debates 1978/79, volume III, Standing Committee 
'/", at column 1130. 
182 
183 
Branson, T. (1982). ̀ Insider Dealing-Part Ill', Journal of Business Law, at 538 etseq. and 
Posner, N. (1980), 'Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals', American Criminal Law 
Review, Vol. 17, at 408 et seq.. 
I lcrzcl. J. and Kratz. F. (1985), 'Insider Trading: Who Loses? ', Lloyds Bank Review, Vol. 165, 
at 15. 
184 Anisman, A. (1986), Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and 
Alternatives, Canberra: Australian Government Publications, at 107 et seq.. 
185 Naylor, J. M. (1990), ̀ The Use of Criminal Sanctions by U. K. and U. S. Authorities for Insider 
Trading: Ilow Can the Two Systems Learn from Each Other? Part F, (1990) Company Lawyer. 
Vol. 11, No. 3. at 58. 
186 Waters, V. and Gallinek, R. (1995), 'Insider Dealing. Time to Turn the Defence Inside Out', 
The Financial Times Afugu_ine, 25/11/95. Also see Payne, E. (1997), 'Chance or Recovery in 
Civil Actions', Company Lawyer, Vol. 18, No. 4, at 1 I8 et seq.. 
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Such factors as the lack of a specific statutory definition as to what constitutes insider 
dealing means that the SEC is not bound by definitional parameters. t 87 In addition, 
prosecutors do not have to overcome statutory defences that may be raised by the 
alleged insider. 188 
If a United Kingdom regulator attempts to use a statutory imposed civil remedy 
it may well have to prove something approaching, or even equivalent to, the criminal 
standard of proof. 189 This is all the more perverse when one considers that, at 
present, most do not possess the extensive investigatory powers of criminal 
authorities. Consequently, it may be more difficult to prove insider dealing cases 
using this type of law. Indeed, some critics are of the opinion that civil actions are not 
quite the 'panacea some British observers believe. ' 190 Ireland's approach to insider 
dealing, being based around both criminal and civil liability illustrates its general 
willingness to adapt previous measures in a bid to make them more effective. 191 Such 
a trait should be a desirable asset in any country. However, such ingredients in recent 
years have not been evident in the United Kingdom. 
If the United Kingdom is to develop a new approach to insider dealing one idea 
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light of the American Experience', Journal of Business Law, at 538. 
McCormack, M. (1991), 'Insider Dealing- New Departures in Ireland. ' Business Law Review, 
at 146; McCormack, M. (1992), 'Insider Dealing -A New Regime for the Republic of Ireland, 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 13, No. 5, at 108 et seq.; Linnane, S. (1994), 'Insider Dealing and the 
Irish Stock Exchange', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 7, at 218 et seq. and Ashe, T. M. and 
Murphy, Y. (1992), Insider Dealing, Dublin: Round Hall, at 114 et seq.. However, recently 
there have been calls for amendment to the 1990 Act; see Linnane, S. (1997), 'Insider Dealing in 
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Authority principles. 192 Such requirements would not, as some SRO's rules try to do, 
seek to replicate the offence of insider dealing as it is defined in all its complexity at 
criminal law. Regulators have neither the extensive powers needed to gather neither 
information on offenders nor the ability to imprison them. Furthermore, regulatory 
interests lie in protecting investors and ensuring the integrity of financial markets, not 
in bringing to bear the draconian criminal powers of the state against wrongdoers. 
The regulators, therefore, should be able to enforce different and possibly higher 
standards of market behaviour than are required by the criminal law. They could 
decide, to adopt rules or issue guidance under the Authority's principles that adapt the 
United States standard to United Kingdom markets by stipulating that firms or 
registered individuals should not trade while in possession of price-sensitive 
information. 
In prosecuting a breach of such a rule, only those defences recognised in the rule 
itself would be open for debate. The multiplicity of the defences currently available 
under United Kingdom and United States criminal law would be irrelevant. However, 
the differences between United Kingdom regulators would have a tougher job than 
their United States counterparts because of the sliding scale civil standard of proof. 
Nonetheless, this approach may provide a more effective mechanism for addressing 
market abuse than the current insider dealing legislation. If successful, it might also 
serve as a basis for a standard of behaviour to be applied, through appropriate 
legislative change, to market participants that are not regulated by an SRO and thus 
would not be covered under this approach. 
Given the new Government's past193 and present194 drive to change City 
regulation that it is highly probable that the form of law favoured to deal with insider 
192 
193 
McVca, 1 1. (I 996), 'Fashioning a System of Civil Penalties. for Insider Dealing: Sections 61 and 
62 of The Financial Services Act 1986', July, Journal of Business Law, at 353 et seq. and 
Graham, G. (I 998), 'PrivateAnalyst Briefing may be Banned, The Financial Times, 29/6/98. 
C i%cnhammmer, J. (1995) 'Labour Pledges to Punish Insiders', The Independent, 24/2/95; 
Donovan, 1'. (1995), 'Labour Plans to Rewrite the Law on Insider Dealing', The Guardian, 
2412/95, Cohcn, N. (1995), 'Labour to Probe Powers of'City Regulators', The Financial Times, 
24/2/95. 
194 Graham. G. (1998), supra, note 192. 
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dealing will be of a civil nature. 195 Determining what form a specific civil remedy 
will take is not easy. Although it seems probable, given the political climate and the 
difficulty faced by investors in launching successful common law action, that any 
remedy developed will take a statutory form doubts as to its overall effectiveness are 
debatable. Moreover, its role is likely to be of a complimentary, rather than 
supplementary provision, as this will have the most impact. However, doubts exist 
whether this type of law will be any more effective than the criminal one as civil 
remedies are plagued with their own set of substantive and procedural problems. 196 
195 Trade and Industry Select Committee, Third Report on Company Investigations, (1990), at 
paragraph 169; Blitz, J. (1996), ̀ Labour to Review Insider Dealing', The Financial Times, 
2/5/96 and Parker, C. (1997), 'Davies Calls for New Powers', The Financial Times, 13/10/97. 
196 post, chapter five. 
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3.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the formal regulatory approaches adopted 
in the United Kingdom and United States in respect to insider dealing. Despite the 
common goal of regulation in both jurisdictions, there are important differences in 
their approaches can be identified. While the United Kingdom has sought to utilise 
concisely worded legislation the United States has used a contrasting approach. Thus, 
the use of loosely worded legislation has provided the foundation upon which insider 
trading may or may not be determined. This pervasive and, somewhat, pragmatic 
approach has allowed the American judiciary to supplement principles, initially 
derived from the SECs' actions and developed at common law, to create an expansive 
web of liability. However, they have yet to enunciate a consistent theory upon which 
regulation may be based. Indeed, it may be viewed as unsatisfactory to develop the 
law in such a piece-meal fashion, given the potentially severe sanctions a convicted 
person may have to endure. Moreover, it may also violate the constitutional guarantee 
that no person shall be penalised by an ex post facto law. Thus, such a position has 
left many market participants without any guidance as to how to arrange their conduct. 
Yet, the United States has enjoyed substantial success in combating insider 
activities. This may be directly attributed to the persuasiveness of the SEC in its 
relentless pursuit on insider activities coupled with the widespread bargaining and the 
potential penalty powers it possesses. 
By contrast, the United Kingdom has resorted to formal laws that are highly 
complex and, by comparison, rarely resorted to. Such complexity can be seen to have 
contributed towards the overall ineffectiveness of them that in turn has had a 
disastrous effect on prosecution rates. The detailed nature of the definition and the 
traditional tendency of the judiciary to interpret criminal statute restrictively has left 
little room for the courts to indulge in creative interpretation. Additionally, the 
exclusive reliance on criminal law has denied flexibility to the enforcement of the 
(JA. Moreover, it is ineffective to combat what is generally perceived as an 
essentially economic crime. Dine sums this position up aptly by stating: 
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`... This is a clear illustration of a penal law where an attempt has been 
made to cater for all the complications of behaviour within the definition 
of a crime and control is sought to be exercised from outside the company. 
As a direct result of the combination of these two factors a complicated 
and largely unworkable law has emerged The implementation of the EC 
Directive was a golden opportunity to reform the law. The opportunity 
has been ignored. Other solutions to the problem either penal, quasi- 
penal or civil have been ignored'197 
Although civil common law remedies aimed at offering forms of redress for 
victims of insider activities exist in the United Kingdom these are extremely hard to 
prove, a fact that makes them virtually redundant in providing a successful route to 
gain monetary compensation. The distinct lack of a civil statutory remedy has yet to 
materialise. Indeed, given the problems associated with causation, determining the 
class of potential victim and value given to any financial remuneration it looks 
distinctly unlikely that any legislation will be developed in the near future although 
legislation will be enacted. Yet the need for a civil remedy is extremely important, 
not only in granting what many see as a form of action more equated with this type of 
offbncc but also in a way of effectively deterring more individuals from participating 
in it. To this end it may be advantageous to look to other jurisdictions not too far 
away, such as Ireland, to learn and adapt a remedy to satisfy these aims. Indeed, it 
may also be advantageous the if the present insider dealing legislation is re-enacted to 
include some of the elements of flexibility that have been so useful in determining 
whether insider dealing has occurred in the United States. 
lt, is important to remove incentives for insider dealing by requiring disclosure 
of information but it is also necessary to prohibit dealing based on information not 
disclosed to the market. Disclosure alone will not suffice to eliminate insider dealing. 
As long as incentives exist, insiders will find ways to circumvent disclosure 
obligations. Disclosure also raises issues about timing and no effective way can be 
devised to enforce this. While the use of administrative proceedings by many SR()'s 
197 Dine, J. (1995), Criminal Law in the Company Context, London: Dartmouth Publishing, at 14. 
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liar breaches of conduct codes have provided strong incentives for members to act 
lawfully and fair these may be improved upon if they are strengthened. Therefore, 
increasing fines and actively publicising offenders as well as vigorously implementing 
the ultimate threat of expulsion from the market place will achieve stricter compliance 





Market manipulation is an extremely complicated, invariably diverse activity that 
embraces a multitude of trading sins. Its impact profoundly cyfects many types of 
market transaction through interfering with the fiundamental market f orces of supply 
and demand. I However, to equate manipulative practices with these factors alone 
belies the notion that certain trading activities can have some effect on the supply and 
demand of securities without actually being perceived as illegal in the eyes of the lmr. 
This is particularly so when the issue of stabilisation is involved, 2 secondary market 
transactions are entered into, 3 especially in light of the development of electronic 
transactions, 4 or when large securities transactions are carried out. 5 
It can generally he observed that the United Kingdom and United States rely on 






Andressen, A. (1942), 'Manipulation of the Over the Counter Securities', (1942) 10 George 
Washington Law Review, at 640; Lee, H. C. (1993(a)), 'Market Manipulation in the United 
States and United Kingdom: Part 1', Company Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 5. at 84 and Mason, J. 
(1999), 'Trader Appeals against Manipulation Conviction', The Financial Times, 9/ 11 /99. 
l'osl, section three. 
Rogoff, R. (1976), ̀ Legal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Market Manipulation. Critique and 
Proposal', (1976) 28 Maine Law Review, at 150. 
'Integrity in Tomorrow's Markets', (1997) European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No. II and 
12, at 282. 
R. v, de Berenger, [1814] 3M and S, at 73-74 and 105 ER, at 536, per LeBlanc J.: 
the raising or lowering of the price of public funds is not per se a crime. A man may 
have occasion to sell out a large sum, which may have the effect of depressing the price 
of stocks, or may buy in a large sum, and thereby raise the price on a particular day, and 
yet he will be guilty of no offence. " 
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behaviour. While the courts in the former country have tended to cautiously 
scrutinise the nature of such transactions to determine their true intentions6 those 
across the Atlantic have liberally viewed any transaction that elevates or depresses 
market activity to determine whether it is genuine or not. 7 
In the United Kingdom the practice of market manipulation has proven to be 
extremely difficult to identify due to the existence of complex commodity8 and 
derirative9 markets. 10 Subsequently, only the most conspicuous of manipulation 
cases have led to detection and eventual prosecution, a fact that makes them 
newsworthy items. 11 Not surprisingly, large proportions of manipulation cases are 
6 Scott v. Brown, Doering McNab and Co., [ 1892] 2 QB 724; cf. Sanderson and Levi v. British 
Western Alines and Share Corporations Ltd [ 1898] 43 Sol 45 per Matthew J.: 
"... No evidence had been given to show that there was anything of an illegal or 
fraudulent character about it... " 
Additionally, see United States v. Brown (1933) 5 F. Supp. at 81. 
7 Section 9(a)(2) SEA. 
8 Murphy, D. and Saigol, A. (1997), 'The $3 Billion Copper Caper', The Guardian, 15/2/97; 
Dawkins, P. Michiyo. 1. and Gooding, C. (1996), 'Rogue Deals Cost Sumitomo $1.8 Billion', 
The Financial Times, 14/6/96; 'The Same Old Story of Manv Warnings Ignored, The 
Independent, 18/6/96; Donovan, P. (1996), 'Exchange's Future at Risk', The Guardian, 
21/6/96; Gooding, N. and Denton, N. (1996) 'Sumitomo Copper Market Loss May Double to $4 
Billion', The Financial Times, 23/6/96 and Mason, J. (1997), 'Brokers to Deny Afanipulation of 
Copper'. The Financial Times, 28/2/97. 
9 "... Th a F'SA['86J, which was preoccupied by investor protection issues, failed explicitly 
to anticipate futures transactions. As a consequence, regulation in the United Kingdom 
gives this a lover priority than the United States. It is not even clear that futures 
manipulation is illegal in London. ' 
: Gilbert. W. (1996), 'Untenable Position for hfanipulators', The Financial Times, 6/8/96. 
10 Price, P. (1996). 'Skynet Relisting maybe Delayed', The Financial Times, 3/9/96; Hughes, M. 
and Allen, J. (1997), 'Legal Liability In the Secondary Debt Market', Butterworths Journal of 
International Business and Financial Law, Vol. 12, No. 10, at 469 et seq. Holley, K. (1993). 
'Market Manipulation', Commonwealth Law Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 4, at 1927 ei seq.; Hilton, S. 
(1994), 'Going to Extremes', Pensions World, Vol. 23, No. 1, at 131; Au, A. (1989), 'Stock 
Alarket Manipulation after the Financial Services Act 1986', Journal of International Banking, 
Vol. 4. No. 2, at 53 et seq.; 'Section 47 FSA'86: Market Manipulation', (1989) Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, Vol. 4, No. 7, at 337 et seq. and 'A Slim 
CFTCThe Financial Times, 11/3/97. 
II The real life publicity surrounding the collapse of Barings Bank and Nick Leeson has been 
turned Into a 'silver screen Icon' with the film Rogue Trader, an adaptation of Leeson's book 
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based around take-over issues, as these offer the greatest incentives for manipulators 
to make substantial profitable gains. For instance, the case involving Guinness 
revolved around the manipulation of the share price of Distillers plc, whilst Blue 
Arrow was concerned with whether an illegal take up of rights had occurred in 
Manpower. It is generally perceived that these problems stem from the lack lustre 
implementation of those given the power to enforce market compliance combined with 
the fact that it is extremely hard, under present legislation, to prove that financial 
detriment has actually been caused by the manipulation itself. 12 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine such practices front the former 
premise, namely, that the laws utilised in this country are inappropriate for their 
declared purpose and that by examining the different approaches adopted in the 
United States some insight may be inferred in providing this country with some 
guidance for producing more effective ways of dealing with these practices in the 
future. However, a cautionary note must be issued, as the United Slates is still far 
from perfect in its pursuit of manipulative cases. This is predominantly (hie to the fact 
that: 
`... manipulation claims require many years to reach trial and tremendous 
expense to investigate. Most CEA and CFTC manipulation cases have 
lasted eight years or more, and have consumed thousands of man hours of 
the agencies' scarce resources. Private lawsuits have had no better 
results. This, of course, discourages the filing of manipulation cases and 
virtually eliminates their deterrent effect. '13 
12 
13 
with the same title, now on release. Indeed, Hollywood `gloss' has been applied to manipulative 
practices before with the production of the film The Hudsucker Proxv (1994) and Oliver Stone :s 
`greed is good' venture, Wall Street in the mid-I 980's which centred on insider trading. 
In `Poll Position', The Observer, 10/4/97,99% of people questioned said market manipulation 
would continue undaunted. 
Markham, K. (1987), Commodities, Regulation, Fraud, Manipulation and Other Claims, at 
paragraph 15.02 et seq.. 
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This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one provides a historical basis as 
to how manipulative practices have evolved and how this impact affects the markets 
today. Part two examines the current types of manipulative practices used on today's 
securities markets. Lastly, part three provides a comparative analysis between the 
United Kingdom's, and United States' various approaches to this type of market 
abuse. 14 
14 Although market manipulation is not strictly a fraudulent practice since it does not employ an 
element of non disclosure the manipulative act itself is tantamount to fraud; Wolfson, L. (1972- 
73), 'Rule 10b. 6 and the Illusory Search for Certainty', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 25, at 95 el 
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4.1. Market Manipulation -A Historical Perspective 
Historically, manipulative practices are not a new phenomenon with many references 
being made of these practices permeating trading markets. Homer, for instance, was 
known to have referred to such fraudsters as ̀ tricksters dealing in countless and 
worthless trinkets to the scandal of the market'. 15 Furthermore, evidence exists of 
frauds revolving around the manipulation of common commodities in the fourteenth 
centuryl6 and precious metals during the sixteenth century. 17 During the seventeenth 
century these practices ravaged the markets of London so much so that a Royal 
Commission was established. 18 It reported that: 
"... The pernicious Art of Stock jobbing hath, of late... wholly perverted 
the End and Design of Companies and Corporations, erected f or the 
introducing, or carrying on of Manufactures,... by selling their shares for 





Red field, J. M. (1986), The Development of the Market in Archaic Greece, in Anderson, B. L. 
and Latham, A. J. H. (eds. ), The Market in History, London: Croom I Ielm, at 52 et seq. and 
Mitnick, B. M. (1980), The Political Economy of Regulation, New York: Columbia University 
Press, at 243 et seq.. 
See generally Russel on Crime, (12th ed. ), at Chapter 100; Jones, E. (1925-26), 'llistoricul 
Development of the Law of Business Competition', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 35, at 906-7; Mason, 
11. (1937-38), 'Monopoly in Law and Economics', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 47, at 38; Statute of 
the Realm, (1363), 37 Edw. 111c. 8. With regard to the practice of engrossing; see, in additional, 
Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v. McGregor, Cow and Co et al., [1889] 23 QBD 598. 
See generally O'Keefe, J. (1966), Law of Weight and Measures, London: Butterworths. 
It was observed at the time that financial markets operated on a trade founded in: 
.... 
fraud, born of deceit and nourished by trick, wheedle, forgeries, falsehoods, and all 
sorts of delusions... " 
Defoe, D. (1697), The Anatomy of Change Alley: A System ofStock jobbing, in Rider, B. A. K., 
Abrams, C. and Ferran, E. (1992), Guide to the Financial Services Act 1986, Bicester: CCI I, at 
paragraph 104. In addition, see Mathias, R. (1936), ̀ Manipulative Practices and the Securities 
Exchange Act', University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 3, at 107 were it was observed that 
manipulative ̀ pools' were used on European exchanges during this period. 
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Trade and Stock comes to fall into unskilful Hands, whereby the 
Mlanufactures... dwindle away to nothing. " 19 
Yet despite Parliament enacting the Act to Restrain the Number and Practice of 
Brokers and Stock-Jobbers market manipulation remained persistently widespread, 
with circulars produced urging Parliament to fortify the regulatory measures taken 
against stock jobbers: 
"... Stock Jobbing hash been so Pernicious to Trade in general, and 
Ruinous to many Families in particular, its therefore very necessary that a 
more effectual Law, than the late Brokers Act should be made against that 
pernicious Practice. "20 
With the advent of war the medium of falsely placed rumours was commonly 
used to manipulate share prices. 21 This was judicially recognised in a number of 
prominent cascs, 22 although the most famous one is probably that of R v. de 
Ikrenger. 23 In this case a number of defendants manipulated stock prices by 
circulating false rumours24 about the death of Napoleon and that the allies had entered 
1'aris. 25 Cases like this illustrated the dilemma faced by the courts in penalising such 
19 House (! f Commons Journals, 25" November 1696. 
20 Reasons on Behalf of litany Eminent Merchants for Continuing the Late Brokers Act under 
Further Regulations; Anon (1700). 
21 Mortimer. T. (1791), Every Alan Ills Own Broker, London, at 53 et seq.. 
22 Gil/eli v. Peppercurne [ 1840] 3 I3eav 78 and Barry v. Croskev [ 1861] 2 John and 11 1. 
23 1181413 M and S 66 and 105 ER 536. 
24 Rumours still form a large part of manipulative techniques used today although they are usually 
combined with other forms of manipulation, such as pools; ßranda, G. (1951), 'Manipulation of 
the Stock dlurAets under the Securities Laws'. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 99, 
at 661 et seq.. 
23 For commentary on dc' Derenger and other general aspects of manipulation; see Ashe, T. M. and 
Counsell, L. (1993), Insider Trading, London: Fourmat Publishing, at 9 et seq.. 
123 
behaviour. 26 Yet, the courts tended to air on the side of caution, unwilling to issue 
harsh sentences, a view that one could say still prevails today. 27 It can be argued that 
the underlying reasoning behind this relates to a general reluctance on the part of the 
judiciary to interfere with the established practices and principles laid down by the 
City itself. 28 However, manipulative practices were not geographically confined to 
the United Kingdom for the markets of the United States had also long been subject to 
such elusive practices, it being estimated that at the turn of this century one third of all 
securities trading represented on the New York Stock Exchange were of a 
manipulative nature. 29 Similarly, in Australia the Rae Report detailed many of the 
market rigging practices prevalent in that country during the 1960's. 30 In other 
common law jurisdictions such as Canada3l and hiong Kong, legislation32 also exists 
that seeks to curtail these types of market abuse. With regards to the latter 
26 Contradictory judicial attitudes towards market manipulation are evident if one reviews the 
judgements in the cases at this time. On one hand the judiciary recognised the value that should 
be placed on the concept of a `free and open market'. sec' dc' ßerenger, supra, note 5, at 538, per 
Lord Ellenhorough C. J.: 
.. (l, J)... the purpose itself is mischievous, it strikes at the price of a vendible commodity 
in the market, and if it gives a fictitious price, by means of false rumours, it is a fraud 







,a view also affirmed 
in R v. Aspinall [1876] 2Qß 48. However, it was also rccogniscd that 
market manipulation was common practice; see Scott v. Brown, Doering AfcNab and Co., 
[1892] 2 QB 729 et seq. and Welby, J. (1992), 'Do Business Ethics Afatter'. International 
Company and Commercial Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 45 et seq., were it is argued that 
manipulative practices are favourable in that they allow manipulator's to utilise their full 
potential as market operators cj entrepreneurial aspects of insider dealing, ante., chapter two, 
section 2. 
Rider, B. A. K. (1994), ̀ A Fair Cop', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, at 2 and Widlake, B. (1995), 
Serious Fraud Ofce, Warner Books: London, at 72 et seq.. 
Post, chapter one and ante., chapter six. 
Loss, L. (1995), Securities Regulation, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, at Chapter 10. 
See generally the Australian Securities Markets and Their Regulation Part 1: Report from the 
Senate Committee, at chapter eight. 
Section 325 Canadian Criminal Code. Interestingly, the SEC has actively sought to impose its 
rules on foreign markets including Canada; see Jacobs, B. (1989), `US-Canadian Oferings: the 
SEC's View on Market Manipulation', International Financial Law Review, Vol. 8, No 12, at 8 
et seq. 
Part XII Securities Ordinance. 
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jurisdiction, the control of securities fraud and market manipulation is dealt with in 
part XII of the Securities Ordinance. Section 135 of the Ordinance frowns upon 
every artificial device used to persuade the public that the activity of a security is a 
reflection of genuine supply and demand where it is not in fact so. 33 Section 136 of 
the Ordinance is a general anti-fraud provision in terms of which an offence can be 
committed notwithstanding that the fraud has not been acted on. 34 Provision is made 
for criminal offences in section 139 and civil remedies in section 141 of the 
Ordinance. The Ordinance is based on two separate but inter-related principles, 
namely the anti-fraud principle and the open market concept. 35 The enforcement of 
stock-market manipulation poses a problem in Hong Kong as the Ordinance's 
exclusive reliance on criminal sanctions as a means of proscribing manipulation and 
protecting investors gives little cause for optimism. The Hong Kong law with regard 
to civil remedy is unclear and it has also been observed that a victim of manipulation 
has to overcome various hurdles including proving that he brought or sold the 
securities at a price which was affected by manipulative activity. 36 
Other jurisdictions such as South Africa and Spain also have made deliberate 
attempts to broaden the scope of market manipulative provisions and establish more 
effective methods of sanctioning. Such provisions have been brought into force due 
to the ideological belief that markets should be free flowing governed only by the 
natural interaction of supply and demand. 
33 Au. A. (1988), 'Regu/acing Securities Fraud and Market Manipulation in Hong Kong: Part AY/ 
of theSecurities Ordinance', I long Kong Law Journal, Vol. 18, at 28 et seq.. 
34 Section 136 can be divided into three parts: false and misleading appearance of active trading, 
wach sales and the dissemination of information relating to market-rigging operations. 
31 Au. A. (1988), supra, note 33, at 26: 
'/t is In the interest of the community that the market fir securities should be real and 
genuine, free from manipulation. Stock market manipulation should be outlawed 
because it amounts to tampering with the natural equilibrium of market forces. ' 
36 Au, A. (1988), op. clt., nt 47 et seq.. 
125 
With regards the former jurisdiction, manipulative practices are prohibited by 
virtue of section 40 of the Stock Exchange Control Act 1985 and sections 20 to 22 of 
the Financial Markets Control Act 1989 which prohibit false trading and market 
manipulation in futures and options. Section 23 of the Financial Markets Control Act 
makes provision for an action for damages in terms of which a person who 
contravenes the prohibition on false trading and market manipulation shall be liable to 
pay any damages to any other person who suffered a loss on account thercof. 37 
In Spain market manipulation is covered under article 99. i of the 1988 Securities 
Market Law. This forbids practices intended to distort the free formation of prices on 
the securities market. This is a provision of broad application and covers most forms 
of manipulation, including deliberate price movements or misleading statements or 
transactions. Any breach of article 99. i is enforced by the CNMV (the Spanish 
securities regulator) with any penalties made being imposed by the Minister of the 
Economy. Such penalties can include: one to five times the profit made under any 
breach; up to 5% of the perpetrator's financial resources; tip to 5% of the money used 
to perpetrate the breach; or up to 50 million pesetas. 38 
While today's markets still bare the scars of manipulative scams39 fewer 
incidences of securities manipulation are actually detected when compared to the past. 
Yet the underlying reasoning for this seems to lie not with the fact that fewer are 
actually being perpetrated but that with advancement of technologically initial 
detection and further investigation are effectively clouded. 40 Thus, it can be 
37 Van Zyl, F. (1994), `Regulation ofInternational Securities Fraud, Twelfth International 
Symposium on Economic Crime. 
38 Financial Services Authority, Market Abuse - Part l: Consultation on a Draft Code ofAfarket 
Conduct, (June) (1998), at 44. 
39 Interestingly, this area has pricked the interest of the public so much that a spawn of semi- 
readable accounts of manipulative frauds that occurred in the 1980's and 90's have been 
published; see, for example, Stewart, J. (1991), Den of Thieves, Simon and Shuster: New York; 
Stevens, M. (1987), The Insiders, Putnam: New York and Levine, D. (1991), Inside Out: An 
Insider's Account of Wall Street, Putnam: New York. 
40 Post, chapter one. 
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presumed that as so manipulative practices cascade they will evolve into new and 
more elusive forms. Indeed, given that section 47(2) FSA'86 is so broadly worded 
with an inadequate number of precedents to support it, offering valuable guidance for 
lawyers and judiciary alike, it looks likely that this position will not get any better 
under the present regime. 41 The inadequacy of the resources presently utilised in this 
country will also exacerbate this situation, especially when such practices take place 
on secondary markets that, in recent years, have provided a steadfast foundation upon 
which new issue markets are based. 42 
41 In the last decade only two main cases have been brought in the United Kingdom regarding 
manipulative market practices. These relate to the cases of Guinness and Blue Arrow, see infra. 
42 1 lilton, A. (I994), 'All Change', Pensions World, Vol. 23, No. 5, at 171 and 'Fine Imposed on 
KIl Suhsldlury', (1995) Financial Services Law Letter, Vol. 8, No. 5, at 3 el seq.. 
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4.2. Varieties of Manipulative Conduct and Deceptive Practices 
4.2.1. Differing Concepts of Manipulative Practices 
Manipulative devices are used to either control or alter the natural progression of 
securities market values. 43 It is not surprising, therefore, that these practices are seen 
to conflict with the legal reasoning of both the United Kingdom and United States, 
that financial markets should operate in an open manner free from fraudulent 
activity. 44 
There are many different types of trading that come under the generic term of 
market manipulation. 45 Such activities are usually described in relation to the unique 
attributes they posses in making a profit for those that operate them. 
Wash sales, for instance, are used to create the facade that securities are being 
actively traded upon, although unbeknown to those who trade upon them there is no 
change in beneficial ownership since the manipulator induces others to buy by 
purchasing and selling the securities either simultaneously or within a short period of 
time. This is usually achieved by the placing of an order to sell with one broker while 
simultaneously placing another order with the same or different broker to purchase the 
exact same number of shares back. To be as effective as possible in achieving a wash 
sale manipulators must deal in a variety of securities at one given time. Additionally, 
perpetrators of wash sales will often use false accounts to conceal the true ownership 
of the manipulated securities. 
43 
44 
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder [1976] 425 US 199. 
Loss, L. (1995), supra, note 29, at 930-934 and United States v. Druwn, supra, note 6, at 85, per 
Judge Woolsey: 
"... He (the outsider) is justified in supporting that the quoted price is an appraisal of the 
value of that stock due to a series of actual sales between various persons dealing at 
91 arm's length in a free and open market on the exchange... 
45 Rider, B. A. K. et al. (1992) supra, note 18, at 128. 
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Another type of manipulative practice is the use of matched orders. These come 
into existence when an individual enters a transaction for the purchase or sale of a 
security with the knowledge that an associate at will enter a matching transaction 
substantially the same time, price and/or size. 46 In such instances, both parties usually 
conceal their identities from the market by dealing through a third party, usually an 
unsuspecting broker. 
Pools are yet another common form of manipulative conduct. They are usually 
created by groups of people combining to rig the market. 47 Their sole objective is to 
either stimulate or depress market activity in a security so to generate a profitable 
income for all those who are pool members. Pools can be either ̀ bull' or `bear' in 
nature. The former operates to raise the price of a security to make a profit for the 
pool. This is achieved by pool members initially acquiring options on the security. 
During this stage the pool will depress the price of the security by masterminding 
heavy sales, although purchases by the pool will outnumber its sales since its 
operations will still be in the accumulation stage. Once it has found a significant 
position in the particular security, the pool will attempt to cause an appreciation in the 
value of the particular security. The pool may then resort to trading although this may 
also be followed by rumours and false publicity about the prospects of the stock that 
consequently causes a rise in the price of the security. Such a distribution of the false 
information may be orchestrated through the medium of the press by carefully placing 
tips with or without the collusion of brokers. If the pool is successful in driving up the 
price of the security, then the stock will be unloaded onto the market. Its members 
will call the options and sell the converted stock at a profit. It is usually unwise for 
pools to sell all their stock at once since heavy selling is likely to depress the price of 
the stock. Therefore, the pool will continue to stabilise the market by purchases, 
although sales will out number this. 
46 In the United States this issue has been narrowly construed; see Wright v. SEC [1943] F 2d 733. 
47 ffranda. G. (1951), 'AlanipulatIon of Stock Markets under the Securities Laws', University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 99, at 661 et seq. and ̀ Market Manipulation and the Securities 
Exchange Act', (1937) Yale Law Journal, Vol. 46, at 512 et seq.. 
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`Bear pools' are frequently used by manipulators to find securities at a price 
lower than on the prevailing market. 48 They seek to depress the price of a security by 
artificial means. Therefore, rather than accumulating securities, pool members will 
sell securities short and ultimately buy them at depressed prices to cover their 
position. During the initial stage sales by the pool will exceed its purchases. In its 
second phase, the activities of the pool will be aimed at marking down the price by the 
various mechanisms referred to above. Once the prices are sufficiently lowered, the 
pool's purchases begin. 
The use of corners and short sales techniques are also common. The former 
occurs when a group of traders ultimately control the supply of an investment 
requiring investors holding short positions to settle their obligations at artificial prices. 
However, for cornering to have a desired effect, the issued capital of the particular 
company involved must be small and there must be few short sellers. 49 Short sales 
involve an investor selling securities that, at the time of the sale, he does not owwwi. 5Q 
If the broker through whom the investor places the order were to execute the order, the 
investor will be short in the particular stock. The short seller would effect the sale in 
anticipation of a fall in the price of the security and his aim would be to make a profit 
by buying at a lower price the same number of shares. Normally the broker would 
borrow the shares, as the purchaser will require delivery of those shares. I Ic could do 
so from another broker. The broker need not actually borrow the shares until he is 




De/afield and Delafield [1967-69] CCH FSLR, at 648, Exchange Rel. No. 8480 (26/12/68). 
Tan, Securities Regulation in Singapore and Malaysia, (1978), at 434 et seq.. Cornering can be 
traced back to the seventeenth century when local cornering of imported commodities was 
common place. Indeed, one writer complained that in this time `these monopolists began to 
swarm like the firogs of Egypt. '; Hearnshaw, E. (1908), Leet Jurisdiction, London, at 114. 
Hart, E. (1979), 'The Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation', Australian Business Law 
Review, Vol. 7, at 143 et seq.. See also Short Selling in the Stock Market, I louse Reports, 
(1992) 102-414, Federal Securities Law Reports and Macey et al. (1989)., 'Restrictions on Short 
Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 , Stock Market Crash', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 74, at 799. 
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An underwriter can additionally make an issue ̀hot' manipulating the demand 
for the stock. 5I This may be affected by distributing misrepresentations regarding the 
stock or purchasing the stock himself to give an appearance of market activity in the 
stock. Prices in a hot issue may be manipulated in various other ways52 such as: 
(i) by deliberately fixing a low initial offering price; 
(ii) by delaying to notify allotees of their allotment; 
(iii) failing to deliver stock certificates to allotees to prevent them from 
disposing of them; 
(iv) by allotting securities to firms trading in the over the counter market 
to induce them to actively make a market in the issue; or 
(v) by simply discouraging customers from selling the securities on pain 
of being excluded from future deals. 
Warehousing practices, too, manipulate securities by allowing broker-dealers, if 
they agree to benefit themselves and insiders of the company, to limit the floatation of 
particular securities. Thus, if it can be surmised that particular securities to be traded 
upon will reached a premium rate soon after official launch an informal agreement 
will be made between the manipulator and their associates o that some will be 
withheld from the public in the expectation of selling them at a premium once the 
desired rate has been reached. Although such a premium rates may occur naturally the 
use of warehousing may mimic this by artificial means providing financial benefit for 
its instigators. Not unlike wash sales, beneficial ownership of the securities is hidden 
by a sham transaction in an account of a third party. One way of successfully 
controlling the supply of securities is to make a play for them at the distribution stage. 
51 1laxen, N. (I996), Securllles Regulation, New York: Little, Brown and Co., at 312 et seq.. 
52 Rotbcrg, P. (1962). 'The Ilot Issue', Business Lawyer, Vol. 17, at 360. 
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This is usually achieved by parking or warehousing the shares. The underwriter, 
therefore, may allot stocks only to purchasers who do not intend or who undertake not 
to dispose of them for some time. The underwriter may also allocate a good portion 
of the issue to accounts over which he has influence or control, such as discretionary 
accounts. Additionally, he can issue stocks to favoured accounts, such as those 
belongings to his affiliates. 
Parking refers to the sale of securities on the understanding that they will be 
repurchased by the seller later. The true ownership of the stock is concealed The 
economic risk of the bargain would remain with the seller. Parking may be 
distinguished from warehousing, which term refers to the purchase of securities by 
one party for or on behalf of another party. For example, a broker may purchase stock 
in a target on the instructions of the bidder and under an arrangement by which the 
broker agrees to transfer the stock to the bidder once bid is announced. The difference 
between parking and warehousing is that parking is achieved through a sham 
transaction. However, parking does not always constitute a manipulation, in the sense 
of creating an artificial market, as it may be effected for various other reasons, such as 
the avoidance of reporting requirements, net capital and margin rules. Nevertheless, 
parking may be adopted as part of a larger scheme to manipulate the market. For 
instance, parking was effected by the defendants in the Blue Arrow53 case to mislead 
the market and to conceal the fact that the rights issue of Blue Arroiv was 
unsuccessful. Parking can be effected by an underwriter as part of a manipulative 
scheine to artificially restrict the supply of stock to avoid depressing the market., This 
may occur in a new issue that is the subject of speculative activity. The stock will be 
issued at one price and soon bid up to a much higher price once trading has 
commenced. Underwriters or dealers can feed speculative activity by parking stock in 
bogus or nominee accounts as part of the initial distribution and then sell them into the 
secondary market at higher prices. 
53 See generally DTI Inspectors' Report, County Natwest and County Natwest Securities, (1989), 
London: HMSO. 
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Runs are yet another form of manipulative conduct. They generally involve a 
group of people creating activity in a security by their own concentrated buying and 
simultaneously distributing rumours, true or false, to cause a sharp increase in the 
price of the shares. Once the price of shares appreciates, those responsible for causing 
the market activity will unload their holdings at a profit. 54 
With the combination of rapid growth, the participation of inexperienced 
investors and the lack of effective regulation all of the aforementioned types of 
manipulative conduct, which are directly centred around securities markets, are bound 
to grow. I lowever, these are other types of manipulative conduct that exist which are 
so directly linked to such market activities and these will be considered now. 
Boiler room operations are yet another form of deceptive practice that involve 
high pressure sales of commodities where the majority, if not all, investor's money is 
stolen. Investors fall prey to unscrupulous con-men who falsely claim to operate 
legitimate commodity trading firms. High commissions and misrepresentations 
ensure that little, if any, of the clients money will be invested in commodity futures. 
It is more difficult for an investor to detect at an early stage that he has been 
cheated in a commodity fraud than in a securities scam. In a boiler room operation 
involving the sale of shares, the victim will discover his loss soon after the shares are 
not delivered to him, whereas in a commodity fraud the victim will not be suspicious 
until after the time of delivery has passed - usually six months to a year after the sale. 
Delivery may also be intentionally delayed until the company has had an opportunity 
to accumulate numerous `clients'. 
54 1 tart. E. (1979), supra, note 50, at 145. 
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4.3. The Differing Legal Approaches to Market Manipulation 
4.3.1. The American Position 
Since 1929 Congress has actively sought to prevent manipulative practices from 
infesting the market place as they originally did. 55 The enactment of section 1756 of 
the SA and more specifically sections 9,10,13,1557 and 21 of the SEA can lead to the 
assertion that the American government has long recognised the problems associated 
with such practices and has taken the initiative to act upon it. 
However, in recent years there has been a focus of concern on the effect 
institutional investors, such as mutual and pension funds or insurance companies have 
had in creating undesirable fluctuations and distortions in the market price of certain 
securities. These problems have been compounded by an increased blurring between 
the distinction of what can be perceived as manipulative or legitimate practicc; 58 a 
problem that has also affected the United Kingdom. 59 This problem is particularly 
evident where securities dealers and others participating in a public offering or 
distribution of securities simultaneously bid for or purchase the same security or 
where corporations influence the price of their own shares by purchasing them in the 






See generally the Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings before the Committee on Banking and 
Currency, U. S. Senate, 73rd Congress, 1" Session. 
Section 17(a) comes into effect when manipulative practices are seen to occur on the Over-tlle. 
Counter (OTC) market. Section I Ob SEA additionally has this effect. 
This section and in particular section 15(c) and rule 15c1-2 promulgated thereupon only relate to 
brokers and dealers trading in securities other than those on national exchanges. Therefore, if a 
broker-dealer engages in manipulative conduct on OTC markets he will attract liability under 
such laws if convicted. Because the language used in rule l5c l-2 is virtually the same as rule 
I Ob-5 the same elements of proof will be needed to gain a conviction. 
US v. AMulheren [ 1991 ] US App Lexis 14392 [CA2,19911 Doc No 90-1691. 
Rogoff, R. (1976), supra, note 3, at 152 and post, section 3.1.1.. 
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approach of enquiring into the very nature of the transaction. 60 Therefore, such 
factors as the volume, the trading by multiple brokers or the timing of the transaction 
will be taken into consideration in determining whether those involved committed an 
illegal or legal act. 61 
Yet, the courts have shifted away from enforcement against those who have 
controlled or dominated market activity, 62 it being argued that the SEA was not 
intended to impose liability on block or bulk orders even if they affected the market 
value of a security. 63 Therefore, it can be surmised that the attraction of any liability 
under the SEA will only come into effect when such block orders are combined with 
other events, such as scienter (i. e. the intention to defraud) which will transform them 
from being acceptable and perfectly legal practice to being manipulative and therefore 
illegal. Such events also play a major role in determining whether a defendant attracts 
liability under section 47(2) FSA'86 in the United Kingdom. 64 
Section 9(a)l SEA essentially details those activities that can be identified as 
wash sales and matched orders. The section thus makes it illegal for any person to 
engage in certain types of conduct for the purpose of creating a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in any security registered on a national securities 
exchange, or a Use or misleading appearance with respect to the market for any such 
security. If an individual or individuals either effect any transaction whereby there is 
no change in the beneficial ownership or enter into a sale or purchase of securities 
60 The adoption of such a flexible approach by the United Kingdom's judiciary, it will be argued 
post, is highly unlikely given the restraints imposed by the lack of case law in this area coupled 
with the doctrine of judicial precedent. 
61 The Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule lOb-S', (1973) New York Law Forum, Vol. 18. at 513. 
62 Ilranda, G. (1931), supra, note 47, at 663. 
63 Lowcnfels and Bromberg, 'Security Market Manipulations: An Examination and Analysis of Domination and Control. Front running and Parking', (1991) Albany Law Review, Vol. 55, at 309. 
64 Lcc, I I. C. (1993(b)), 'Afarket Manipulation in the US and UK: Part 2', Company Lawyer, Vol. 
14. No. 7, at 124. 
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with the knowledge that an order of substantially the same size, at substantially the 
same time and at substantially the same price, for the sale or purchase of any such 
securities, has been or will be entered by or for the same or different parties this will 
be deemed unlawful under this section. 
While some broker-dealer practices will be ensnared under this section of the 
SEA they may not be manipulative per se. Such an assumption will only be made if a 
fraudulent intent can be inferred from either the defendant's actions or from clear 
evidence connecting the defendant with the alleged manipulative activitics. 65 
Although there are very few defences that can be used to justify those offences 
committed under section 9 SEA the use of customary practices is deemed as the one 
most accepted. Thus, if an individual or firm can prove that they where acting on the 
instructions of another they will be deemed by the courts to be not committing an 
offence under section 9 SEA, since the beneficial ownership in the securities will have 
moved from one side to the other. However, if discretionary or company accounts 
have been used by the same individual or firm who initiated such a transaction, then it 
will be assumed that some manipulative practice has come about. 
Section 9(a)2 SEA covers those transactions which amount to manipulative 
pools where a number of individuals participate in either creating a bull or bear effect 
on the securities market. It is, therefore, unlawful for any person to effect a series of 
transactions in any security, 66 creating actual or apparent active, 67 or raising or 
depressing the price, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security 
by others. 68 Section 9 SEA also ensnares a wide variety of other manipulative 
practices. These can be seen to include the circulation or dissemination of false 




It has been suggested that the number of transactions entered into need only be as few as three to 
attract liability; Lee, H. C. (1993(a)), supra, note 1, at 85. 
Either one of these criteria has been held sufficient to bring this section into effect; see U. S. I", 
Stein [1977] 456 F. 2d, at 850 (2nd Cir. ) 
By contrast, the FSA'86 adopts a more capacious view of the nature of inducement. Thus, it 
relates to inducing another person to `acquire, dispose, subscribe for or undem-rile' tile 
investment(s). 
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ini'ormation, 69 or the making of a false or misleading statement relating to the price of 
a particular security. 70 No special relationship between the parties concerned need be 
proven as the courts have deemed it sufficient for evidence of knowledge of the 
scheme to attract liability. 71 
Section 10(b) SEA is a catch-all provision, designed to deal with those abuses 
that have escaped the specific prohibitions of sections 9 and 10(a). 72 This section 
makes it unlawful for any person to use the mails or facilities of interstate commerce 
so as to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
of for the protection of investors. It is interesting to note that section 10(b) does not 
by its terms make anything unlawful unless the SEC has adopted a rule prohibiting it. 
Under this section rule l Ob-5 has been promulgated. The rule itself is viewed as 
being one of the fundamental cornerstones of all the anti-fraud provisions utilised in 
the United Statcs73 and is defined as follows: 
'It shall be unlatinf ul for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
69 Scction 9(2)4 SEA. 
70 Scction 9(2)6 , SEA. 
71 Russell Maguire and Co (1941 j 10 SEC 322,341. 
72 Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green [ 1977] 430 US 462. 
73 1 laten, N. (1996). The Law of, Securitles Regulation, at 702 et seq.. 
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(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to stale a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, 
(3) 
or 
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. ' 
In the past 60 or so years since its adoption, this simple rule has been invoked in 
countless SEC and private proceedings, and applied to almost every conceivable kind 
of situation. It has spawned a formidable outpouring of legal scholarship, including a 
number of leading books74 and innumerable law review articles. 75 
In the 1970's and 80's, many federal appellate courts and district courts 
developed expansive interpretations of rule l Ob-5 (along with other anti-fraud 
provisions). They applied it to impose liability for negligent as well as deliberate 
misrepresentations, for breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate management and for 
failure by directors, underwriters, accountants and lawyers to prevent the wrongdoing 
by others. In private actions for damages, the courts were willing to imply a private 
right of action in anyone whose losses were even remotely connected with the alleged 
wrongdoing, or even in someone who had suffered no loss if his suit would help to 
encourage compliance with the law. The Supreme Court aided and abetted this 
74 
75 
Lee, H. C. (1993(b)), 'Market Manipulation in the US and UK: Part 2', Company Lawyer, Vol. 
14, No. 7, at 124. 
Bearle, B. (1931), `Liabilityfor Stock Market Manipulation', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 31, at 
264; Moore, B. and Weisman, E. (1934) 'Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act', 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 2, at 46; Mathias, J. (1936), 'Manipulative Practices 
and the Securities Exchange Act', University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 3, at 7; 'Afarket 
Manipulation and the Stock Exchange Act', (1937), Yale Law Journal, Vol. 46, at 624; Bearle, 
B. (1938), 'Stock Market Manipulation', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 38, at 393; 'Regulation of 
Stock Market Manipulation', (1947), Yale Law Journal, Vol. 56, at 509; Branda, G. (1951), 
-Manipulation of Stock Markets under the Securities Laws', University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 99, at 651; Jacobs, L. (1973), 'Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule lOb-5'. 
New York Law Forum, Vol. 18, at 511 and Posner, N. (1986), 'Stock Market Manipulation and 
Corporate Control Transactions', University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 40, at 671. 
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development, giving an expansive reading to the terms ̀ fraud' and ̀ purchase or sale' 
and to the ̀ connection' that had to be found between them. 
I lowever, in 1975, a new conservative majority on the Supreme Court sharply 
reversed this trend and in a series of decisions gave a narrow reading to the terms of 
rule l Ob-5 and other anti-fraud provisions, thus limiting the situations in which a 
private right of action could be implied. The tone of these Supreme Court decisions 
was classed as even more important than their actual holdings as they cast doubt on 
the validity of many of the expansive decisions of preceding years, including those 
that have not been specifically overruled. 
Although not arranged in any logical order there are three separate clauses in 
rule IOb-5. Clause (I) and (3) speak in terms of `fraud' or `deceit' while clause (2) 
speaks in terms of misstatements or omissions. It is generally assumed, however, that 
clause (3), which prohibits `any act, practice or course of business which operates or 
would operate as (a) a fraud or deceit (b) upon any person (c) in connection with.... the 
purchase or sale of any security, ' has the broadest scope. Each of the elements of this 
formulation has given rise to interpretative questions. 
It has now become established under the rulings of the Supreme Court that no 
person can be found to have violated rule l Ob-5, in either a SEC or private action, 
unless he is shown to have acted with scienter. This was firmly established that in the 
case of Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder where the American Supreme Court stated that 
manipulation indicated: 
"... Intentional and wilful conduct designed to deceive or defraud 
Investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities... "76 
The scienter requirement, in the view of some courts, does not require that the 
person acted intentionally or wilfully, 77 but may be met by showing that he acted 
76 11976] 425 US 185. In addition, see Aaron v. SEC [1980] 446 US 680. 
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recklessly. 78 However, the courts have adopted a flexible approach in their attempts 
to find a scienter. Thus, where the manipulator has avoided a loss or made a gain 
through his activities the courts have readily acted against them, 79 although it has 
been noted that this does have limitations. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has held 
that a violation of clause (2) or (3) of section 17(a) SA (from which the language of 
the corresponding clauses of rule IOb-5 was adapted) can be established without 
showing scienter. 8o Thus, the language of clause (2) and (3) of rule l Ob-5, because it 
is based on section 10(b) SEA, has a different meaning than the corresponding 
language in section 17(a) SA. 
Since the SEC's rule-making power under section 10(b) is to be exercised . for 
the protection of investors, ' it can be argued that the only persons entitled to the 
protection of rule lOb-5 are those who can be classified as 'investors. ' Hlowever, the 
definition has been stretched in a number of ways. One of the most important came in 
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp. 81 involving a suit by a corporation which 
had been defrauded into issuing shares for an inadequate consideration. The 
defendant argued that the issuance of stock was not a 'sale' and that the corporation 
was not an 'investor. ' The court rejected both arguments, holding that the issuance 
was a 'sale' and that the corporation, having parted with shares which had economic 
value, was in the same position as an investor. 
While the fraud must be ̀ in connection with the purchase or sale, ' it need not 





Although it can be noted that the courts have sometimes adopted a broader interpretation of the 
scienter in order to convict a defendant; see Cargill Inc. v. Hardin [ 1971] 452 F. 2d 1 154 were it 
was held that intentional conduct amounted to manipulation. In addition, some courts have 
embraced a `fraud on the market theory' so to allow an action to be brought against a defendant 
without proof of reliance by the plaintiff; see Blackie v. Barrack [1975] 524 F. 2d 891, Pan: irer 
v. Wolf [1981] 663 F. 2d 365 and Shores v. Sklar [1981] 647 F. 2d 462. 
Sanders v. John Nuveen [1977] 554 F. 2d 790. 
US v. Charnay [ 1976] 537 F. 2d 341. 
Lee, N. C. (1993(a)), supra, note 1, at 86. 
81 [ 1960] 282 F. 2d 195. 
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Life and Casualty Co., 82 a group which obtained control of an insurance company 
caused it to sell certain securities which it owned, then misappropriated the proceeds 
for their own benefit. The Supreme Court, reversing the courts of appeals, held 
unanimously that 
"... since there was a 'sale ' of a security and since fraud was used 'in 
connection with' it, there is redress under section 10(b), whatever might 
he available as a remedy under state law... " 
E lowever, subsequent lower court decisions have read this decision narrowly, 
holding that the fraud must have infected the securities transactions itself, rather than 
merely involving a misappropriation of the proceeds, 83 and that there is no liability 
when there is a substantial time gap or no direct causal link between the sale and the 
alleged fraud. 84 
The most important extension of the ̀ in connection with' language came in the 
decision reached in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.. 85 In this case the court held that 
misstatements in a press release issued by a publicly-held corporation, which was not 
at the time engaged in buying or selling any of its shares, violated rule lOb-5 because 
they were made ̀in connection with' the purchases and sales being made by 
shareholders in the open market. 
Rccognition of a private right of action for fraudulent misstatements under rule 
l Oh-5 raises the possibility that such an action may be brought where the misstatement 
is covered by another, more specific, provision of federal securities law. Thus, in SEC 
82 [ 1971 ] 404 US 6. 
83 Re Investors Funding [1980] 523 F. Supp. 563. 
84 Rochelle v. Marine Midland [ 1976] 535 F. 2d 523 and Ketchum v. Green [ 1977] 557 F. 2d 1022. 
83 [1968) 401 F. 2d 833. 
v. National Securities Inc. 86 the Supreme Court held that rule IOb-5 could be applied 
to misstatements in proxy statements, even though proxy solicitation was governed by 
specific SEC rules under section 14 SEA. In other case, the court has held that suit can 
be brought under rule I Ob-5 to recover damages resulting from misstatements in a 
1933 registration statement, even though such misstatements give rise to a specific 
right of action under section 11 SA. 87 Lower courts have also held that such suits can 
be brought with respect to misstatements in documents filed under the SEA, as to 
which there is specific civil liability under section 18.88 
The most significant court-imposed limitation on private litigation under rule 
l Ob-5 is the requirement that the plaintiff be either a `purchaser' or `seller' of 
securities in the transaction being attacked. However, problems frequently arise 
where a minority shareholder attacks the sale of a controlling block of stock, at a 
premium over the current market price, as a `fraud' on the minority shareholders. In 
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 89 one of the earliest cases under rule l Ob-5, the 
court held that the purpose of the rule was to protect purchasers and sellers of 
securities from being defrauded, and that since neither the minority shareholders nor 
the corporation had purchased or sold any securities, they had no cause of action. 
The `purchaser-seller' requirement of Birnbaum was reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 90 In this case, the defendants were 
obliged under an antitrust decree to offer plaintiffs certain shares in a new company. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated rule l Ob-5 by giving a 
deceptively pessimistic portrayal of the new company in the prospectus, for the 
purpose of inducing the plaintiff not to 
buy the shares. While the facts were highly 





Herman and MacLean v. Huddleston [1983] 459 US 375. 
Ross v. Robins Co. [1979] 607 F. 2d 545. 
[ 1952] 193 F. 2d 461. 
[1975] 421 US 723. 
142 
unusual, the court rested its decision denying standing to any person other than a 
purchaser or seller on the broad policy ground that it would deter ̀vexatious litigation' 
which 
"... may have a settlement value out of any proportion to its prospect of 
success at trial... " 
and which may raise , 
"... many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which depend(s) 
almost entirely on oral testimony... " 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is replete with expressions of hostility to private 
actions against corporate management, leading dissenting Justice Blackburn to remark 
that: 
"... the court exhibits a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well- 
being and a seeming callousness toward the investing public quite out of 
keeping.... with our own tradition and the intent of the securities laws... " 
One important exception to the purchaser-seller equirement is that a person whose 
shares are automatically converted into shares of another company in a merger put 
through by means of misleading statements is entitled to sue under rule lOb-5 as a 
fi)rcecl seller. '9I It should be noted that the courts have continued to apply the 
'/orcccl seller' exception aller the Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip. 92 
91 1 ine V. Qeneflciai Finance [1967] 374 F. 2d 627. 
92 Allcy v. Alirunion (19801614 F. 2d 1372,1387. 
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4.3.2. The English Position 
4.3.2.1. The Common Law Position 
While such cases as R v. Aspinall93 have long recognised the need to criminalize 
manipulative practices, 94 on the basis that it provides retribution and increases the 
deterrent effect, English common law has also allowed investors to sue such 
fraudsters, albeit in limited circumstances, under the tort of deceit. 95 This was 
illustrated in the case of Barry v. Croskey96 where a number of defendants and a 
jobber entered into an agreement with the plaintiff jobber to purchase shares in a 
company. The defendants made a fraudulent representation to the Stock Exchange to 
obtain a listing for that company and secured allotments for themselves through 
fictitious names. Consequently, the plaintiff jobber could not obtain shares for 
delivery and had to pay the defendant jobber certain sums to be released from this 
contract. The court held that a bill in equity to recover sums paid by the plaintiff 
would lie if amended to show that the plaintiff discovered the fraud after the payment 
of those sums. However, in this case it was recognised that a plaintiff could only 




[ 1876], supra, note 26. In this case the defendants were charged with conspiring to falsely 
obtain a listing of the stock exchange for the purpose of inducing potential investors of believing 
that the rules of the exchange had been complied with. In similar factual circumstances it was 
judicially recognised in Burns v. Pennell that in such instances the use of the criminal law would 
be more appropriate than civil law; [1849] 2 }IL 497,525 per Lord Campbell. 
The problems associated with criminalizing financial offences has not just been experienced by 
the United Kingdom see, for instance, Ozawa, E. (1994), 'Market Price Afanipulation', 
Butterworths Journal of International Business and Financial Law, Vol. 9, No. 4, at 53 et seq., 
which details the problems Japan has encountered in interpretating the criminal law within this 
context. 
In reviewing the elements necessary for the tort of deceit to come about see Viscount Afaugham 
dicta in Bradford Building Society v. Borders [ 1942] 2 All ER 205,211. 
96 [ 1861 ] 70 ER 945. 
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"... it appear[ed] that such [a] false representation was made with the 
intent that it should be acted upon by such a third person in the manner 
that occasions the injury of loss... "97 
and that the loss must be 
"... by the immediate, and not the remote, consequence of the 
representation thus made... "98 
Thus, a number of thresholds had to be overcome in order for the potential plaintiff to 
rewarded with any remedy. Initially such evidential hurdles dissuaded many from 
bringing an action under this tort. In particular whether or not the ̀ third person' in V-, 
C Wood's second principle should amount to a market purchaser was perceived as a 
major obstacle. However, when this principle is considered in light of his remarks as 
to victims in the case of de Berenger's and discussion in Longridge v. Levy, it is clear 
that such a ̀ third person' should be ascertained and does not include a stranger/market 
purchaser. Indeed such an interpretation was also affirmed in the later case of 
, Salurnan v rVarner. 99 There the plaintiff had sold shares short in a company promoted 
by the defendants who had made false representations to the Stock Exchange in order 
to obtain a settling day. The defendant also secured allotment of large bulk of the new 
shares through nominees and thereby managed to corner the market. As a result of the 
defendant's rigging activities, the plaintiff had to purchase the shares at a higher price 
than expected. The court held that the injury to the plaintiff was too remote, there 
being no civil right of the plaintiff that had been invaded by the defendant's 
conspiracy to rig the market. 
97 Op. cit., at 953 - 55, per V-C Wood. 
98 Anle. 
99 11981165 TLR (NS) 951. 
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However, in a heavily criticised case, Bedford v Bags haw, i o0 the court held that 
the defendants were liable to a purchaser on the market. In that case the defendants 
obtained a listing on the Stock Exchange by making false representations to the listing 
committee that two-thirds of the shares had been subscribed. The plaintiff, knowing 
the rules of the Stock Exchange relied on the representations and purchased shares on 
the market. The shares turned out to be worthless. 
Yet, it is difficult to reconcile Bedford v. Bagshaw with the earlier case of Peek 
v. Gurney. 101 In that case, the court held that a purchaser on the market could not 
recover damages from the defendant director's estate since the force of the fraudulent 
prospectus was exhausted after the allotment of shares. In other words, only 
subscribers and not subsequent purchasers can sue the perpetrators of fraud for 
damages. 
A later Court of Appeal case seems, however, to qualify the I louse of Lords 
decision in Peek v Gurney. In Andrews v Mockfordl02 the Court of Appeal gave relief 
to investors who had purchased shares on the market if it could be proved that the 
fraudulent prospectus was intended to induce subsequent market dealings. Despite the 
fact that preference has been given to Andrews v Mockford over Peek v Gurney, 103 the 
latter, being a House of Lords decision, is nevertheless considered as representing the 
general principle at common law. 104 
The above contention seems to suggest that in order for an investor to claim 
damages from a market rigger it is necessary to show privity of contract or trust, 
without which the court would normally deny a remedy on the ground of remoteness. 
100 [ 1959] 4H and N 538 and 157 ER 951. 
101 [1873] LR 6 HL 377 at 396 et seq.. 
102 [1896] 1Qß 372. 
103 Welch, N. (1985), ̀ Breach of Prospectus Requirements', Company Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 6, at 
249 et seq.. 
104 Clerk, J. and Linsell, K. (1982), on Torts, Butterworths: London, at 21 et seq.. 
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But such a proposition seems odd for in an action for deceit the issue of privity need 
not be proven. 105 According to Viscount Maugham in Bradford Building Society v 
Borders 106 the elements of deceit are: (i) there must be a representation of facts made 
by words or by conduct; (ii) the representation must be made with a knowledge that it 
is false; (iii) it must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the 
plaintiff or by a class of persons which will include the plaintiff in the manner which 
resulted in damages to him; and (iv) it must be proven that the plaintiff has acted upon 
the false statement and has possibly sustained loss. 
One way of explaining this conundrum was suggested in Clerk and Lindsell 
wherc it was suggested that: 
"... where a person has acted upon a false representation which was not 
made directly to hint, the practical test whether he was intended to act 
upon it is whether it was to the defendant's interest that he should do so. 
Therefore, where persons spread a false rumour for the purpose of raising 
the price of certain stock, they will not be liable in damages to those who 
deal with other persons on the faith of such rumour being true, there 
being no intention to deceive any persons other than those who dealt with 
the defendants themselves, inasmuch as the defendants had nothing to 
gain unless the investors dealt with themselves. "107 
however, this argument cannot explain cases like Andrews v Mockford or Scott 
v Dixon where the plaintiffs succeeded in recovering damages from the defendants 
despite the absence of a contractual relationship between the two. In the latter case 
the plaintiff brought shares in a banking company upon the faith of a fraudulent report 
105 Pasley v. Freeman [ 1789] 3 TR 51; 100 ER 500. 
106 [ 1942] 2 All ER 205, at 211. 
107 Clerk, J. and Linsell, K. (1982), supra, note 104, at 29 etseq.. 
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made by the company's directors. Copies of which were left at a bank for distribution. 
The court held that the directors were liable in damages to the plaintiff. lo8 
It seems therefore that contractual relationship is not the only situation in which 
relief can be granted to victims of stock market fraud. Another situation in which 
damages can be granted, it is submitted, is the case where there exists a direct 
communication between the market rigger and the plaintiff victim. The point was 
forcibly put by Lord Chelmsford in Peek v Gurney: 
"... It appears to me there must be something to connect the directors 
making the representation with the party complaining that he has been 
deceived and injured by it; as in Scott v Dixon, by selling a report 
containing the misrepresentations complained of to a person who 
afterwards purchased shares upon the faith of it, or as suggested in 
Gerhard v Bates by delivering the fraudulent prospectus to a person who 
thereupon becomes a purchaser of shares, or by making an allotment of 
shares to a person who has been induced by the prospectus to apply fcor 
such allotment. In all these cases the parties in one way or other are 
brought into direct communication; and in an action the 
misrepresentation would be properly alleged to have been made by the 
defendant to the plaintiff; but the purchaser of shares in the market upon 
the faith of a prospectus which he has not received from those who are 
answerable for it, cannot by action upon it so connect himself with then? 
as to render them liable to him for the misrepresentations contained in it, 
as if it had been addressed personally to himself... " [emphasis added] 109 
This idea of direct communication can also explain Andrews v. Afockford. It 
should be recalled in that case the defendants issued a prospectus a copy of which was 
sent to the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff was more than a mere stranger who had 
108 [ 1959] QB }1T. 
109 [1873] LR 6 HL 377 at 399 et seq.. 
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purchased shares on the market. He was an ascertained member of a specific class 
whom the defendant had direct intent to injure. As such, the facts of the case seem to 
satisfy V-C Wood's three principles and Viscount Maugham's dictum on the 
requirement of deceit in Bradford BS v. Borders. 
In cases involving securities fraud and market manipulation, it seems therefore, 
for an investor to maintain an action against the market riggers, he will have to work 
out a relationship with the former either in contract or in some other form of nexus 
such as direct communication. The court, in a majority of cases, appears as in other 
areas of tortuous liability relating to economic loss, to have exhibited a desire to 
restrict liability in order to prevent floods of claims from strangers like purchasers on 
the market. 
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4.3.2.2. . The Legislative Position 
4.3.2.2.1. Section 47(1) 
Section 47 creates two categories of offences: in essence subsection (1) concerns 
misleading statements, whereas subsection (2) concerns conduct creating a misleading 
impression. However, the two subsections do not seem mutually exclusive, in that a 
`statement, promise or forecast', or `concealment' 110 (caught under subsection (1)) 
may also constitute an 'cict or ... course of conduct' (caught under subsection (2)). 
This causes difficulty as subsections (1) requires proof of dishonesty (or recklessness) 
whereas subsection (2) does not. Thus, it would seem that even honest statements 
which are not penalised by subsection (1) may be penaliscd under subsection (2). 
Thus, it is possible for a company director to be liable under this section if he knows 
that statement to be misleading; dishonestly conceals any material fact or recklessly 
makes a misleading statement. 111 
110 It may be argued that the offence by concealment can arise only if it would make what has 
already been said or disclosed false, misleading or deceptive; R v. MacKinnon [ 1959) I QB, at 
154: 
III 
"l f anv fact that is omitted from a statement, promise or forecast is material, it can unly 
be material in that its omission makes what has been said misleading, false or 
deceptive. " 
Past decisions interpreting the comparable provision in the Prevention off Fraud (lnvesnnent) 
Acts of 1939 and 1958 suggest that dishonestly was required for a person to be guilty when 
charged under the 'knowledge' category. Interestingly, the courts, when interprctating similar 
sections in the 1939 and 1958 Acts took divergent views on whether dishonesty had to be proved 
when charging a person under the 'knowledge' category. In R v. MacKinnon, op. cit., the court 
had to pronounce on the meaning of 'recklessly' which appeared in section 13 of the 1958 Act. 
Salman J. took the view that section 13 dealt with three categories of persons. 
According to him, there was no difference between categories I and 2 because if the 
omission was dishonest it was only because the person who made the statement knew what was 
said was misleading, false or deceptive by reason of that omission. 
fraud. 
It was not the purpose of the 1939 Act to include offences which had nothing to do with 
However, in the case of Bales [1952] 2 All ER 842 affd sub nom [1953] I WLR 77 the 
word `recklessly' was given its full ordinary meaning. As the courts saw it, if reckless' meant 
something more than carelessness it is not clear why Parliament had not used that word as it had 
done in the line immediately before. Moreover, in words of Donovan J.: 
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The parenthetical clause in section 47(1)(b) has introduced ambiguity into 
section 47(1)(a) as it is open to two possible interpretations. On the one hand, 
Following the judgements in MacKinnon) 12 and Batesl 13, proof of dishonesty may be 
required to prove a charge of making a false statement or concealing material facts. 
Alternatively, dishonesty may be only required if the charge is one of concealment. 
Recklessness as a mental element is sufficient only in respect of affirmative 
statements and not omissions. Thus, paragraph (b) qualifies only the statement part of 
paragraph (a). The words `or otherwise' in the parenthetical clause are necessary only 
because, in their absence, dishonesty would be thought of as an essential element of 
(a) as well. In fact, this was how the requirement of recklessness was interpreted by 
the court in MacKinnon. 
On the other hand, dishonesty is explicitly dispensed with only for offences 
arising from statements recklessly made. By implication, therefore, dishonesty 
remains as an element of the offence constituted by knowledge. Moreover, at the time 
the amendment by the parenthetical clause was made to section 13 of the Prevention 
of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, Parliament would have been cognisant of the 
decision in Bates and MacKinnon both of which expressed the view that dishonesty 
was involved in offences arising from statements knowingly made. Since Parliament 
amended only paragraph (b), it must be assumed to have acquiesced in the views 
expressed by the courts on paragraph (a). 
"(/)t is not a dijricult matter to decide in any given case whether a false statement offact 
is false to the knowledge of him who makes it, nor whether a concealment offacts is 
dishonest. But then the section goes on to deal, among other things, with forecasts which 
are misleading, false or deceptive. They may be falsified by the events. How, in a 
majority of cases, could one prove they were made dishonestly, even if such were the 
case? It would seem understandable therefore for Parliament, intending to do something 
about then, took the view that as a practical matter, it ought to go a step further than 
false statements and dishonest concealments offacts, and besides striking at the 
dishonest prophet, do something to ensure that even the honest ones should take due care 
to see that their forecasts were not misleading, false or deceptive. " 
112 Op cit. 
113 Supra, note 111. 
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It is submitted that the plain meaning of the words of section 47(l) does not 
warrant the conclusion that dishonesty is a prerequisite for statements known to be 
false, misleading or deceptive. If dishonesty did not mean something other than 
knowledge, it is difficult to understand why the word `knowledge' is used in respect of 
one part of the clause and ̀ dishonesty' used in the other. 
Dishonesty and knowledge refer to two different though not mutually exclusive 
states of mind. Dishonesty connotes a state of mind marked by deliberation or 
wilfulness which are not necessarily involved when a person acts knowingly. It is not 
necessary to establish that in making a knowingly false statement, a person acted 
dishonestly. Conversely, he may not be acting dishonestly when making a statement 
in the knowledge that it is false or misleading. Therefore, it is not necessary to prove 
that in making such a statement he acted dishonestly. 
In practice, however, it will be difficult to prove dishonesty except by reference 
to his knowledge. Dishonesty, after all, refers to a person's state of mind and, in the 
absence of a willing acknowledgment of his own dishonesty, it has to be inferred from 
what he knew and what he did. Thus, a person cannot be said to have acted 
dishonestly in omitting to divulge facts of which he was unaware. But, if he knew that 
he was concealing facts which were material to an investment decision, then it would 
be difficult for him to maintain that he did not do so dishonestly. However, 
knowledge, like dishonesty, is equally difficult to prove. 
In R v. Ghosh, 114 the meaning of `dishonesty' as it appeared in section 1 of the 
Theft Act 1968 was considered, and the Court of Appeal determined that it referred to 
state of mind rather than conduct. Therefore, the test of dishonesty was said to be 
subjective. Nevertheless, the court held further that the standard of honesty to be 
applied was the standard of reasonable and honest men and not that of the accused. In 
otherwords, if the accused knew that the society at large would believe he was acting 
dishonestly, then he would be acting dishonestly regardless of his own state of mind. 
1 14 [1982] 2 All E. R. 689. 
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In Ghosh, the court was confronted with two lines of authorities on the issue at 
hand, one holding that the test to be applied was subjective, 115 and the other holding 
in favour of an objective test. 116 The court reconciled the two by regarding the 
specific mental element of dishonesty as a state of mind but at the same time making 
it subject to the standard of reasonable men in society. If dishonesty was described as 
referring to a course of conduct, it could then be established independent of the 
knowledge or belief of the accused. Instead, the court chose to characterise it as a 
state of mind. But in applying the test of reasonable and honest men to the accused's 
belief, the court applied an objective test regardless of what the accused believed. , 
If the notion of dishonesty were to be judged solely according to the current 
social mores, a person might be found guilty for not disclosing facts which, by civil 
law, he is not obliged to disclose. The better view is to regard dishonesty as not only 
reflecting moral but also legal considerations. Accordingly, in the absence of a legal 
duty to disclose, dishonesty will not be made out merely because of their non- 
disclosure. 117 
Recklessness, ̀normally involves conscious and unreasonable risk taking either 
as to the possibility that a particular undesirable circumstances exists or as to the 
possibility that some evil will come to pass. ' As in the case of negligence, 
recklessness involves unjustifiable risk taking but, unlike in negligence, the risk is 
known. Thus, making a statement regardless of whether facts existed to support it 
Would amount to recklessness. 118 The decision in Caldwell119 and Lawrence120 have 
given a wider meaning to the concept of recklessness. According to Caldwell, a 
115 Rv. Landv[1981] I WLR355. 
116 R v. Greenstein [1975] 1 WLR 1353. 
117 Arlidge and Parry on Fraud, (1996), London: Sweet and Maxwell, at 218 et seq.. 
118 R v. Gruwald [1963] 1 Q. B. 935. 
119 (1982] A. C. 341. 
120 [1982] A. C. 510. 
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person will be acting recklessly even if he did not actually foresee the particular risk 
but would have realised the risk had he stopped to think, i. e. not given thought to the 
possibility of any risk. In the context of section 47(1) a person would be reckless 
either (i) when he foresees the risk of the statement, promise or forecast, or (ii) fails to 
give his mind to the possibility of the statement, promise or forecast being misleading, 
false or deceptive although there is an obvious risk that the statement might he so. 
The statement, promise or forecast must be made on the facts concealed for the 
purpose of inducing another person to enter or offer to enter into, or to refrain from 
entering or offering to enter into, an investment agreementl2l or to exercise, or refrain 
from exercising, any rights conferred by an investment. 122 
It is not a requirement of the offence that the statement be made to, or the facts 
be concealed from, the person who is induced to enter into or refrain from entering 
into an agreement. The person to whom a statement and the person who is intended to 
be induced need not be the same. 
Criminal liability under section 47(1) does not arise if certain requirements 
referred in section 47(4) are absent. Thus, a person is not liable in respect of a 
statement made from outside the United Kingdom to enter into an agreement outside 
the United Kingdom. If a statement is made from outside the United Kingdom 
inducing a person in the United Kingdom, it may result in liability. 
121 See section 44(9) FSA'86 for the definition of investment agreement cf, section 13(l) paragraph 
(b) of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 under which an offence was made out 
even if the accused induced another person to take part in any arrangement with respect to 
property other than securities, and where such arrangements enabled the participation in or 
receiving of profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of 
such property. 
122 As defined in section 1(3) FSA'86. 
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4.3.2.2.2. Related Offences 
In a similar vein, section 200 FSA'86 makes it an offence for a person to furnish 
information known to be false or misleading or recklessly to furnish information 
known to be false or misleading or recklessly to furnish information which is false or 
misleading for the purpose or in connection with any application of the FSA'86 or in 
purported compliance with any requirement imposed on him by or under the FSA'86. 
There is an apparent overlap between sections 47 and 200 FSA'86. However, a 
breach of section 47 must be made for the purpose of inducing. Regarding the 
secondary market, where the company is not a contracting party, disclosure, arguably, 
is not at all made for the purpose of inducing, which is a prerequisite for section 47, 
but rather to keep the market informed or alternatively to comply with the Stock 
exchange's disclosure requirements. If this argument is accepted, the significance of 
section 200(1) FSA'86 comes to the fore and fills the gap that the requirements : `for 
the purpose of inducing' in section 47 FSA'86 may create with regard to disclosure in 
the secondary market. 
An offence similar to that committed under Section 200 FSA'86 can also be 
found in section 19 of Theft Act 1968. Under this section an offence is committed 
where a company's annual accounts are misleading. Section 19(1) provides: 
"{Where an offence of a body corporate or unincorporated association (or 
person purporting to, act as such) with intent to deceive members or 
creditors of the body corporate or association about its affairs, publishes 
or concurs in publishing a written statement or account which to his 
knowledge is or may be misleading. False or deceptive in a material 
particular, he shall ... 
be liable to imprisonment... " 
Subject to the provisions of section 19(3), the defendant must be (or purported 
to be) an 'ofJicer' of the corporation or association. ̀ Officer' is not defined in the 
Theft Acl 1968, but the Companies Act 1985; section 744, provides that in relation to a 
company that the expression any director, manager or secretary. This expression is 
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commonly held to mean any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of 
their body corporate and is intended to impose criminal liability only upon those who 
are in a position of real authority, the decision-makers within the company who have 
both the power and responsibility to decide corporate policy and strategy. 
An auditor is an `officer' who is appointed to fill the offence of auditor and not 
merely `ad hoc for a limited purpose. ' Thus the offence is committed by an auditor 
who is corruptly dissuaded from qualifying this report. Section 19(3) adds: 
"Where the affairs of a body corporate or association are managed by its 
members, this section shall apply to any statement which a member 
publishers or concurs in publishing in connection with his functions of 
management as if he were an officer of the body corporate or 
association" 
The actus reus of the offence is the publication of a written statement or account 
which is or may be misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular. The 
requirement of falsehood `in a material particular', in the light of the required mental 
clement, presumably means only that the falsehood must relate to the affairs of the 
corporation or association. It is also sufficient if the defendant does not publish the 
statement or account himself but concurs in the publication by someone else. The 
general belief is that section 19 does not apply to exuberant oral statements by 
directors to the press, even though those may substantially affect public views of the 
company. But it is arguable that if a director makes a statement to the press he is 
`concurring' in the statement's subsequent publication. 
The mens rea of the offence does not include dishonesty. Two elements are 
required: the first (somewhat superfluously in the light of the second) is knowledge 
that the statement or account is or may be misleading, false or deceptive, the second is 
an intent to deceive members or creditors of the corporation or association about their 
affairs. The intent to deceive, it is submitted, should be construed as an intent to lead 
members or creditors to believe a proposition which is false. 
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4.3.2.2.3. Section 47(2) 
Unlike section 47(1) FSA '86 that was originally defined under section 13 of the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958123 what amounts to market manipulation 
has no previous legislative roots124 although this can now be found in section 47(2) 
FSA'86. Even though section 47(2) only comprises of a mere six lines in the statute 
book its apparent simplicity and terseness belie the complexity of this market activity 
and the profundity of its impact on many types of securities transactions. This section 
states that market manipulation occurs when: 
`Any person who does any act or engages in any course of conduct which 
creates a false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price 
or value of any investment is guilty of an offence if he does so for the 
purpose of creating that impression and of thereby inducing another 
person to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite those 
investments or to refrain from doing so or to exercise, or refrain from 
exercising, any rights conferred by those investments. ' 
It applies to any body, whether they be natural or corporate entities irrespective of 
their authorisation under the FSA'86. The subsection is also supplemented by three 
further provisions relating to defences, 125 territorial application126 and criminal 
pcnaltics. 127 Yet, like the forbearer to section 47(1), 128 section 47(2) has had little 
123 Stoakes, D. (I 996), ̀ Asking Leading Questions', Eurornoney, June, at 30. 
124 Although similarities can be deduced from section 70 Securities Industry Act 1970 (New South 
Wales). Before section 47(2) came into effect any prosecution in this area was carried out under 
the aegis of conspiracy to defraud; see, for example, Scott v. Brown, Doering McNab and Co 
[ 1892], supra, note 6. 
125 Section 47(3) FSA'86. 
126 Section 47(5) FSA'86. 
127 Section 47(6) FSA'86. 
128 Control of manipulative practices have not just been relegated to these two pieces of legislation. 
Roth the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers and the Stock Exchange have general principles 
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impact on those that seek to use these devices to make money. 129 Indeed, 
determining what is a legal or illegal act for the purposes of section 47(2) has not been 
clear primarily due to the lack of specific case law on this particular point. While 
there have been calls for clarification on the extent of this section130 these have 
essentially gone unheeded with the result that this section is broadly worded and 
extensive in scope, a fact that can be advantageous given the number of manipulative 
practices that exist. 131 
One of the most difficult aspects of determining whether market manipulation 
has occurred for the purpose of section 47(2) relates to the issue of stabilisation. 132 
Stabilising techniques refer to those market operations undertaken which support 
securities issues at a certain market price and is a practice which is used to prevent 
outsiders from manipulating certain market conditions, for example, when a security 
has been recently issued or traded upon in Eurobond markets. 133 
directed at this practice; ̀ Market Manipulation; Offences; Take-Overs', (1988) 3(1) Corporate 
Briefings, at 2 et seq.. 
129 Ooi, P. (1993), notes that the reasons for failure on the part of the Prevention of Fraud 
(investments) Act 1958 lay with its terms and poor enforcement; `The Regulation ofShure 
Pushing: A United Kingdom Perspective', Company Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 11, at 209. 
130 See comments made by the Minister for Trade and Industry, Francis Itfaude in relation to take. 
over bids; Hansard, 16/5/89, at 116 et seq. 
131 1{owever, Lee, H. C. (1993(b)) disputes that this section actually covers 'corner' or'squee_e' 
devices given that these: 
"... involve the limitation of supply but may not necessarily involve an intent 'to induce 
another' to deal with the securities... " 
, supra, note 
74, at 125. 
132 Tennekoon, H. (1989), ̀ Stabilisation of Securities after the Financial Services Act 1936', 
Butterworths Journal International Banking and Financial Law, Vol. 4, No. 7, at 304 et seq.. 
133 Shepard, S. (1990), `Bond Buy-ins and the Law', Butterworths Journal of International Banking 
and Financial Law, Vol. 5, No. 5, at 198 et seq.; Hancock, G. and Maddock, J. (1989), 
Financial Regulation: Eurobonds - Duty to Disclose Successes or Otherwise of Bond 
Syndication', Journal of International Banking Law, Vol. 4, No. 6,253 et seq. and I lorwood, I. 
(1994), `Now to Massage the League Tables', Euromoney, December, at 30 et seq.. 
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Stabilisation is a complex and sophisticated transactional used both on primary 
and secondary markets. On primary markets stabilisation is usually achieved through 
the under or over allotment of securities by the appointment of a leading dealer. A 
number of stabilising techniques may be used by such dealers in order to achieve a 
particular result. These include the use of `ramping', which involves the making of an 
advanced purchase of securities before their actual issue date has been set thereby 
pushing or depressing its value; 134 ̀bear squeezes', achieved when the lead manager 
under allots to dealers who, in anticipation of their allotment, might have oversold the 
securities on the market causing their price to fall; or `short squeezes', achieved when 
the lead manager will only sell at a specific price. This former practice has been used 
on a number of occasions . In 1989 a lead manager employed a short squeeze tactic 
in 
connection with Toyota Motor Credit. On this occasion, some dealers, including 
some members'of the syndicate, had sold more bonds than they owned in a hope of 
buying them back later at a lower price. The lead manager declined to make a public 
price at which it would sell the bonds saying it would deal only by telephone and that 
the offer price would depend on who wanted to buy. 
Other techniques include the use of: 
``... pegging or special bids. Pegging is the placing of a continuous offer 
at a specified price so that a floor is effectively established. A special bid 
is a scheme to purchase a specified number of shares around the desired 
price. [Yet] The danger in stabilisation is that in the case of unpopular 
issues, it may soak up so much of the float that it looks very much like a 
134 This practice was used in the original Guinness trial; Guinness PLC v. Saunders [1988] 1 WLR 
863; Levi, M. (1993), Royal Commission on Criminal Justice; The Investigation, Prosecution 
and Trial of Serious Fraud, Research Study No. 14, HMSO: London, at 219 et seq.; R v. Ward, 
Howarth, Dolye, Cranford and Pollard [1995] unreported; see Barnett, A. (1996), ̀ Fraud 
Enforcement in the Financial Services Act 1986: An Analysis and Discussion of s. 47', Company 
Lawyer. Vol. 17, No. 7, at 209. 
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corner or squeeze which [may be] manipulative... "135 (amendments 
added) 
Stabilising activities technically can constitute a prima facie contravention of 
section 47(2) FSA'86 if it can be shown that its effects are to create a false securities 
market. However, the FSA'86 permits stabilisation provided it is effected in 
accordance with rules made under itself. 
This ambiguity causes significant problems in that what may be a legitimate 
transactions through stabilising techniques may equally be an illegitimate market 
manipulation. 136 Lee argues that in order to correct this conundrum: 
"... A better approach would be to create a separate offence fir the 
breach of stabilisation rules. This offence should attract a lighter penalty 
to reflect the lack of an intention to defraud. Emphasis should sh? /l away 
from the need to prove intention to mislead onto proving failure to 
disclose which is the primary objection to any allegedly illegal 
stabilisation... "137 
Section 47(2) comprises of a number of other key elements that must be proven 
in order for a alleged manipulator to attract criminal liability. Thus, the act engaged in 
by the potential manipulator must create a misleading or false impression. While the 
latter principle can be satisfied, if viewed by the court, as being objectively 
mendacious, the former impression has been judicially construed to refer to the 




Lee, H. C. (1993(b)), supra, note 74, at 126. Although it should be noted that markct 
manipulation would only occur if combined with the intention to `create a false and misleading 
impression' in the securities market. 
Although under section 48(7) FSA'86, states that nothing done conforming to the Authority's 
rules , applicable to 
both directly authorised persons and to SRO members, will be in breach of 
section 47(2); see ante, chapter two. 
Lee, H. C. (1993(b)) supra, note 74, at 127. 
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manipulator. 138 Ultimately though such an impression is decided on the facts and 
merits of each case placed before the court. In addition, a defendant will not attract 
criminal liability if he refrains from engaging in conduct contrary to s. 47(2) unlike 
s. 47(1). While the general rule under English Criminal law is that a defendant will not 
have committed a criminal offence by way of omission unless he is under a duty to 
act, 139 it is highly probable that a defendant ensnared under section 47(2) will have to 
prove that there is no causative link between his actions and the alleged manipulation 
that has taken place irrespective of any omission on his part. 
Section 47(2) covers a vast number of securities transactions that are intended to 
operate on and off the market floor. However, even if these transactions abide by 
applicable rules and regulations, the court may still find a defendant liable if he uses 
any fraudulent means to create the wrong impression to an investor, private or 
otherwise. 140 This can be deduced if one looks to the United States for guidance. 
There, the courts have long recognised that even if steps have been taken by the 
defendant to ascribe to market regulations he will still be liable under the SEA if he 
ultimately creates a false impression when trading he will be found liable under the 
SEA. This was illustrated in the case of Halsey, Stuart and Co. Inc. 141 where an 
underwriter, who has been left with a large inventory of unsubscribed shares in a new 
issue made further purchases in order to make it appear as if there is active trading in 
that security. In these circumstances he will be found liable of manipulative conduct. 
138 CRIV Ltd v. Sneddon [1972] 72 AR (NSW) 17. 
139 Jefferson, M. (1995), Criminal Law, Cavendish: London, at 106 et seq.. 
140 Under section 47(2) the phrase `purpose of creating (an) impression' can be construed as being 
satisfied in light of proof of recklessness; the premise being that if the proof of intention be the 
only criteria the defence under section 47(3) would serve no purpose. Therefore, it would seem 
appropriate that the decision reached in R v. Caldwell [1982] AC 341 will be applicable in such 
instances where an individual: 
(a) engages in a course of conduct which in fact creates an obvious risk that a false or 
misleading market will be created; and 
(b) when he engages in that course of conduct either he had not given any thought to the 
possibility of there being such a risk, or he recognised that there was some risk involved 
and nevertheless went on to engage in the course of conduct. 
141 (1949] 30 SEC 106,112. 
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This stems from the conceptional belief that the market should be free and open. 
Bence, the correct value of any listed security should be arrived at by consensus 
between bone fide purchasers and sellers. Therefore, if this equilibrium is 
maladjusted by manipulative conduct this will be unlawful under section 47(2). 
Under section 47(l)(b) a defendant will only be liable if it can be shown that he 
had the requisite mens rea at the time he created such a false or misleading 
impression. It can therefore be surmised that more emphasis should be placed on the 
mens rea requirement rather than the actus reus requirement of this offence, although 
it is accepted that for a defendant to be found liable under section 47(2) it must be 
proven that he not only had the intention to create an impression as to the market price 
or value of a security but also that he induced another into dealing in such a 
sccurity. 142 In order for the former requirement to be satisfied by the prosecution it 
must be proven that the defendant created an impression as to the value or price of the 
investment which was knowingly wrong or inaccurate. The latter mcns rea 
requirement will only be satisfied when it can be shown that the defendant either had 
the intention to create a false and misleading impression. It is also not necessary to 
show that the defendant acted in any dishonest manner. 143 
The adoption of very broad language in section 47(2) in conjunction with the 
fact that there have been few cases that have dealt adequately with this section can be 
perceived as causing problems in relation to defining the working parameters of it 
determining what should be classed as either legal or illegal, While the altering of 
securities for legitimate reasons, such as for tax should not attract liability, this point 
has not yet been severely tested in the United Kingdom's judicial system. 144 
Therefore, if such inferences do come within the courts domain the adoption of a more 
flexible approach similar to that used in the United States and Canada will facilitate 




Scott v. Brown [1892], supra, note 6. 
Lee, 11. C. (1993(b)), supra, note 74, at 124. 
Lee, F1. C. (1993(b)), op cit.. 
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Developments Ltd, 145 may well provide the United Kingdom's courts with some 
guidance to those instances where multi-motive trading practices are involved. In this 
case stockbrokers advising a corporate client on reorganisation of share capital as a 
preliminary measure to taking over and merging with another corporation, devised a 
trading scheme to maintain the target price for their client's shares, which were trading 
at a deflated price. Since there was no disclosure of the scheme, a false and 
misleading subterfuge of active trading was devised and put into effect, as a result 
they were held to be in violation of anti-manipulative provisions. It was stated by 
Mason J. that: 
"... Purchases or sales are often made for indirect or collateral motives, 
in circumstances where the transactions will, to the knowledge of the 
participants, have an effect on the market for, or the price of, shares. 
Plainly enough, it is not the object of the section to outlaw all such 
transactions... "146 
The Canadian courts, in a similar manner to the American courts have also 
sought to clarify what actions taken by a trader should be deemed as acceptable 
market practice, and therefore legal or manipulative, and therefore illegal. The 
decision reached was that any motive, honest or dishonest, should essentially be 
derived from circumstantial evidence. Thus, in R v. Jay147 the accused was charged 
for engaging in a series of transactions in violation of section 325 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code. Evidence was presented of several individual purchases alleged to 
have been made by the defendant through orders he had placed with his brokers over 
a considerable period of time. However, the quantity and the purchase price of the 
orders fluctuated from time to time. In acquitting the defendant, Roach J. A. stated: 
145 [1982] 56 ALJR 106. 
146 Op. cit., at I21. 
147 [1965] 2 OR 471; [1966] 1 CCC 70. 
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In order to succeed the Crown would have to prove, with respect to 
each of these purchase orders, that a substantially corresponding sale 
order had been entered by the accused at substantially the same time so 
that when the purchase and sale of the quantity specified would be 
completed they would offset one another with no profit to the accused. "148 
The court stated further that the Crown would have to go further: 
"... and prove beyond reasonable doubt that those corresponding 
purchase and sale orders were entered with intent to create a false or 
misleading appearance of active public trading. " 
This approach was also taken in the case of R v. MacMillan, 149 a case which also 
related to the same provision of the Code although interpreted in a less restrictive 
manner. In this case, the accused was charged for wash trading by way of 
manipulative trading through family and friends. No evidence was given by the 
defendant at her trial. However, in the absence of any explanation by her as to her 
intentions, the court was compelled to find against her, stating that: 
"... in the absence of circumstances which might reasonably lead to 
another conclusion, the only logical inference to be drawn from her 
conduct is that her real and dominant intention was to create a false or 
misleading appearance, of active trading in the shares of Golden Arrow. 
The suggested intent to benefit friends could amount to no more than a 
mere subsidiary consideration.... For these reasons, the appeal against 




Op. cit., at 473. 
[ 1968] 66 DLR (2d) 680. 
Op. cit., at 687. 
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Additionally, in the case of Rv Lampard15 t involving a charge of 29 accounts of 
wash trading the court relied on the proposition that the defendant must have intention 
to be able to the foresee the consequences of his actions. McLennan J. A. said of the 
defendant: 
"... He had been in the brokerage business for many years and must be 
taken, in the absence of evidence from which some other reasonable, 
explanation may be inferred, not only to have foreseen that each wash 
trade would create a false appearance of active public trading but to have 
intended that result... " 152 
At common law, the prosecution need not prove that the defendant intended to 
defraud a specific person, as was the case in de Berenger, it is impossible to know 
who would become purchasers of the security being rigged. It is not clear from the 
wording of section 47(2) whether it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that 
the defendant intended to induce a specific person to deal with him. Arguably this 
subsection should follow the common law position, for to rule otherwise will unduly 
restrict the scope of the provision in protecting the investors. It is therefore submitted 
that in a case where fraud is aimed at the general public (or a class thereof) it will be 
sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant intended to affect the investors in general 
(or a class thereof). 
There is under subsection (3) a defence available to the accused if he reasonably 
believed that his act of conduct would not create a false or misleading impression. 
Thus the test for liability is mainly subjective - whether the accused honestly believed 
his act or conduct would create a false impression - depending upon the objective 
safeguard that such belief must be `reasonable'. In determining whether the accused's 
belief was reasonable or not, presumably it is not the standard of the ordinary investor 
that wil I be used; rather the question should be whether a person in the accused's 
151 [ 1968] 2 OR 470. 
152 Op. cit., at 476. 
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circumstances would have held the belief, taking into account all the accused's 
characteristics. 
Proof of subjective belief may appear to be difficult. However, if the accused's 
conduct is such that no reasonable person in his position would have held that belief, 
then there exists powerful evidence that he did not honestly hold that belief. The 
standard of proof required for the defence under the subsection would be a balance of 
probabilities. It should be noted that the prosecution would need to prove all the 
ingredients in section 47(2) beyond reasonable doubt before the burden of proof shifts 
to the accused, in the event that he desires to avail himself to the subsection (3) 
defence. 
Under section 47(6), a person guilty of an offence under section 47(2) is liable 
to up to seven years imprisonment or a fine or both. In addition, under section 61(1) 
the court may grant an injunction on application from the Authority or the Secretary of 
State to restrain a person from infringing section 47(2). However, the FSA 86 does 
not expressly provide a civil remedy for violating section 47(2) that can be directly 
enforced by those putatively injured by market manipulation. 
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4.4 Summary 
Aware of the damage they could do to the orderly functioning of securities markets, 
securities laws seek to penalise misleading statements, market manipulation and other 
related activities. With regards to the first type of abusive practice both the United 
Kingdom and United States have adopted the use of civil remedies as a way of 
compensating individuals who have suffered damage. Such civil remedies are built on 
common law remedies and to that extent display the inadequacies which are seen in 
common law. 
In the United States, the civil remedies are seen as having not merely a 
compensatory but a deterrent function as well. The same cannot be said of English 
Law. The FSA'86 relies on the criminal provisions of section 47 to deter misleading 
statements. American law focuses on the registration process and relies on civil 
remedies. 
One way in which the law seeks to limit this kind of abuse is by imposing upon 
issuers of securities and other collateral participants involved in its sale a duty to 
disclose all material information which will enable investors to make an informed 
choice whether or not to buy the securities. A regime of administrative controls, 
supplemented by civil and criminal liabilities, ensures that these obligations are 
complied with. Common law and statutory law give the shareholder of a company the 
right to information about the company's affairs, but this is a limited right and is 
available only to shareholders. No such right is available to an investor. The seller 
must not utter falsehood or mislead but there is no obligation to speak. However, 
statutory developments in this field have virtually rendered the principle of caveat 
empor irrelevant. 
Like insider trading legislation, the adoption by the United Kingdom and United 
States of two dissimilar approaches to legislating against stock market manipulation is 
evident. The broad brush approach, as exemplified by the United States Rule lOb-5 
widely contrasts with that adopted by the United Kingdom, which seeks to set out the 
nature of the offence in more detail. Ironically, the FSA'86 is still seen as vague and 
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its generality has caused much uncertainty in practice. What is needed seems to be 
either a far more detailed form of legislation, as adopted by the likes of Australial53 or 
Hong Kong, outlining in detail what does and does not constitute market 
manipulation, or the adoption of a more flexible approach, 154 as in the United States 
and Canada, by the judiciary in widely interpreting legislation. 155 
With the possibility of legislative change in the future, it is hoped that the that 
the ambiguity caused by section 47(2) FSA'86 will be averted. The present form, with 
the lack of judicial impetus has left this section stagnant in comparison to insider 
dealing legislation. The legislature should embrace a forward thinking attitude so as 
to produce a statute that allows new forms of manipulative practice to be caught. 
Such an opportunity could also provide a period for the role of the judiciary in 
implementing such laws to be developed. Indeed, the roles of the criminal and civil 
law should equally be considered when determining what form of sanction should 
befall a particular form of manipulative practice. In this respect, the severity of such a 




Ashworth, J. and Miller, R. (1997), 'City Star at Heart of Nomura Inquiry', The Times, 6/3197. 
Widholm, B. (1997), 'Sweden: Securities - Market Manipulation', International Company and 
Commercial Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, at C52 et seq. were comments on the new controls 
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Section Three 
This third, and final, section examines the issues related to the detection, investigation 
and prosecution of insider dealing and market manipulation. Its purpose is to identify 
the fundamental problems associated with these essential areas and offer, where 
possible, practical solutions that if implemented may resolve many of the 
shortcomings presently experienced 
The purpose of chapter five is to examine the problematic issues surrounding 
the effective regulation of the financial markets of the United Kingdom. Comparative 
analysis with the United States is used in this respect to compare the two jurisdictions 
and speculate whether any ideas utilised under the Financial Service and Markets Bill 
will have any beneficial effects. 
Chapter six assesses the suitability and effectiveness of the criminal law and 
criminal justice system in dealing with issues related to market abuse. Thus, the value 
and effectiveness of the implementation of the criminal law is critically examined in 
conjunction with the problems faced in prosecuting through the adhesion to standard 
procedural and evidential rules. 
Lastly, chapter seven seeks to examine the problems associated with 
extraterritoriality in the context of how the use of one or more jurisdiction can affect 
the chances of successful detection, investigation and prosecution of insider dealing 




In order for any law to be effective it must possess two distinct yet entwined 
properties. The first can be said to revolve around the notion of legitimacy, I in that 
laws that promote order and stability influence market behaviour. 2 Market 
participants therefore are seen to comply with such laws out of a general willingness 
rather than because of the fear of sanctions. The notion of legitimacy thus can be 
viewed as the combination of moral as well as normative aspirations displayed by 
both internal and external market bodies. 3 
The second of these qualities relates to the notion of enforcement. In that: 
"... the inclination to forgo economic opportunity simply in order to act 
legally is obviously slight, unless circumvention of the formal /aw is 
strongly disapproved by a powerful convention, and such a situation is not 
likely to arise where the interests affected by a legal innovation (such as a 
new law) are widespread... "4 
It is generally acknowledged that the notion of regulatory enforcement in the United 
Kingdom is weaker than in other jurisdictions. This lack of effective investor 
protection can be predominantly put down to the fact that self-regulation, def encic's 
in the enabling statutes and an ardent resistance to change have long existed. Yet, 
I Beetham, D. (1991), The Legitimation of Power, London: Macmillan, at 20 et seq.. 
2 Op, cit., at 32 et seq.. 
3 Supra, note 1, at 25. 
4 Rheinstein, J. (ed. ) (1966), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Socigv, London: Macmillan, at 
38. 
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given the importance now placed on adequate regulation providing a competitive 
edge other markets, 5 how will the radical overhaul in the form of the Financial 
Services and Markets Bill cope? Now more than ever the financial markets of the 
United Kingdom need to be more unified so that a convergence of new and more 
effective implements of enforcement can be introduced. Indeed, given the recent 
change in government, amendment to the present regime has become a reality, 'yet 
will this model be better than the last? The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to 
explore, using comparative analysis with the United States, how this jurisdiction can 
make the present regime of regulatory enforcement more effective without stumbling 
on issues of over-regulation. This is achieved by dividing this chapter into four 
sections. Section one examines the general underlying problems associated with 
detection of insider dealing and market manipulation in the United Kingdom. Section 
Iwo generally examines enforcement issues in the United Kingdom. Section three uses 
comparative analysis to assess whether the model of enforcement utilised in the 
United States offers any insight into any general way the new enforcement regime6 
being presently implemented in the United Kingdom can be improved upon. Finally 
section four examines the implications of the impact of the Financial Services and 
Markets Bill and discusses the main criticisms associated with it. 
5 
6 
McCathery, T. (ed. ) (1993), Corporate Control and Accountability, London: Macmillan, at 14. 
As mentioned in chapter one, the model upon which regulatory enforcement will be critically 
assessed upon the model espoused by Fishman; see Fishman, L. J. (1993), ̀ A Comparison of 
Enforcement of Securities Law Violations in the United Kingdom and United States', Company 
Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 9, at 163. 
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5.1. The Underlying Problems Associated with Detecting Market 
Misconduct in the United Kingdoi n 
Regulators and the legislator have often had problems defining the correct equilibrium 
for vetting firms.? If vetting requirements are too strict they will inhibit market 
trading by preventing new firms from entering the market. Alternatively, if too 
loosely defined they will allow those who are supposed to be kept out in. 8 Indeed, 
this dilemma is further exacerbated where an individual in a position of trust may 
decide to `step over the line' and acts in a fraudulent manner. 
Of all securities offences committed insider dealing and manipulative practices 
have long proven to be the most elusive to detect. 10 The reasoning behind this can be 
put down to a variety of key factors. As both offences are of a `private' rather than 
public nature little visible evidence of their commission exists. It Even when 
suspicious securities transactions are detected there is no guarantee that an 
investigation can be mounted because it is not uncommon for market abuses like these 
to be scattered and enshrouded by other market transactions. 12 Indeed, because of the 
form taken by these types of offence the majority are detected in a sporadic manner. 
The majority of formal investigations by regulatory bodies are usually initiated 
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Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, at 179. 
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This especially true in relation to insider dealing; Naylor, J. M. (1990(a)), `The Use of Criminal 
Sanctions by United Kingdom and United States Authorities for Insider Trading: Ilow can the 
Two Systems Learn from Each Other? Part 1', Company Lawyer, Vol. 11. No. 3, at 54. 
Croall, H. (1992), White Collar Crime, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, at 12. 
12 Brummer, A. (1995), ̀ City Medicine Fails to Halt Epidemic', The Guardian, 16/12/95. 
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some particular development13 that is generally picked up by computer surveillance 
equipment. 14 Alternatively, tip-offs from market forces or reports from suspicious 
public investors may be used. Although a certain amount of value that can be 
attached to this latter form of detection, as reliance on them can add validity to some 
rumour, 15 information also carries the risk of turning out to be nothing more than 
speculative or malicious. In this respect some are a waste of time and resources. Yet, 
general information from genuine investors or market participants can often be abated 
by a distinct reluctance especially when rumours turn out to be unsubstantiated and 
the individuals are likely to be viewed as foolish or where investors may incriminate 
themselves because of less than honest past dealings. 16 Whether these arguments are 
plausible is extremely hard to prove or disprove due to the surrounding circumstances, 
although it may contribute in explaining why so little visible evidence exists. 
Detection may also be compounded by the fact that, in the United Kingdom, a large 
proportion of trading occurs on secondary markets. Therefore, investigating bodies 
need not only possess superior expertise over perpetrators but also an adequate time 
allowance of weeks, months or even years to unravel sometimes highly complex 
market deceptions. 17 Invariably, given the technological advances that exist, a large 
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Levi, M. (1993), The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: The Investigation, Prosecution 
and Trial ofSerious Fraud, (1993), at 62. 
Graham, G. (1996), 'Stanchart Inquiries Over Bid Rumours', The Financial Times, 3/2/96. 
Note that in this area auditors have often been called upon to act as 'whistleblowers' -a task 
which they have not relished given that it can undermine confidential relations with their clients 
as well as increase the chance of their liability should they fail to report matters which is later 
considered should have been reported; see section 109 FSA; House of Commons Debates, 
Hansard, 28/6/95, at columns 910 - 913. In addition, see Sarker, R. (1995), 'Blowing the 
Whistle on Fraud', Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 185. 
16 See generally Mann, K. (1985), Defending White Collar Crime, New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
17 Although this aspect has been severely criticised; House of Commons Trade and Industry 
Committee: Third Report on Company Investigations, (1990), at xiv. Also see, Cusick, K. 
(1995), 'Guinness Judges Scales Mountain of Evidence', The Independent, 21/10/95 and 
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The implementation of the most appropriate laws combined with effective 
enforcement to deal with market fraudsters are highly desirable qualities in any 
regulatory system. However, if financial resources are constrained the prevailing 
result will usually lead to a lower rate of detection and prosecution, which, in turn, 
undermines the deterrent and preventative value of the types of law used against such 
practices. 18 Accordingly, there have been many calls, not at least from enforcement 
agencies themselves, for increased resources. Yet, whether the allocation of extra 
resources will prevent a further escalation of these types of fraud is debatable given 
that their annual growth rate is so rapid. However, Levi has provided a number of 
arguments in support of increasing resources for the policing of commercial fraud that 
can equally be applied to securities fraud. He suggests that while the contribution of' 
investigation work for many conventional crimes are negligible, allocating more 
resources to such agencies would increase the amount of fraud detected through more 
leads being followed up. 19 This, in turn, could increase the credibility and 
effectiveness of such agencies, which may lead to more victims reporting more 
offences. Finally, there may be some political benefits in increasing detection rates, 
although Levi notes that there are beneficial limitations in the cost effectiveness of 
policing such markets. 20 
Although suspicious market transactions can be detected by an assortment of 
regulatory bodies only two can be perceived to have actively sought to enhance their 
abilities in this respect. Thus, the surveillance department of the London Stock 
Exchange21 and the Securities and Futures Association (the `SfA') have sought to 




Beyleveld, D. (1992), 'Deterrence Research and Deterrence Policies', in Von II irsch, A. and 
Ashworth, A. (eds. ) (1992), Principled Sentencing, Boston: Northeastern University Press, at 78 
et seq.. 
In 1990 the average cost spent on insider dealing cases was £100,000; /louse of Commons Trude 
and Industry Committee: Third Report on Compmry investigations, (1990), at xxxv. 
Levi, M. (1987), Regulating Fraud" White Collar Crime and the Criminal Process, London: 
Tavistock, at 280 et seq.. 
21 Ashworth, J. (1995), ̀ Criminal Inquiries at Record', The Times, 28/9/95 and I lamilton, K. 
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predict more accurately when suspicious trading has occurred22 as well as trading 
suspensions to prevent leaks of price sensitive information23 and implementing 
swifter ways of punishing City wrongdoers. 24 Interestingly while investigating 
bodies work within the confines imposed by particular laws they can be seen to utilise 
them strategically `bargaining and bluffing' the majority of small-time offenders. 25 
Therefore, the `sledgehammer' of criminal prosecution is used only as the ultimate 
threat to encourage compliance26 against the most serious offenders. 
However, laws and rules that seek to impose compliance can be significantly 
affected by external factors. These include conflicting interests, competitive rivalry 
between regulatory agencies in sanctioning offenders and a general lack of 
communication which has led to a system that many believe is `fragmentary' in 
nature. 227 with an overlap of case jurisdiction and interest. 28 This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that some enforcement bodies are run by Government 
departments who consequently influence departmental polices and also intervene in 
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intervention is evident. 29 Indeed, the issue of prosecution can become politically 
controversial; an underlying factor that may account for the general ambivalence 
displayed by some agencies. This can be aptly illustrated in the investigation of Lord 
Archer for insider dealing where concern was expressed that the decision as to 
whether or not to prosecute Lord Archer lay with another Conservative politician, 
Michael Heseltine. 30 However, very little is still known about the criteria that 
underlies such decision making policies and processes. 31 
29 
30 
IIawkins, K. (1990), `Compliance Strategy, Prosecution Policy and Aunt Salh': A Comment on 
Pearce and Tombs', British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 30, No. 4, at 456 and Levi, M. (1993), 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice; The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial ofSerious 
Fraud, Research Study No. 14, at 20 and 70 et seq.. 
White, M. and Donovan, P. (1994), ̀ Archer is Cleared of City Scam', The Guardian, 29/7/94. 
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5.2. The Process of Enforcement in the United Kingdom 
The starting point of any investigation relating to insider dealing or market 
manipulation must be founded on reasonable suspicion. In both the United Kingdom 
and the United States irregular trading activities are detected by a mixture of internal 
and external bodies whose purpose it is to have both a proactive and reactive effect on 
financial markets. 32 The latter effect is achieved by the surveillance and reporting of 
any unusual transactions to the appropriate authorities so that they can be more fully 
investigated and accordingly punished. The former is achieved through the use of 
compliance strategies to produce a `deterrent factor', that is the use of techniques that 
are: 
"... pre-monitory [devices which attend] to conditions that induce 
conformity or to foreboding of harm... "33 
The positive correlation between those that have access to information that is 
price sensitive and incidences of insider or manipulative activities suggests that 
securities finns, which are the original keepers of such information, must have 
adequate control of their responsibilities. In order to achieve this compliance officers, 
compliance and annual compliance reviews34 have been adopted not only to avoid 
embarrassing incidences that may involve securities firm being linked with such 
illegal activities but also to avoid expulsion or suspension from market trading. 35 





Reiss, A. J. (1984), ̀ Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organisational Life', in 
llawkins, K. and Thomas, A. (1984), op. cit., at 27 et seq.. 
For rulebook requirements, see FSA Principle 9; Rule 34 of the Core Conduct of Business Rules 
34 and those rules made under the rulebooks of the various SRO's which apply to their members 
and supplement he Core Conduct of Business Rules, such as SFA Rule 5-51 or IMRO Rule 
1.5(2). 
In order to understand the role of compliance officers see generally Bosworth-Davies, R. 
(1992). ̀ Practical Training for Compliance Ofcers: An Assessment, International Journal of 
Regulatory Law a Practice, Vol. 1, at 34. Also see Weait, M. (1993), ̀ The Contribution of the 
Compliance Function of Effective Financial Services Regulation', Journal of Asset Protection 
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Consequently, compliance officers are often one of the first parties to initially 
suspect that something is wrong. This may have been deduced through scrutinising 
an account type, security or group of securities, unusual price fluctuation or intuition. 
Any investigation by compliance officers should receive the full co-operation of 
senior management as it is in the interests of that firm to make sure that its reputation 
remains untainted. 36 Yet, the inevitable barrage of problems they invariably have 
little control over can frustrate compliance officers. Establishing the existence of 
organised rings, for instance, is hard to detect. 37 Indeed, given that the primary duty 
of any compliance officer is to the investigation of their own firm, the impetus to act 
further may be lacking. To rectify this position compliance officers not only need to 
co-operate more, but have the incentive to develop a more comprehensive network 
than already exists. This would then allow them access to a more enhanced pool of 
information relating to other securities firms. 38 The present system can generally be 
seen to be under-subscribed, under-resourced and poorly managed. The compliance 
officer may lack the determination needed to succeed; facts which may be put down 
to the prevailing attitude of some officers. 39 
Investigations in the United Kingdom are carried out by a varied array of bodies 
that rely on the powers bestowed upon them by various statutes. The use of Self 
Regulatory Organisations (the `SRO's'), the surveillance unit of the International 
Stock Exchange (formally known as the `Insider Dealing Group')40, the Take-over 
Panel, the Serious Fraud Office (the `SFO' ), the Crown Prosecution Service (the 
`CPS'). the Financial Services Authority (the `Authority') and the Departinent of 
Trade and Industry (the `DTI') all have separate and/or combined roles in the 
36 While it will generally be the case that compliance officers should not come up against 
opposition by the firm that employs them, this is not always the position. See, for example, Re It 
Company's Application [1989] BCLC 462. 
37 On the effect of organised rings on investigations, see generally R v. Cohen and Greenwood, 
unreported, The Financial Times, 24/1/90. 
38 Flannigan, B. (1994), Insider Dealing, London: Kluwer, at 24 et seq.. 
39 Bosworth-Davies, R. (1994), ̀ Policing Insider Dealing - The Self-Regulatory Regime', 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 6, at 112. 
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investigating of insider dealing and market manipulation depending upon the issues 
that may be thrown up during an investigation. 41 However, the last three bodies can 
be viewed as dealing with the prosecution of these offences. 
By contrast, all investigations carried out in the United States are done so by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the `SEC'), whose primary function in this 
context is to bring enough evidence together so that a charge may be brought against 
those suspected of insider dealing or manipulative practices. Unlike the United 
Kingdom regulators, the SEC has no powers to prosecute under criminal jurisdiction. 
Emphasis here has been placed on bringing such fraudsters to justice via the use of 
administrative proceedings and civil law. Although the power to bring about a 
criminal prosecution does exist it is initiated and dealt with not only by a different 
department - the Department of Justice - but only used in those instances where such 
activities are of an extremely serious nature. Moreover, if the defendants in such 
cases are successfully prosecuted a private plaintiff may use the findings of the 
criminal case to prove his own civil case. 42 Judging by the number of offenders 
penalised under such an enforcement regime it has been argued on numerous 
occasions that the United Kingdom could improve its prosecution rate by adopting a 
similar strategy to that of the United States. However, attitudes in this country must 
change for as impetus, ignorance and naivete has long dominated 43 While it has 
been standard policy amongst the Conservative Party not to enact any new or radical, 
form of regulatory or legal change, the Labour party has long advocated the 
opposite. 44 
40 Insider Dealing and Investor Confidence', April (1990), Stock Exchange Quality of Markets 
Quarterly Review, at 26. 
41 Core-Browne on Companies, Supplement 16, at paragraph 12.31. 
42 Cottrel I, H. (1986), `Insider Dealing in the United Slates: Part I', New Law Journal, Vol. 136, 
at 90 et seq.. 
43 Fishman, L. J. (1993), supra, note 6, at 171. 
44 Miller, V. and Sherman, K. (1997), `One Watchdog to Monitor All City Dealings', The Times, 
21/5/97; Graham, G. (1997), `Bank to Lose Supervisory Role', The Financial Times, 21/5/97 and 
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In recent years SRO's have played an increasing important role in the 
monitoring and surveillance of those firms associated with them. Yet, this has been 
tainted by the questionable competence of some SRO's given the number of frauds 
that have subsequently developed due to haphazard monitoring and investigating 45 
Even though the Authority possesses a number of provisions46 that can be utilised to 
enforce SRO's to comply with their duties these are seldom used. 47 This illustrates 
the'general irresolute attitude of those involved in enforcing regulation. 
Yet with an element of foresight a fair proportion of the problems now 
encountered could have been avoided. During debate on the Financial Services 13111 
concern was voiced that with having (at the time) five SRO's, there was bound to be 
an overlapping of duties and responsibilities. 48 The fear was that unscrupulous firms 
could join the regulatory organisation which best suited their business interests 
tempered with the weakest form of regulation 49 Concern was also raised regarding 
competition between bodies that might hinder investigations and prosecutions. 50 
Although originally stating that the concern was misplaced51 all the problems 
envisaged have materialised. However, given the general historic attitude of those 
involved in City affairs, of which the majority possess a Conservative background, it 
is not surprising that this route was followed. 
45 Post. 
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Although three SRO's now presently exist only the Securities and Futures 
Authority (`SFA') and the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation 
(`IMRO') have seem to have gained the most media attention in relation to their 
encounters with insiders and manipulators. However, this is to be expected given 
their area of jurisdiction. Each SRO has incorporated within it various units that 
monitor and, where appropriate, bring civil52 or administrative proceedings against 
market offenders. However, if the circumstances under investigation are of a complex 
nature, these will be passed over to another body, such as the Authority53 or DTI for 
further, in-depth investigation. 54 Since 1991 all SRO's have made public all 
disciplinary measures taken against member firms in the belief that many firms 
`teetering on the brink' of breaking those rules relevant to them will fear the adverse 
publicity rather more than the fine imposed if caught. The publication of results also 
stems from the belief that it shows SRO's to be doing something against such 
breaches. 55 The use of publicity therefore can be perceived as a highly effective 
means of deterrent. 56 
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While both the SFA and IMRO have a variety of powers at their disposal it 
seems that it is only the SFA that has the determination in the past to use these powers 
to their full extent. 57 Such powers allow each SRO to fine, cease trading, or take hold 
of any assets of any member firm it believes has breached the relevant rules that relate 
to it. 58 Indeed, support exists for an extension of these powers to deal with insider 
and manipulative activities in instances where such activities are relatively small in 
both size and financial gain. However, although this line of thought offers a possible 
solution to the problems associated with the prosecution of these types of offences it 
also presents problems that have not yet been encountered under the present 
regulatory enforcement system. 59 As SRO's are not empowered to bring criminal 
prosecutions against insider and manipulative activity, the only form of redress SROs 
have against these individuals is via the civil law through a contractual breach of 
those member rules that relate to that individual's activities. However, in order for 
this to come into effect the SRO concerned must make a request to the Authority in 
order for this action to be initiated. Once this is granted, though, it presents to the 
SRO, evidential and procedural problems aside, with what many see as a formidable 
weapon that can be used against these types of activity. 
The surveillance unit of the International Stock Exchange primarily deals with 
the investigation of insider dealing. 60 - Although manipulative practices may also be 
individual is being investigated can have a detrimental effect on that persons character, which in 
the City counts for much: 
'... These inquiries are always lengthy and often inconclusive. Their names may never be 
ful/v detached from this investigation in the public mind because of the DTI's self- 
imposed code of silence. This has happened before in insider dealing inquiries, and it is 
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investigated it seems that these are, on the whole, dealt with by the Authority and DTI 
rather than by this unit. Over the years61 the unit has been subjected to a barrage of 
criticism, some of which may be seen to be unfounded, relating to the resources it has 
had at its disposal to deal with insider activities. Originally, any investigations were 
carried out manually. 62 This position has now changed and the unit harnesses not . 
only a general database that records the details of every transaction from the time of 
`Big Bang' but also a real-time artificial intelligence programme that actively seeks 
and predicts possible insider activities. 63 
As with most other bodies that deal with insider dealing investigations, the' 
International Stock Exchange has a common policy of non-disclosure of information 
relating to an investigation where no evidence is found. However, in an effort to 
increase its effectiveness the Stock Exchange has pressed the Government for the 
right to publish its findings relating to enquiries so as to side step the failure created 
by criminal prosecutions. 64 It will also have a number of other beneficial effects. 
Executives who have initially been implicated will be publicly exonerated; 65 a fact 
that may increase voluntary co-operation. 66 
61 
62 
Surveillance facilities where originally set up in 1974; Rider, B. A. K. (1983), Insider Trading, 
London: Jordans, at 148. 
Although it has been noted that: 
`from its early days.... [the Stock Exchange] considered complaints from clients against 





; Morgan, E. V. and Thomas, W. A. (1969), The Stock Exchange: Its History and Functions, 
London: Elek Books, at 166 et seq.. 
Donovan, P. (1996), `Insider Dealing Faces 'Clean Up", The Guardian, 30/1/96; ' Exchanize 
Plans to Deter Insider Traders', The Independent, 31/1/96; Atkinson, D. (1997), 'Man vs. Brain 
is No Contest', The Guardian, 21/3/97; Eisenhammer, I. (1996), 'Exchange Lobbies for 
Changes that would Introduce Fuzzy Software Spy'. The Independent, 21/5/96 and Gapper. J. 
(1996), 'Stock Exchange Steps Up Insider Dealing Offensive', The Financial Times, 20/5/96. 
Donovan, P. (1996), ̀ Insider Dealing faces 'Clean Up ", The Guardian, 30/ 1 /96 and Tehan, E. 
(1996), ̀ SE Looks at Insider Policy', The Times, 31/1/96. 
The Guardian, 23/9/96. 
66 Rider, B. A. K. (1983), supra, note 61, at 153 et seq.. 
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The Stock Exchange surveillance unit has always focused its attention on 
detection rather than prosecution. 67 Consequently, if it seems likely that enough 
evidence can be gathered in order for a criminal prosecution to be initially prepared 
for them, then all the evidence gathered is passed over to the DTI, which has more 
extensive powers of enquiry. 68 
The Stock Exchange can be seen to adopt a positive policy of harnessing good 
relations not only between other investigating bodies in this country but also those 
from other jurisdictions. Thus, it has forged links with the United States and Canada, 
for instance, in a bid to combat those who wish to frustrate any detection by using an 
extra-territorial element in their activities. 69 
Although both these bodies possess powers that relate to the investigation70 or 
prosecution of these types of offences they rarely utilise them to full effect. it is 
feasible that this is due to their belief that securities frauds are largely regulatory 
offences. 71 However, they cannot be dismissed out of hand as each can be called into 
play. Recently, the Authority, amongst other things, has implemented a Shared 
Intelligence Service designed to improve the efficiency of all Authority regulators by 
enabling them to bring together information in their possession that may facilitate any 
investigation underway. 72 The SF073 is only brought in on a case if it fulfils the 
67 
68 
Although it has prosecuted cases on those occasions when the DTI has referred a case originally 
investigated by the Stock Exchange surveillance unit back to them; see, for example, R v. 
Lukins, unreported but see The Financial Times, 8/11/90. 
One of the underlying reasons behind this passing over was due to insider dealing becoming a 
criminal offence; see post, chapter three. 




For example the FSA can carry out under an investigation under sections 94 and 105 FSA'86. 
For more details on the various sanctions available; see infra. 
it is well established that both the FSA and SFO view insider dealing as a purely regulatory 
offence; Long, J. (1994), ̀ Policing the Markets', Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, at 83; and' The 
Power of Fear', (1993) Company Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 1, at 2. 
Securities and Futures Authority Annual Report, (1993), at 18; the Securities and Investment 
Board Annual Report, (1992/93), at 30; the Large Report, `Making the Two Tier Syystem Work', rk', 
(1993), at 58 et seq.; The Regulation of the United Kingdom's Equity Markets - Discussion 
Document, (1994), at chapter eight; Securities and Investment Board Annual Report (1993/94), 
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criteria of being classed as a `serious and complex' fraud. 74 Although its general 
ambivalence towards securities frauds and insider dealing in particular casts doubt on 
whether these criteria are genuine or used as a convenient excuse. 
The DTI has for a considerable time been bestowed with a variety of wide , 
reaching powers of investigation into company affairs. Its powers allow it to inspect a 
company's books and papers. 75 On paper, these are a useful means of curbing 
misfeasance and oppression. However, in practice they have not proved so effective. 
Historically, the powers of investigating insider dealing and market 
manipulation have been either inadequate or non-existent. 76 This was partially due to 
the lack of importance that was originally placed on investigating these sorts of 
practices by regulating agencies. 77 However, under the FSA'86 new powers of 
investigating have been developed. With regard to insider dealing it can be observed 
that it was not until 1980 that specific powers of investigation78 came into force. 79 
at 23 et seq.; Securities and Investment Board Annual Report, (1994/95), at 26 et seq. and 







See post, chapter six specifically for more detail. 
The Serious Fraud Ofce, 1" Annual Report, at paragraph 11 cf. Staple, G. (1996), 'The 
Investigation and Prosecution of Serious Fraud: The Serious Fraud Office', March, Journal of 
International Business and Finance Law, at 107. 
Third Report, House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee on Company Investigations 
(1990), supra, note 19, at 36. 
Post, chapter one. 
House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee Report on Company Investigations, (1990), 
supra, note 19, at paragraph 166. 
'... The immediate purpose of most investigations is to find out what has happened or is 
happening when there are grounds to suggest some irregularity in the conduct of a 
company, businesses or individual in order to provide the Secretary of State with the 
information needed to decide what is to be done. A statutory investigation is only 
undertaken when other methods are inadequate to deal with the position, and the 
situation in itself sufficiently material or potentially of sufficient concern to warrant 
further investigation using the compulsory powers available. The ultimate purpose of 
any investigation is to provide information on which to take some action if the facts 
discovered in the course of the investigation warrant it... ' 
; DTI Investigations Handbook, April (1990), London: HMSO, at 3. 
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Indeed, pre - 1986 comparatively few statutory powers of investigation existed. It 
was not until section 177 FSA'86 was enacted in 1986 that the need to appoint 
inspectors was fully recognised. 80 Under section 177 important new powers were 
introduced whereby the Secretary of State could appoint inspectors81 to establish 
whether or not there had been a contravention of the legislation that dealt with insider 
dealing. 
If it is suspected that a company has been engaged in insider dealing or market 
manipulation activities the DTI can appoint by virtue of the Secretary of State one or 
79 "... We have dropped the special power to appoint inspectors to investigate suspected 
cases of insider dealing. We do not think that it is right to provide such far reaching 
powers that can threaten individual rights. If such powers are not generally needed for 
the investigation of crime, then should not be needed in this area... We took the view that, 
in practice we could obtain the information that is needed using existing officials and 
using The Stock Exchange mechanisms. Our proposal to get rid of investigators could 
make it easier to obtain the information we want... " 
; Commons Parliamentary Debates, 1979/80,1 Standing Committee 'A', at column 559 of sc'q.; 
cf Commons Parliamentary Debates, 20/3/86, Standing Committee 'E', at column 880: 
"... The main reason for the small number of prosecutions and convictions has been the 
di 
. 
Ticulty of obtaining sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt... " 
80 
81 
The provision came into effect on the 15/11/86 two months ahead of schedule and the main 
body of the FSA'86. This was due to the Collier investigation at the time; sec' generally 
Tridimas, T. (1989), `The Financial Services Act and the Detection of Insider Dealing', 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. 4, at 162. Hannigan, B. (1994), supra, note 38, at 33, has made 
an interesting observation that since 1987 both the prosecution rates and number of inspectors 
appointed has fallen. She believes that this can be put down to the following factors: 
'(i) growing disenchantment with the legislation as prosecutions fail; 
(ü) a fall-off in insider opportunities as the economy went into recession; 
(iii) a change in culture in the City which has deterred would be insider dealers; or 
(iv) it may be that having watched a number of naive individuals being prosecuted, the 
professional insider dealers have taken even greater care in hiding their tracks. ' 
See generally, Investigation Handbook (1990), supra, note 78, at appendix c. The appointment 
of inspectors has always attracted criticism. The Trade and Industry Committee noted that on 
average it took between 5 and 20 months to appoint inspectors after a referral, a delay which 
could result in the evidential trail going cold; House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee 
Report on Company Investigations (1990), supra, note 19, at paragraph's 23-24. Consequently, 
its recommendations that the DTI decide within 21 days either to appoint inspectors or allow the 
stock exchange to prosecute received semi-positive response from the Government; op cit., at 
paragraph 168. 
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more (although it is usually two) inspectors to delve into that company's affairs. 82 - 
Many of the appointments made usually come about because of a failure to produce 
documentation requested form an earlier investigation. 
82 Section 432(2) Companies Act 1985. 
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5.3. The Process of Enforcement in the United States 
In a similar manner to the United Kingdom with all SRO's being answerable to the 
Authority, all exchanges in the United States must be registered with the SEC; this 
being achieved only through exchanges being able to show that they have adequate 
enforcement procedures in place that can be used against any member. 83 
Monitoring, information gathering and investigatory powers are all initially 
carried out by exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, who alI 
have similar rules or practices needed to regulate their members. Likewise, the 
exchanges84 as well as the SEC85 possess extensive disciplinary powers that can be 
used at any time against member firms. The SEC also has supervisory rights over 
exchange disciplinary proceedings; 86 the reasoning behind this being that the threat of 
using the SEC to intervene into the affairs of exchanges makes the exchanges more 
diligent in their functions. 87 
Established in 1934, the SEC can be viewed as the body most central in dealing 
with insider dealing and market manipulative practices and has generally been far 
more successful in its approach to these types of offences than the United Kingdom. 
This can put down to a number of significant factors. Firstly, its reputation and 
recognition as an elite body has drawn a large number of `high flyers', eager to gain 
from the experience of being associated with it, into its fold. Rather than being seen 
as a permanent career move many of those employed in the SEC only stay for a 
limited period, gaining valuable experience, before moving on into private practice. 
Other reasons that account for the SEC's effectiveness relate to combining its 
extensive powers to increase the chances of prosecution with good co-ordination 
83 Sections 6b SEA cf. Schedule 2 FSA'86. 
84 Sections 6 and 15A EA. 
85 Sections 15(b)(4) and (6) EA. 
86 Section 19 EA. 
87 Miller, R. (1985), ̀ Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination', George 
Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 42, at 853 et seq.. 
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between criminal agencies and itself. Although the SEC possesses a wide and varied 
arsenal of powers, which include administrative, cease and desist, and civil actions 
against securities perpetrators, it must refer any matters relating to criminal actions to 
the Department of Justice for scrutiny and action. 88 The reasoning behind this is 
because criminal investigations are viewed by the SEC as not being cost-efficient 
enough due to the complexities often associated with them. Hence, most SEC actions 
seek civil remedies. 89 The SEC's licensing powers also provide an effective 
enforcement mechanism. 90 Under its licensing authority, the SEC can hold 
administrative hearings of a disciplinary nature. 91 
Investigatory and enforcement duties are primarily the responsibility of the 
regional offices of the SEC, which are located throughout the United States. Regional 
offices activities are subject to review and direction by the SECs Division of 
Enforcement. When the SEC learns of possible violations of federal securities laws, it 
commences a preliminary investigation. This involves a general request for 
documents and factual information. 92 No subpoenas are issued, nor testimony 
compelled. The preliminary investigation is based upon the voluntary co-operation of 







Section 21(d) SEA. 
I lazen, N. (1979), `Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's Use of Injunctions and Other Enforcement Methods', Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 
31, at 435 et seq.. 
Under section 6 SEA, the SEC can suspend or revoke registration of an exchange. Additionally. 
the SEC can also expel individual broker -dealers from a national exchange, can bar an 
individual from associating with broker-dealers and has powers dealing with the securities listed 
on an exchange; Hazen, N. (1979), op cit., at 435 et seq.. Under section 8 SA the SEC can delay, 
suspend, or stop the effective date of a registration statement, which is required before a new 
issue of securities can be sold to the public. 
Matthews, R. (1980), `Litigation in Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement 
Proceedings', Catholic University Law Review, Vol. 29, at 235 et seq.. 
Note that broker-dealers must keep extensive records and file regular reports on their financial 
condition and keep accurate records of their transactions; section 17(a) SA. 
Ferrara, D. and Nerkle, N. (1985), `Overview of an SEC Enforcement Action', Corporate Law 
Review, Vol. 8, at 306. 
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investigation, it may request the SEC to authorise named members of the staff to act 
as officials in conducting a formal investigation. 
A formal investigation can be commenced once the SEC has found a likelihood 
of wrongdoing or that a person has violated or may have violated one of the securities 
statutes. The agency will issue an order of investigation to provide the staff with 
subpoena power. 94 At this point, the SEC can issue a judicially enforceable subpoena 
for the production of documents. In addition to gathering information, another 
preliminary remedial step, a trading suspension of a listed company, can be imposed 
at any time in the course of investigation. Unlike other federal agencies or the 
Authority, the SEC does not utilise special agents, whose assignments are limited 
solely to criminal investigations or to the matter under investigation. Attorney 
accountants and investigators are part of the permanent staff of the SEC and have a 
fact-finding role. 95 This approach enables the building of a cumulative expertise in 
securities regulation and enforcement. 
Enquiries and complaints by investors are one of the primary sources of leads 
for detection of securities law violations. The regional offices also conduct surprise 
investigations of the books and records of brokers and dealers to determine whether 
their business practices conform to prescribed rules. They work closely with the 
exchanges and also trace market fluctuations in particular stocks. 
The SEC has a spectrum of remedies at hand. The mildest remedial action is a 
cautionary letter, whereby the SEC staff may advise the corporation or individual of 
perceived violations of the securities laws or of conditions that makes violations 
likely. The cautionary letter is non-public. The most common enforcement remedy is 
the consent decree. The accused securities law violator agrees to refrain from a 
particular action in the future, does not admit wrongdoing, and agrees to pay a fine. A 
consent decree is efficient, effective and swift. Expense time and resource consuming 
94 Section 21(b) SA. 
95 Matthews, 1. (1971), `Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related 
Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases', George Washington Law 
Review, Vol. 39, at 913 et seq.. 
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litigation is avoided. It is advantageous to the accused in that the company or 
individual can put the violations behind them. 
One of the most effective and least expensive SEC enforcement activities is 
publicity. Under section 21(a) SEA the SEC can publicise the results of investigations 
by publicly naming individuals or issuing a public report of its investigation of EA 
violations. However, it can be noted that this device has been little utilised. 
Under each of the Securities Acts, the SEC can seek temporary or permanent' 
injunctive relief whenever it shall appear that any person is engaged, has engaged or is 
about to engage in a violation of securities acts. The SEC must show there is a 
reasonable likelihood of future violations. The injunction has been the SEC primary 
civil remedy and directs the subject to comply with the law in the future. The 
advantage of the injunction is the ease and speed with which it may be obtained and 
the civil burden of proof that is lower than with a criminal prosecution. An injunction 
can also aid private rights of action related to the same matter, because many courts 
have found that defendants are collaterally estopped from re-litigating matters 
determined in an injunction proceeding. 
Associated with the SEC's seeking injunctive relief, the equitable powers of 
federal district courts can give a range of relief ancillary to the statutory injunction.. 
The purpose of ancillary relief is to provide individual remedies to meet the needs of a 
specific case and to ensure future compliance with the federal securities laws. 
A SEC enforcement tool with an even lower burden of proof than an injunction 
is a section 15(c)(4) administrative action. Under section 15(c)(4) of the EA the SEC 
need only find for failure to comply in any material respect with one of the 
enumerated provisions, rules, or regulations under which the violations have occurred. 
Section 15(c)(4) has provided the SEC with a versatile remedy for reporting violations 
and reducing future non-compliance. It offers flexibility in dealing in administrative 
enforcement actions with accounting and complex issues. The SEC can specify under 
what standards or guidelines it may impose compliance and the time limits within 
which the issuer must fulfil ordered obligations. 
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The SEC can also seek in a federal district court, civil monetary penalties for 
violations of the Securities Acts, the rules and regulations thereunder, or cease and 
desist orders under the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act 
1990 (the ̀ PSRA'). The statute creates three tiers of penalties based on the gravity of 
harm or threat of such by the violation. These sanctions are in addition to other 
actions that can be brought by the SEC or by the Attorney-General. The statute also 
permits the SEC to hold administrative proceedings against brokers/dealers, 
investment advisors, government securities dealers and other securities professionals 
that can result in monetary penalties and order for accounting or disgorgement of 
gains. 
The SEC can obtain, after notice and a hearing, temporary and permanent cease 
and desist orders against individuals required to be registrated with it and temporary 
cease and desist orders against regulated entities and associated persons. Cease and 
desist orders are essentially less severe penalties than injunction, more appropriate to 
isolated infractions without the collateral consequences of an injunction. The 1'SRA 
also allows the SEC to bar or suspect person from serving as an officer or director. 
Alternatively, or in addition to civil relief, if the facts developed in a SEC 
investigation so warrant, the matter can be turned over to the United States 
Department of Justice, which works with the SEC in preparation of criminal charges. 
The Justice Department and the SEC may avail themselves of the additional 
investigatory resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There may be parallel 
civil and criminal proceedings. 
While the SEC staff itself conducts all administrative and civil litigation, the 
Department of Justice has sole jurisdiction over the conduct of criminal prosecutions. 
Regional United States attorneys, actively assisted by SEC staff members, present the 
SEC's cases to grand juries, conduct trials, and brief and argue appeals. 
" In the 1980's SEC enforcement priorities turned to the prosecution of insider 
trading which had always been a concern. The SEC has used its whole arsenal of 
remedies to deal with insider trading. Usually, an administrative proceeding or 
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consent decree resulted in the disgorgement of gains. Criminal prosecutions utilised 
rule I Ob-5 to regulate and enforce insider trading activity. 
Congress concluded that the SEC's traditional remedies, particularly the civil 
ones, were inadequate to deter insider trading. Its response was the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 ('ITSA'), which gave the SEC authority to impose against 
insider trading violations a civil penalty for up to three times the profit gained or loss 
avoided from unlawful trading. The maximum fine for criminal violations was 
increased from $10,000 to $100,000. Unexpectedly, the ITSA was followed by a 
dramatic increase of insider trading cases involving prominent individuals and firms. 
Congress answered with the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988 (`ITSFEA'), which introduced new penalties for `controlling persons' including 
employers who failed to take appropriate action once aware of, or in reckless 
disregard of, circumstances indicating that an employee was engaged in insider 
dealing. The ITSFEA created an affirmative duty for broker/dealers and investment 
advisers to establish, maintain, enforce, review, and update written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prevent insider trading. 
A bounty programme was instituted whereby the SEC can pay informers up to 
10% of the penalty imposed. The EA also codifies a private right of action for those 
who trade contemporaneously with and on the other side of the market with insider 
traders. This legislation will not stop an insider dealing, but by placing an affirmative 
burden on firms to monitor their employees or be subject to severe penalties and by 
encouraging potential witnesses and investigators through the bounty programme, it 
raised the stakes of engaging in such conduct. Such determination to deal with these 
illegal, dealing practices is not yet evident in the United Kingdom. 
Perhaps the greatest difference in regulatory approaches between the United 
Kingdom and the United States is the impact of the private right of action on 
securities enforcement. The FSA'86 provides for a private cause of action by 
individuals who suffer loss as a result of security laws violations or a contravention of 
the rules of the organisation of which it is a member. Violators of the core conduct of 
business rules of the Authority's enforcement powers are subject to civil suit. The 
grant of a private right of action was the most controversial single provision in this 
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statute. Although under the Companies Act 1989 amendments, the right to bring suit 
under the FSA'86 has been limited to investing members of the public in the United 
Kingdom, a notably non-litigious group. 
In the United States investors' private rights of action complement government 
enforcement of securities laws. While American securities laws provide some express 
remedies, courts have found that Congress intended to give private parties implied 
rights of action for violations of many sections of the securities laws. Because of the 
ambiguities in the legislative history of the American Securities Acts, whether private 
plaintiffs have a right of action for violation of a particular section of the securities 
acts has been a subject of ongoing judicial interpretation. The lower courts were 
particularly responsive to the expansion of private rights of action, and this has had a 
multiplier effect upon the overall enforcement effort. 
Though rights of action for damages are more explicit in the FSA'86, it is 
doubtful that private litigation will play nearly as important a role in the English 
system given the limitations on contingent fees for lawyers and the weight of interest 
groups against private rights of action. 
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5.4. Following the American Way: The Impact of the Financial 
Services and Markets Bill on Regulatory Enforcement96 
Given that there is no one true financial centre that exists in today's market place the 
strength of the United Kingdom economy largely depends on the fairness and 
dependability of its financial markets. These two facets are largely dependent on the 
activities carried out by the Authority. However, recently two substantial proposals 
have been put forward in the Financial Services and Markets Bill which, when 
implemented, will radically shape what will become `market abuse', that is any 
activity that attacks the two principles already mentioned. Whether or not this Bill 
achieves its desired affect when it actually becomes law is debatable given that a large 
number of criticisms have already been made of it. This section examines what 
amounts to market abuse and looks at the new sanctioning powers that have been put 
forward to enforce against such a practice. It also examines the criticisms made of the 
Bill to assess whether or not they will make the present regulatory system more 
resistant to market abuse or whether it just provides a `broad brush' regulatory 
approach that will ensnare innovative, but not technically illegal market practices. 97 
The two main proposals made clear in the Bill deal with what amounts to market 
abuse and when this will attract a civil liability. A Code has also been provided. This 
deals with what amounts to market conduct. 98 
Under clause 56 of the Bill market abuse is viewed as behaviour in relation to 
qualifying investments, traded on markets designated by the Treasury, which satisfies 
at least one of the following tests: 
96 Nole: A more detailed account of the Bill can be found in the appendix. 
97 
98 
See generally Freshfields - `FSA: Market Abuse', (1998), Practical Law for Companies, 
Vol. 9. 
No. 7, at 77 et seq.; Alcock, A. (1998), `The Draft Financial Services and Markets Bill', 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 19, No. 9, at 258 et seg. and Clarke, M. and Hunter, G. (1999), 
`Combating Financial Crime', European Counsel Supplement, Vol. 4, No. 8, at 43 et seq.. 
`Draft Code of Afarket Conduct Proposed', (1998) Financial Services Bulletin, Vol. 6, at I et 
seq. and Nelson, E. (1998), `The FSA's Code of Market Conduct', Compliance Monitor, 
Vol. 
l 1, No. 2, at 21 et seq.. 
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(i) a distortion test (relating to behaviour that is likely to distort the market) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
a misleading impression test (relating to behaviour that gives market 
participants the wrong impression regarding value, supply, demand or price); 
or 
a privileged information test (which relates to information that is not available 
to market participants which if known would have a bearing on whether any 
transaction was entered into). 
Under clause 57 of the Bill the Authority must publish a code for the purpose of 
helping to determine whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse. It is 
intended that breach of the code be evident of breach of the prohibition on market 
abuse. If the Authority is satisfied that a person has engaged in market abuse, it may 
impose a fine on him, seek an injunction from the court or order him to disgorge 
profits. The operation of these provisions will not be limited to persons who are 
authorised to carry on regulated financial sector business; the Authority will have 
unlimited jurisdiction over anyone whom it considers to have committed market 
abuse. Authorised persons will also be subject to the disciplinary powers of the 
Authority, which can lead to public censure or loss of authorisation as well as the 
remedies already mentioned. The Authority alone will determine the procedures 
leading to any of these outcomes, except in relation to proceedings for an injunction, 
which will be in the usual situation of acting as investigator, prosecutor and tribunal in 
each case. 99 
The introduction of a new market offence is all well and good in deterring unfair 
behaviour but it should be noted that various provisions already exist that deal with 
market abuse. The proposals in the Bill therefore provide yet another layer of 
potential liability and consequently there is a real danger of greater complexity being 
generated unless this position is clarified. The new regime seeks to extend rules 
currently applicable only in organised markets 
in two ways: 
99 'FSA: New Powers to Combat Market Abuse', (1998) International Banking a Finance Law, 
Vol. 17, No. 2, at 13 et seq. and Elgar, J. and Shaxson, F. (1998), 'New Powers to Tackle 
Afarket Abuses', 10 Corporate Counsel, Vol. 10, at 52. 
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(i) Under the Bill, the Treasury would have power to specify which markets 
are covered by the new regime. This power is not restricted to organised 
markets but may also be exercised to bring OTC markets within the scope 
of these new arrangements for tackling market abuse. 
(ii) The jurisdiction of the Authority to impose civil fines would not be 
confined to conduct by members of the exchanges. Market abuse 
perpetrated in the OTC look-alike or back-to-back markets in investments 
traded on those exchanges designed by the Treasury would also be caught 
under the new regime where the conduct was aimed at manipulating 
exchange-based markets or taking unfair advantage of information 
relating to investments traded on those markets. This issue, in turn, may 
cause problems in that many exotic options negotiated on a bespoke basis 
may be put together and largely executed outside the United Kingdom for 
fear of being innocently implicated. 
Every exchanges has its own disciplinary procedures however given that the Bill 
also contains procedures that may cause an overlap between firms regulations and 
statutory procedures this potentially causes problems in that many firms will find 
themselves in the precarious position of double jeopardy. 
In relation to the abuse of privileged information, the new legislation overlaps 
with the insider dealing regime and the Take-over Code, potentially exposing market 
participants to criminal proceedings or, in the case of takeover advisers, discipline by 
the Takeover Panel as well as the Authority for the same conduct. 
Conduct that is currently criminal under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 would 
also fall foul of the proposed regime under the Code. The proposed new regime is, 
however, wider than the current insider dealing regime set out in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 in a number of important way s: 
(i) The Code does not follow the definition of inside information as set 
out in the Criminal Justice Act 1993. To satisfy the current test, the 
information must relate to a specific issue or issues of securities, must 
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be specific or precise, and if made public, must be such as would have 
a significant effect on the price of the securities. The Code's definition 
of `relevant information' is any information that a market used would 
reasonably regard as significant in determining whether or not to deal 
in an investment. It will not be necessary to establish whether 
publication of the information would have had a significant effect on 
the price in question. 
(ii) At present only individuals can be prosecuted - under the new regime 
corporates and other organisations could be fined for the actions of 




Since June 1996 it has been obligatory under the Takeover Code for 
take-over bidders to disclose details of derivatives positions held which 
relate to securities in the target company. This captures (amongst other 
take-over-related activity) take-over bidders implementing a hedging 
strategy to cover themselves against price movements in case their bid 
fails., The new regime would only allow the bidder to buy the shares of 
the target, completely disallowing any strategy to obtain any other 
economic exposure to price movements in the shares. 
The current regime requires some sort of relationship between the 
insider and an issuer employment. In the proposed new regime, the 
relevant concept is ̀ privileged possession': the only question is 
whether the person with the information knows that other market users 
cannot legitimately obtain that information. Somebody who invents a 
clever new tool for analysing performance of securities could thus be 
in `privileged possession' and be open to attack under the code. 
These provisions seem designed to widen the range of conduct that is 
currently on the fringes of insider dealing in order to bring them within 
the scope of the new disciplinary regime. Increasingly market users 
would have to seek legal advice as to the propriety of proposed trading 
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strategies in order to avoid the risks of `civil fines' or the other 
sanctions available to the Authority under the Bill. 
Given the overlap between the Authority's enforcement powers in respect of the 
Code and the existing responsibilities of the DTI, Serious Fraud Office, exchanges 
and the Takeover Panel, the Authority suggests that relevant organizations will need 
to work closely to avoid duplication. The results of this may not necessarily build on 
existing enforcement experience or lead to the most appropriate enforcement body 
dealing with the relevant cases. Rather, it could lead to unhelpful competition 
between regulators. 
Generally, the degree of overlap between the proposed new regime under the 
13i11 and Code seems to fly in the face of the belief that their should be a consolidation 
of agencies and tiers of law and regulation which are intended to deter unacceptable 
behaviour and, where necessary, take action against it. 
By using examples of market abuse and in refraining from proposing a 
comprehensive definition, the Authority has clearly accepted that market abuse is a 
difficult concept to define. However, clear and precise definitions of transactions that 
constitute market abuse are equally elusive. In the broadest sense, all trading has a 
tendency to make prices move and therefore `normal' trading needs to be excluded. In 
the narrowest sense, deliberately releasing false information into the market to change 
the price of an investment is clearly market abuse. The types of transaction in 
between are extremely varied and are constantly in flux. 
The Code tackles this dilemma by broad drafting of the types of transaction that 
constitute market manipulation and misuse of information; by not requiring abusive 
intentions on the part of the wrongdoer. The Code potentially catches all transactions 
in between the two extremes and, most alarmingly, common transactions which are 
currently permitted and generally regarded as ̀ safe'.. The Authority attempts to set 
out guidance as to potential categories of carve-outs, but such guidance is very 
limited. 
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Under the current framework, market supervisors and the competent authority 
are viewed as best placed to regulate market conduct. This approach is in marked 
contrast to those views put forward in the Consultation Paper where the Authority 
alone is to define whether market conduct should be classed as abuse. I lowever, 
exchanges are closest to the marketplace and are keenly aware of the fine line 
dividing acceptable market practice and market abuse. They therefore would seem to 
be the most appropriate persons to formulate rules on market conduct. 
While rules are certainly needed to ensure that all significant market players 
comply with standards of good behaviour, there is no obvious need to apply a regime 
of civil fines to all market users. It will very quickly run into cross-border 
jurisdictional difficulties and, without a concerted effort by regulators in different 
countries to take the same approach, will very quickly succeed in doing one of two 
things: driving some internationally mobile business out of the United Kingdom's 
financial markets, or showing that the Authority cannot deliver penalties under the 
new market abuse regime. 
Even where the existing regulatory arrangements allow unsuitable conduct to go 
unchallenged, there is the criminal law. Shortcomings in the criminal legal system 
where financial-sector activity is concerned have received much attention in the press. 
To solve these difficulties by a regime that allows for penal sanctions to be imposed 
by the Aulhorily, acting as a non judicial body, potentially behind closed doors 
without a hearing and without legal representation for the ̀ accused, seems rather 
extreme. A middle way ought to be achievable in the interests of financial markets 
based in the United Kingdom. 
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5.5 Summary 
As observed in the chapter both the United Kingdom and the United States have 
traditionally adopted radically opposing views and structures in the way they 
implement regulatory enforcement. Both systems can be perceived to contain 
advantages and disadvantages - the United Kingdom, for instance, being viewed 
as 
too fragmentary whilst the United States being viewed as slow to act against insider 
dealing. Yet, it seems that the system adopted and more importantly the ideological 
beliefs placed on enforcing insider trading and other trading abuses is radically 
different from that of the United Kingdom. One striking difference is the emphasis 
that is placed on providing new recruits with a `spring board' on which to launch their 
career. This does not and seems unlikely to materialise in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, this is not the only striking difference. The stress that is placed on 
combating insider dealing in the United States is impressive. The implementation of 
new legislation on more than one occasion within a short space of time illustrates the 
importance the United States places on market regulation. However, can the same be 
said of the United Kingdom with the passing, in the near future, of the Financial 
, Services and Markets Bill? 
The Financial Services and Markets Bill is an extremely unstable piece of 
legislation at present. I use the word `unstable' mainly because many of the criticisms 
of it have yet to be settled. However, this is understandable given the stage the Bill is 
at. It is interesting to note the since this new piece of legislation has been presented 
many of the traditional problems which raised their head under the FSA'86 have not 
yet been resolved. The fragmentary nature of the overall structure, the fact that `turf 
battles' will be evident at times and the issue of `double jeopardy' have all been 
discussed and criticised. So can this Bill be argued to improve the present, pre- 
implementation, period. Some would argue `yes' as it seems that the place more 
emphasis on the notion of regulatory enforcement and as a by-product creates investor 
confidence in the market. Yet, on the other hand the fact that the market may be too 
regulated and consequently hinder its growth. Indeed, given the forecast that the 
markets that will grow the most in the future are those that are secondary can it be 
said that this Bill will take on-board the complex and innovative nature of some of 
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these financial instruments. At present there is no way of telling how the ßi11 will 
eventually appear as an Act but it is hoped that most of these issues will be resolved if 
only for the sake of financial growth. 
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Chapter SLL 
From Caught to Court: 
The Problems Associated with Prosecuting Financial Fraud 
and Sentencing Financial Criminals 
Overview 
In the United Kingdom the reliance on the criminal law and the criminal justice 
system to enforce it represents to many the achilles heel in bringing market ji"audsters 
to account for their actions. Yet is this view wholly just fled? The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the main issues of contention surrounding the prosecution 
process generally to hypothesise whether the role of the criminal law and the 
sentencing of offenders can indeed be improved upon. 
For the sake of clarity this chapter is divided into two sections. Section one identifies 
the f sndaºnental problems associated with the prosecution of financial criminals and 
assesses the validity in these assumptions. Whilst section two turns to the issue of 
sentencing and examines the salient issues surrounding the most appropriate bray to 
sentence market abusers. 
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6.1. Common Problems Associated with Fraud Trials 
In any criminal trial, legal rules structure the proceedings and determine the amount 
and kinds of information, which are relevant. The arguments offered by both 
prosecutors and defendants alike are shaped by the requirements of rules relating to 
evidence and by the nature of the offence or offences themselves. Defendants, for 
example, cannot simply claim that offences were not their fault; they must provide 
legal arguments that deny any legal accountability. Not surprisingly, in trials 
involving financial crimes, the law itself and the specific characteristics of the offence 
strongly influence the tactics and strategies that are available to both types of counsel. 
The task of the prosecution in any criminal offence is to present sufficient 
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the 
offence in question and that he had both the required mens rea and actus reus that 
coincided to form that offence. Yet, it is because of the need for such a high standard 
of proof that many offences fail to be prosecuted. Often this position is further 
exacerbated because of the unique characteristics attached to such financial crime 
trials. Many involve more than one defendant, each of who may have participated in 
only some of the activities and some of whom may be only indirectly implicated. 
Complex cases may also involve a number of different kinds of offences, all of which 
are the subject of different indictments, and some of which may be easier to prove 
than others. In addition, the evidence generated in these types of cases can involve 
mountains of documentation, detailed examination of corporate and personal banking 
transactions, I and require testimony of witnesses, some of whom may be unable or 
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With length of time comes increased cost, as trials involving fraud are never 
cheap to bring. Nine years ago it was estimated that to bring an insider dealing 
prosecution it would cost in excess of £100,000. Today's figures will invariably be 
higher. Yet apart from the overall high expense, one of the most fundamental areas 
that have been contested in recent years is the right for these types of trial to be tried 
by jury. 3 
The jury system was said to be imported to the United Kingdom4 aller the 
Norman Conquests to provide a number of functions. They acted as witnesses, 
providing information about local matters, and were largely used in administrative 
matters. However, by the time of Henry 11, the jury began to take on an important 
judicial function, moving from reporting on events they knew about, to deliberating 
on evidence produced by. the parties involved in a dispute. Gradually it became 
accepted that a juror should know as little as possible about the facts of the case 
before the trial, a trait still carried on today. A major milestone in the history of the 
jury was in the case of Bushell. 6 Before this, judges would try to bully juries into 
convicting the defendant, particularly where the crime had political overtones, but in 
Bushell's case it was established that the jury were the sole judges of fact, with the 
right to give a verdict according to their conscience, and could not be penalised for 
taking a view of the facts opposed to that of the judge. The importance of this now is 
that juries have the independent capacity to acquit a defendant, without being 
pressurised by a judge. 
3 Time, Money and the Jury', (1995) 145(6715) New Law Journal, at 1493; Wright, T. (1998). 
'Prosecution White Collar Crime - What's Going On? ', November, Amicus Curiae. Vol. 12 at 
12 et seq.; McKenna, M. (1998), 'Juries in Serious Fraud Trials', July/August, In-House 
Lawyer, Vol. 62, at 77 et seq.; Hansen, 1. (1998), 'Juries in Serious Fraud Trials', June, Amicus 
Curiae, Vol. 8, at 4 et seq.; 'Juries and Fraud Trials', (1998), April, Criminal Law Bulletin, 
Vol. 32, at 7 et seq.; Rhodes, N. (1998), 'Juries in Fraud Trials', New Law Journal, Vol. 148, 
No. 6828, at 239 et seq. and 'Here We Go Again... and Again', (1996), New Law Journal, Vol. 
146, No. 6728, at 77. See also Juries in Serious Fraud Trials -A Consultation Document, 
Home Office, (1998). 
4 Although the fact that it originated from the Holy Roman Empire is mere conjecture. 
5f lowever, it should be noted that there are possible antecedents of the jury to be found in the 
Laws of Aethelred (997). 
6 Bushell's Case [1670]. 
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While the value of juries has very rarely been questioned in criminal trials the 
role it plays in cases involving financial crime has often been suspect.? This is 
essentially down to the question of suitability - that is, can jurors be found that not 
only possess the ability to give up a large period of their time8 but also have the 
intellectual abilities needed to comprehend complex and detailed evidence often 
needed if a conviction is to be gained? 9 It is therefore not surprising then that it has 
been suggested that the use of juries have become the scapegoat for the inherently 
risky nature associated with financial fraud trials1Ö and that by limiting the use of 
juries, using streamlined rules of evidencei1 and by the use of computerised transcript 
recording techniques12 conviction ratings may increase. 13 
Prosecutions are rarely undertaken unless there is a reasonable chance of 
success. Therefore one would assume that it might be expected that cases would be 
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follows intensive pre-trial review and negotiation between prosecution and defence 
attorneys. To defence attorneys, prosecution in itself represents failure, as their first 
aim is to prevent it. 14 Where cases are taken to court therefore it is likely that there is 
strong evidence and defendants may secure some advantages by plea-bargaining. 
Therefore, few cases are contested. 15 However, this does not mean that defendants 
cannot attempt to minimise their guilt by denying intent and culpability. Rather than 
use these arguments to contest guilt, they can be used in an attempt to reduce the 
sentence. Consequently, in fraud trials substantive legal arguments are often used not 
in defence, but in an adversarial sentencing process. 16 Pleading guilty has the 
additional advantage that it reduces the amount of evidence provided by the 
prosecution, as'they do not have to establish intent or mens rea. Therefore, evidence 
which might indicate dishonesty and blameworthiness is not provided, which enables 
defendants to deny their existence in mitigation. 17 In the United Kingdom, where the 
powers of regulators to secure ̀ out of court settlements' and conduct pre-trial 
negotiations are very different, these considerations may not apply. 18 Of more 
concern in England and Wales has been an apparently high rate of acquittals, often 
attributed to the inability of juries to comprehend proccedings. 19 Whether or not 
acquittal rates are too high is impossible to judge in the absence of any standard that 
indicates how many acquittals can reasonably be expected, but it is clear that many 
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technicalities, which may result from the prosecution's failure to provide sufficient 
evidence. 20 
The prevalence of financial crimes in occupations and organisations where they 
are widely tolerated demonstrates the limited impact the criminal law has had in this 
area. Enforcement problems, the small number of prosecutions, and the leniency of 
sanctions further constrain the preventive and deterrent value of the criminal law. 
This is exacerbated by the many ambiguities and loopholes associated with specific 
laws. Few disagree that the law has a limited impact, but there are conflicting 
analyses of why this is the case and what should be done about it. 
Broadly speaking three distinct approaches to these questions can be discerned. 
Following the logic of what might be called a ̀ regulatory' approach; some argue that 
the criminal law should be used sparingly given the cost and ineffectiveness of 
prosecution. The nature of the activities to be regulated in any event create problems 
for law and its enforcement and, therefore, greater emphasis should be placed on self- 
regulation and administrative sanctions, which are cheaper and more effective, and 
thus better protect the public. A very different agenda is advocated by those who 
argue that the laws are weakened by their failure to treat the crimes of wealthy and 
powerful offenders with the same vigour applied to conventional offenders. White- 
collar crime, they argue is crime and ought to be dealt with as severely as other 
crimes. Accordingly, the criminal law should be strengthened, more offenders should 
be prosecuted and sanctions should be tougher. 21 
These views represent somewhat extreme positions, and elements of both can be 
combined. It can be accepted that self-regulation and administrative sanctions may 
well be more effective in preventing and even deterring offences, but also that they 
may not be sufficient. It can also be accepted that public prosecution and punishment 
are necessary on the grounds of morality and justice, as the offences are offences and 
20 
21 
Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 45 et seq.. 
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offenders do enjoy advantages. Sentencing policies should therefore aim at 
prevention and deterrence along with justice and equity. Braithwaite, for example, in 
his theory of re-integration shaming suggests a mixture of policies combining self- 
regulation and state punishment, which would shame offenders without stigmatising 
them, and provide for stiffer punishments to underline the moral unacceptability of 
offences. 22 
The inability of criminal law to substantially reduce crime is not restricted to 
financial crime. It is now widely accepted that what are generally known as reductive 
sentencing policies, that aim to either deter or rehabilitate offenders, are relatively 
ineffective in preventing recidivism, and have little effect on the volume of crime as 
only a small minority of conventional offenders are ever caught and subjected to 
punishment 23 Deterrent policies have other limitations. It has often been argued, for 
example, that the majority of the population do not commit crimes because they feel 
they are morally wrong, and tend to be more worried about the reactions of friends 
and family than about particular forms of punishment. 
24 These kinds of arguments 
can be used in support of a `just deserts' model that justifies punishment on the 
grounds that offenders have done wrong and, therefore, 'deserve' punishment. 
Sentences should be based on considerations of culpability and should be in 
proportion to the gravity or seriousness of the crime, thus ensuring equity and justice. 
In theory, this should eliminate the inequities and disparities often attributed to 
individualise sentencing based on rehabilitative considerations. 25 
Recent proposals to reform sentencing policy indicate a shift away from 
rehabilitation and deterrence in favour of principles of 
just deserts, and in addition 
stress the importance of incapacitation, which may 
be necessary for public protection. 
22 Braithwaite, J. (1989), Crime, Shame and Re-integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, at 75 et seq.. 
23 Ashworth, A. (1994) 'Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences', Criminal Law Rcview, at 341 
et seq.. 
24 Braithwaite, J. (1989), supra, note 22, at 81. 
25 Hudson, B. (1987) Justice Through Punishment, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, at 64 et 
seq.. 
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These kinds of proposals reflect a general consensus that prison should be used less, 
and should be reserved for the most serious, persistent, violent and dangerous '. 
offenders, however these might be defined. Current proposals also suggest that more 
emphasis should be placed on `punishment' in the community. 26 Crime reduction, on 
the other hand, is better achieved by strategies aimed at preventing crime, where more 
responsibility is placed on individual citizens to protect themselves. 
These arguments have also affected analyses of white-collar crime, although the 
application of specific policies and proposals may be somewhat different. Many 
conventional crimes are unambiguously regarded as criminal and, therefore, few 
would dispute that burglars should be prosecuted or punished however ineffective this 
may be in reducing the total amount of burglary. The many differences between 
white-collar offences and offenders, and their conventional criminal counterparts also 
means that the application of principles of deterrence retribution, incapacitation and 
rehabilitation may be very different, especially in relation to organisational crime. 27 
It is often assumed that a major aim of sentencing white-collar offenders is ,.. 
deterrence. This reflects a general view that offenders are more deterrable than 
others, as offences are assumed to be economically motivated and involve calculated 
risks by rational actors. 28 Defendants' arguments that the process is punishment also 
reflect the potential deterrent value of the law as many individual offenders do risk 
losing their employment and reputation, high incomes and comfortable life styles. 
Corporations are often assumed to be future orientated, concerned about their 
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harrowing experience of investigation, prosecution and trial, therefore, can and do act 
as deterrent. 30 
Nonetheless, this deterrent potential can be undermined by the low rates of 
detection and prosecution, and the limited impact of sentences. The view that 
offences arise from rational and conscious decision making can also be questioned 
particularly in relation to organisational crime where individuals may not intend to 
commit offences. The criminogenic elements of organisations may also remain 
whatever punishment follows conviction, thus effectively neutralising any deterrent 
effect. 31 In addition, Levi argues that the `fall from grace' effect may be 
exaggerated. 32 Some offenders may lose their occupational status, but may be able to 
pursue alternative careers and may even benefit indirectly from their offences. For 
example, many of the Watergate conspirators profited greatly from their memoirs! In 
other cases, offences may be a consequence of the failure or poor performance of a 
business; therefore, offenders have already lost everything anyway. 
Whether or not deterrence works in practice, it can also be argued that it is not 
and should not be the only principle underlying the use of the criminal law or the sole 
aim of punishment. Proponents of a just desert' approach, for example, argue that 
offenders should be publicly prosecuted and punished for their offences, and many 
object to the implicit inequity of treating one group of offenders differently from any 
other group. However, the `just deserts' approach also creates several problems, 
particularly in relation to financial crime. 
33 `Just deserts' models rely on notions of 
guilt, blame and culpability, which could 
lead to less ̀ justice' for financial criminals, 
given their ability to minimise elements of 
intent and culpability. In addition, to 
30 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2 at 89 et seg.. 
31 Moore, C. A. (1987), Taming the Giant Corporations? Some Cautionary Remarks on the 
Deterrabiliry of Corporate Crime', Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 33, at 383 et seq.. 
32 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 54 etseq.. 
33 Braithwaite, J. (1982), 'Challenging Just Desserts: Punishing White Collar Criminals', Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 73, No. 2, at 125 et seq. and Braithwaite, J. and Pettit, 
P. (1990), Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 243 et 
seq.. 
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prosecute all financial crime offences, let alone all conventional offenders, would be 
prohibitively costly. Principles of just deserts further stress that punishment should 
reflect the harm done. However, it has been previously noted that offences are often 
considered to be less serious and therefore any equation of punishment to harm done 
might have little effect. A general problem with the implementation of just deserts 
models lies in the difficulties of determining which crimes are more serious than - 
others, and whose definitions of seriousness are adopted. Application of `just deserts' 
models could well perpetuate class based and ideological definitions of the 
seriousness of crime, thus confirming the distinction between white collar crimes and 
`real crimes'. 34 
34 I Judson, B. (1987), Justice through Punishment, London: Macmillan, 5 et seq.. 
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6.2. Sentencing the City Fraudster 
Generally speaking, there has been little discussion of the application of the principles 
of sentencing to market abuse. High profile offenders are rarely seen being in need of 
help, advice or counselling as they are assumed to have made rational choices when 
embarking on their crime. Therefore, rehabilitative policies have rarely been 
considered. Similarly, incapacitation is also rarely considered given that abusive 
market practices can be perceived as ̀ victimless', offenders are not likely to he 
defined as `dangerous' and losing their jobs before conviction may have effectively 
incapacitated them. Consequently, they will not have the opportunity to become 
persistent offenders. However, it can be argued that incapacitation can be a useful 
approach as individual offenders can be disbarred or disqualified. 35 
Yet whatever sentencing policies are adopted, their effect in reducing crime and 
thereby protecting the public may be limited. Thus, as is increasingly the case for 
conventional crimes, much emphasis is placed on public protection and prevention, 
which underlie the use of preventive and compliance strategies. The role of self- 
regulation is also of great significance, as ultimately more crime can be prevented 
within organisations themselves. Effective regulation may therefore, require both 
preventive policies and a range of different sentencing policies. 36 
Braithwaite suggests such a combination in an attempt to develop an approach 
that can be applied to both conventional and white-collar crime. 37 Accepting that 
traditional sentencing policies and strategies of crime control have failed, he argues 
that the most effective social control exists where offenders experience shame for 
their actions and where there is strong moral disapproval of wrongdoing. Therefore, 
tough formal punishment should underline the moral unacceptability of olTences and 
policies should encourage shaming. However, 
it is argued, that punishment should 
not be too severe, as this can create ̀
outcasts' and `organisecl subcultures of 
35 Braithwaite, J. and Geis, G. (1982), supra, note 27, at 299. 
36 Nove, T. (1998), `Closing the Loopholes', Policing Today, Vol. 4, No. 4, at 12 el seq.. 
37 Braithwaite, J. (1989), supra, note 22, at 97 et seq.. 
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resistance'. Policies should, therefore, aim at support and re-integration rather than 
stigmatisation. For most kinds of white-collar crime, he argues: 
`... the moral educative functions of the law are sorely neglected by ,, 
insufficient levels offormal punishment coupled with state shaming. '38 
Punishment for organisational crime should therefore maximise the sense of shame 
which: 
`... communicates the message that white collar crime is as abhorrent to 
the community as crime in the streets. '39 
Policies should, therefore, underline the moral unacceptability of white collar crime, 
by encouraging widespread publicity which would shame offenders along with firmer 
punishments where necessary. The closest approximation to the `family model of 
punishment' for white-collar crime is self-regulation within organisations, which 
should encourage moral disapproval for non-compliance. This, however, must be 
backed up by state punishment. Therefore, neither prosecution nor persuasive models 
best fit the requirement of re-integrative shaming - adversarial approaches threaten to 
make outcasts of otherwise compliant businesses and compliance strategies underplay 
the moral educative function of the criminal law. Effective business regulators he 
argues, are those who are flexible enough to persuade offenders who are willing to 
comply and at the same time use punishment against the recalcitrant. 
Many strategies are suggested by these arguments. Some focus almost 
exclusively on prevention and protection of the public, leading to suggestions for 
increased self-regulation and even decriminalisation. Others wish to see the criminal 
law tightened and penalties made more severe, and yet others argue that new 
strategies should be developed which may be more appropriate to the specific 
problems posed by white-collar offences and offenders. 
38 
39 
Braithwaite, J. (1989), op. cit., at 132. 
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6.2.1. Decriminalisation 
It has already been seen that the use of the criminal law and, in particular, the use of 
strict liability is unpopular among both lawyers and business groups. Hardly 
surprisingly, therefore, there have been calls for decriminalisation. An influential 
Justice report in 1980 advocated a drastic reduction in strict liability offences and 
argued that the criminal law should be restricted to offences that are clearly mule in 
se. 40 Arguing that the use and proliferation of strict liability offences decreases 
respect for the criminal law, it recommended the creation of a category of 
`contraventions' subject to civil penalties. Decriminalisation was also an option 
favoured by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981 and in the Law 
Society's recommendations to the Keith Committee on Revenue Lary that observed 
that: 
`Routine regulatory mechanisms should not, in the tax field, be fenced 
with criminal sanctions. Automatic civil surcharges and penalties are 
more appropriate, and more reliable in their application. '4 1 
Decriminalisation has also been proposed by Tench who suggests that consumer 
and other regulatory offences should be dealt with in a new ̀ middle system of luw. 
which would be neither civil nor criminal. This would remove the sense of grievance" 
expressed by offenders and could lead to higher penalties: 
`... under the new system the court may well feel much more at ease in 
awarding a civil penalty that really hurts, once the obloquy of a criminal 
conviction is removed from the transgression. '42 
40 Levi, M. (1984), ̀ Business Regulatory Offences and the Criminal Law'. Company Lawyer, Vol. 
5, No. 6, at 253 et seq.. 
41 Levi, M. (1984), op. cit., at 257. 
42 Tench, D. (1981), Towards a Middle System ofLmv, London: Consumer's Association, at 21. 
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For `crooks' and `real fraud', Parliament should determine that some acts are to 
be considered as ̀ wicked and forbidden', while others should be considered to be `not 
wicked', but in need of regulation. Public funds would be saved as many cases would 
not go to court. This system should be clearly distinguished from criminal law by 
using a different language-words like penalty, liability, contravention, transgression 
and violation would all be suitable unlike crime, offence, guilty or fine, imprisonment, 
prosecute and charge. 43 
There are many problems with the kinds of proposals. Deterrence could be 
further undermined by the absence of public prosecutions 44 In addition, while strict 
liability does enable defendants to minimise their blameworthiness and may lead to 
lower penalties, the difficulties of proving intent might lead to very few prosecutions 
of the really `wicked, who would all presumably deny dishonesty or intent 45 
Despite the many protests about the injustice of convicting morally innocent business 
persons, selective prosecution policies and low penalties in themselves make such 
injustices unlikely. 46 Finally, many object to the ideological assumption underlying 
decriminalisation proposals that these ̀ contraventions' or violations are essentially 
different from crimes and offences. 
Much of the responsibility for preventing and detecting white-collar offences 
lies with industry itself, either through the internal arrangements of individual 
companies and businesses, or through trade associations and self-regulatory 
organisations, like those that exist in the City of London. Many, offences are, indeed, 
more likely to be discovered within organisations than by outsiders, and many are 
dealt with by private policing and private justice. 47 Some self-regulatory 
43 
44 
Tench, D. (1981), op. cit., at 19 etseq.. 
See generally Borrie, G., Sir (1980), ̀ Laws and Codes for Consumers', Monthly Review, Vol. 
88, No. 12. 
45 See generally Borne, G., Sir (1984), The Development of Consumer Law and Policy - Bold 
Spirits and Timorous Souls, London: Stevens. 
46 
47 
Levi, M. (1984), supra, note 40, at 251 et seq.. 
See generally Clarke, M. (1990), Business Crime: Its Nature and Control, Cambridge: Polity. 
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organisations can also disqualify offenders or apply other sanctions and industrial and 
trade associations also monitor compliance with standards 48 The scope and 
significance of self-regulation is, therefore, enormous. Accordingly, many argue that 
far greater emphasis should be placed on improving and strengthening arrangements 
for self-regulation, which can be more effective and less costly, as many of the costs 
of enforcement are borne by industries or trade associations themselves. 
Braithwaite and Fisse, on the basis of their research in the pharmaceutical and 
other industries, summarise the many benefits of self- regulation. Inspections carried 
out by company inspectors, they argue, can be more exhaustive compared to the 
often-ineffective coverage of government inspectors. Corporate inspectors tend to be 
better trained, have a more specialised knowledge of the company's operations. and 
arc in a better position to detect cover-ups and set up traps for suspected wrongdoers. 
To be effective, however, self-regulatory arrangements must have informal clout and 
management backing. Ideally, there should be provisions for accountability for 
compliance through line management accompanied by effective monitoring. In 
addition, problems must be effectively communicated to those capable of taking 
action and those involved should be adequately trained and supervised. 
49 
While few dispute that self-regulation can be more effective than public 
regulation, many doubt whether its potential can be realised, as many industries and 
especially trade associations have shown a marked reluctance to institute systems with 
sufficient clout. As Braithwaite and Fisse point out, industries often need to be 
threatened by increased state regulation before they are prepared to institute 
sufficiently rigorous controls. 
50 Furthermore, much self-regulation has been 
criticised for prioritising industrial 
interests, and giving less weight to the interests of 
workers, consumers or the public at large. 
51 The practical effects of self-regulation 
48 Braithwaite, J. and Fisse, B. (1987), 'Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime', in 
Shearing, C. and Stenning, M. (1987), Private Policing, London: Sage Publications, at 76 et 
seq. 
49 Braithwaite, J. and Fisse, B. (1987), op. cit., at 45. 
50 Braithwaite, J. and Fisse, B. (1987), supra, note 48, at 34. 
51 Cranston, R. (1984), Consumers and the Law, London: Butterworths, at 23 et seq.. 
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can, therefore, be limited. A further objection to an over-emphasis on self-regulation 
is that it is not publicity accountable and offenders are not publicly prosecuted. 52 
On the other hand, state and self-regulation can and do operate side by side, and 
as Braithwaite argues, to be effective self-regulation should be backed up by stiffer 
penalties, a combination central to his proposed theory of re-integration shaming. 53 
Self-regulation should, he argues, attempt to foster corporate cultures in which an 
absence of compliance is seen as morally wrong, and should be based on trust and co- 
operation, involving all employees. He therefore rejects the kinds of self-regulatory 
systems which increase levels of monitoring and surveillance and create more and 
more `auditors' and `monitors' which, he argues, merely exacerbate the diffusion of 
responsibility and in which organisational complexity is used to `protect people from 
their own consciences'. 54 To encourage the development of such a culture, 
organisations should encourage ̀ whistle-blowing' and going direct to the top where 
non-compliance is found. 55 Trust is essential in such a system, where everyone is a 
guardian and no one is the ultimate guardian. 
52 Clarke, M. (1987), ̀ Prosecutorial and Administrative Strategies in the Control of Business 




Braithwaite, J. (1989), supra, note 22, at 101 etseq.. 
Braithwaite, J. (1989), supra, note 22, at 147 et seq.. 
Whistle-blowing has now been afforded statutory protection by Parliament although it is too 




6.2.2. Administrative Sanctions 
The many powers and sanctions available to both self-regulatory organisations have 
already been outlined. These powers have many advantages. They are deterrent, as 
they threaten the very survival of a business they protect the public and prevent 
further offences. Accordingly, there are many suggestions that they should be 
extended and used more often. 
In certain circumstances, offenders can be disqualified. Such incapacitation can 
be achieved, argue Braithwaite and Geis `swiftly and without barbarism'. 56 In 
Britain, individuals can be prohibited from running financial service businesses, and 
from professional practice in accountancy if they are deemed to be not a `fit and 
proper person'. 57 Such a judgement is not necessarily related to offences, as 
convictions are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for being banned, and they 
can be made where a lack of commercial probity, gross negligence or total 
incompetence is present. Theoretically, these powers are deterrent and punitive, and 
also incapacitative. However, there are some practical problems. Where individuals 
have not been convicted, it may be difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate whether or not someone is a `fit and proper person' and, of course, many 
at one time considered to be `fit and proper', nonetheless, commit oflences. 
58 Levi 
also points out that disqualified persons can readily set up new companies under a 
front person who has not been disqualified. What Braithwaite further limits the effect 
of disqualifications and Geis 
describe as substitution problems - one person within a 
business or corporation may be removed, but subsequently replaced by another person 
56 Braithwaite, J. and Geis, G. (1982), supra, note 27, at 307. 
57 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2 and Levi, M. (1989) ̀ Fraudulent Justice? Sentencing the 
Business Criminal' in Carle, P. and Cook, D. (ed. ) (1989), Paying. for Crime, Oxford: Martin 
Robinson, at 88 et seq.. 
58 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 348. The notion of justifiable evidence through self- 
incrimination has for some time been argued given the decision reached in Earnest Saunders 
case and the implications it has on civil liberties; see, for example, Sarker, R. (1997), 'A l)-rrhic 
l'ictoryfor Ernest Saunders', European Financial Services Law, Vol. 4, No. 3, at 111 et seq.; 
Edenborough, P. (1997), 'Use of Statements Given Under a Legal Compulsion', Student Law 
Review, Vol. 21, at 36 et seq. and Mason, K. (1997), 'Litigator's 6'iew', Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 5. 
at 12. 
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who may be prepared to commit the same offences. 59 Finally, of course, they are 
only applicable where qualifications are required except with the case of directorship 
where the court may impose a ban. 
The power to grant or withdraw licences also has considerable potential, in that' 
it is preventive and threatens profitability and survival. Indeed, these powers can shift 
the balance of power in favour of regulators. 60 
Many self-regulatory organisations and public enforcement agencies can also 
impose financial penalties, powers that many argue should be increased, which is 
implicit in proposals for decriminalisation. They also have a considerable deterrent 
value and amount to punishment while avoiding costly and risky prosecutions. Other 
strategies can also provide financial disincentives to offend. 
59 
60 
Braithwaite, J. and Geis, G. (1982), supra, note 27, at 79 et seq.. 
Pearce, F. and Tombs, S. (1990), `Ideology, Hegemony and Empiricism: Compliance Theories 
and Regulation', British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 30, No. 4, at 424 et seq.. 
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6.2.3. Criminal Law and Enforcement 
However effective many of these administrative measures may be, most accept that 
the criminal law must be used as an ultimate sanction, if only for the most recalcitrant 
or `wicked offenders. Others argue further that the criminal sanction is also 
necessary to underline moral disapproval of activities that are criminal offences. 
Furthermore, private justice is not publicly accountable and leads to a situation in 
which a different set of rules is applied to different groups of offenders, a situation 
which would be exacerbated by a greater emphasis on alternatives to prosecution. 
Accordingly, therefore, there have been many suggestions for strengthening criminal 
law, and making both enforcement and sentencing policies more punitive. 
Against the view that the criminal law is inevitably limited, it could be argued 
that many of its gaps and loopholes could be plugged. It is impossible to examine 
here the many proposals for strengthening different laws that include proposals for the 
criminalization of many fraudulent practices. The law could, for example, clarify the 
duties and responsibilities of company directors. 
The creation of laws is undoubtedly important, but when created they have to be 
enforced, and there are many ways in which enforcement could be strengthened. 
Previous chapters have shown how resource constraints can lead to a lower rate of' 
detection and prosecution that, in turn, reduces the deterrent and preventive value of 
the law. Accordingly, there have been many calls, not least from enforcement 
agencies themselves, for increased resources. 
61 It could, of course, be argued that the 
allocation of extra resources to the police force has not so far affected the upward 
trend in the crime rates. More resources for regulatory enforcement agencies would 
enable them to carry out more 
inspections and testing, which would increase their 
chances of detecting offences and, thereby, 
improve public protection. Allocating 
more resources to enforcement might, in turn, result in a greater number of 
prosecutions, which can 
be justified on the grounds of both deterrence and justice. It 
could be argued, for example, that 
for some, particularly high status offenders, public 
61 Bruce, T. (1999), ̀ Collective Responsibility Must be Felt if Fraud is to be Tackled Effectively', 
The Times, 13/5/99. 
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prosecution in itself might enhance an important deterrent and public awareness of 
offences. A higher rate of prosecutions would also reduce the inequities produced by 
the present situation in which business and white collar offenders are more likely to 
be subject to private justice and less to public justice than conventional offenders. 
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4 6.2.4. Making Offenders Pay 
While more prosecutions might constitute a deterrent, insignificant fines could well 
undermine this. Raising the level of fines is therefore, seen by many commentators as 
imperative. Increasing maximum fines and encouraging the use of higher fines within 
the permitted range can do this. Many argue, for example, that fines should better 
reflect the illegal profits made offences. 62 Fines could also be more closely related to 
the offender's ability to pay. There have been many arguments for the adoption of a 
`unit fine' system in which fines are calculated on the basis of units that are then 
related to the offender's means. These have now been introduced and their cf ect on 
fines for white-collar offenders could be substantial. Levi argues not only that very 
large fines should be imposed where appropriate, but that the media should be 
encouraged to take a more sophisticated attitude when reporting sentences by relating 
fines to offenders means. 63 The introduction of unit fines and the raising of lines for 
many regulatory offences have implicitly accepted many of these points. 
It could be objected that fining companies too severely could penalise innocent 
parties like shareholders whose dividends might be cut or consumers who might 
suffer if the cost of fines were passed on by way of higher prices. However, both 
Braithwaite and Leigh argue that shareholders accept an element of risk by investing 
and also those companies may not be able to raise prices in competitive markcts. 64 
punitive fines could also make shareholders ask more questions about the 
responsibilities of senior executives. 
65 One problem that could arise in relating fines 
to offenders' ability to pay is how this ability can be ascertained. As Levi points out. 
62 See generally Braithwaite, J. (1984), Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul at 68 et seq.. 
63 Levi, M. (1989), supra, note 57, at 54. 
64 Braithwaite, J. (1984), supra, note 62 and Leigh, L. H. (1977), `Policy and Punitive Measures in 
Respect of Economic Offences', in Leigh, L. H. (ed. ), Criminological Aspects of Economic 
Crime, London: Butterworths, at 5 et seq.. 
65 Geis, G. (1978), ̀ Deterring Corporate Crime' in Ermann, M. D. and Lundman, R. J. (eds. ) 
(1978), Corporate and Government Deviance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, at 142 el sey.. 
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the self-reported income and debt statements of the accused is not the most valid 
method of data gathering in professional fraud or organised crime cases. 66 
In addition to fines, offenders can also be made to pay through the imposition of 
compensation orders or the confiscation of assets. For example, courts may order 
confiscation of assets in cases of serious frauds, involving sums of over £10,000. 
However, Levi points out that these powers may be limited in practice, as assets may 
be in foreign bank accounts that are difficult to access. 67 Compensation orders can 
also add to the total financial penalty, and can be used where fines are low to increase 
the total sum. There are, therefore, many ways in which offenders can be made to pay 
for their crimes. However, financial penalties for the very rich can still be of limited 
value as they may have to be very high to be sufficiently deterrent and they may not 
have an equitable effect - they can, for example, perpetuate the situation in which the 
rich can pay for their crimes whereas the poor are less able to do so. 68 
66 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 58 et seq.. 
67 Op cit.. 
68 Cook, D. (I 989)'Fiddling Tax and Benefits: Inculpating the Poor, Exculpating the Rich' in 






While many argue that sentences hould be more punitive, it is not easy to determine 
how this can be done. An obvious suggestion is that more white-collar offenders 
should be sent to prison for longer periods of time on the grounds that the threat of 
imprisonment is deterrent, and that it is widely regarded as the most severe sanction 
under the criminal law. 69 Gels also argues that more use of imprisonment would he 
retributive, and would encourage moral outrage and media attention. 70 On the other 
hand, arguing for more prison sentences contradicts the general consensus that prison 
serves little more useful purpose and that its use ought to be reduced. 71 It could also 
be seen as somewhat ironic to suggest that rich and wealthy offenders should be 
maintained at the state's expense. 
Even when imprisoned, white collar offenders continue to enjoy favourable 
treatment, more often being sent to open prisons on the assumption that they present a 
smaller security risk. They are more likely to be paroled, and less likely to be seen as 
being in need of rehabilitation. 72 Some of the Guinness defendants were sent to Ford 
open Prison which has a more relaxed regime, and where offenders could issue 
business instructions, freely use the phone and write letters. White-collar offenders' 
experience of prison may, therefore, involve fewer pains that that of conventional 
criminals. 
69 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 66 et seq.. 
70 Geis, G. (1978), supra, note 65. See also Durston, K. (1996), ̀ Fraud Trials: Is There a I'ia 
Media? ', Criminal Lawyer, Vol. 67, at 7 et seq.. 
71 Braithwaite, J. (1984), supra, note 62, at 76 et seq.. 
72 Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 51 and Doig, A. (1984), Corruption and Misconduct in 
Contemporary British Politics, (1984), at 126. 
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6.2.6. Incapacitation 
Despite the apparent difficulties of incapacitating white-collar offenders, Braithwaite 
and Geis argue that: 
`... although incapacitation is not apt to be very effective or acceptable for 
controlling traditional crime in a humane society, it can be a highly 
successful strategy in the control of corporate crime. Indeed, it can be 
more workable with corporate crimes because their kind of criminal 
activity is dependent on their being able to maintain legitimacy in 
formalised roles in the economy. '73 
While these strategies may be both deterrent and preventive, their potential use and 
effect is likely to be somewhat limited. Box comments, for example, that they might 
well be seen as ̀ draconian and ideologically repugnant'. 74 In addition, Levi points 
out that the individuals involved could set up new operations under assumed names or 




Braithwaite, J. and Geis, G. (1982), supra, note 27, at 307. 
Box, S. (1983), Power, Corruption and Mystification, London: Tavistock, at 9 et seq.. 
Levi, M. (1987), supra, note 2, at 53 et seq.. 
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6.2.7. Shaming Offenders 
Publicising offences can be a major deterrent and can also, argues Box, act as a 
catalyst by raising public consciousness. 76 Publicity is also central to the shaming 
strategies outlined by Braithwaite who points out that as white-collar offenders have a 
more profound stake in conformity they are deterred more by adverse publicity. 77 
This view is also echoed by Chambliss who believes that white-collar criminals are 
among the most deterable types of offenders because they do not have a commitment 
to crime as a way of life and their offences are not spontaneous but are rather 
calculated risks. 78 There is considerable evidence that white-collar offenders do fear 
adverse publicity. For instance, Benson found that offenders whose cases had been 
reported felt embarrassed or embittered, whereas offenders whose cases had not been 
reported felt relieved. 79 
Nonetheless, despite the considerable publicity surrounding major cases, 
publicity does not inevitably 
follow conviction, especially for regulatory offences, 
which are often heard in lower courts, and only irregularly covered by the media. 
Therefore, many argue that courts should have powers to order some kind of 
publicity. However, determining the 
form that court ordered publicity might take 
creates difficulties. There 
have been some experiments with `corporate atonement' 
policies in the United 
States, where companies are required to pay for advertisements 
correcting misleading ones, 
but companies often used specialist journals, rather than 
the consumer journals used 
for the original advertisements. 80 Levi also argues that 
courts could require 
firms to take out an advertisement in either the local or national 
press to publish 
details of their violations. Fisse and ßraithtiraiie recommend a 
variety of schemes 
including adverse publicity orders as a formal sanction, calling 
76 Box, S. (1983), supra, note 74, at 32 et seq.. 
77 Braithwaite, J. (1989), supra, note 22. 
78 Chambliss, W. J. (1988), Exploring Criminology, New York: Macmillan, at 54 el seq.. 
79 Benson, 1.. (1985), ̀ Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-Collar 
Crime', Criminology, Vol. 23, No. 4, at 294 et seq.. 
g0 Box, S. (1983), supra, note 74, at 43. 
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press conferences immediately after corporate convictions, and encouraging 
investigative journalism by rationalising defamatory laws. 81 
However, the use of adverse publicity as a form of deterrence has not been 
without its critics as an apt way of dealing with white-collar offenders. Schemes 
invoking adverse publicity have been deemed ineffective in cases where the 
perpetrator is a large organisation. In other words, large multination conglomerates 
are unlikely to be affected by a few misplaced publicity campaigns. Likewise, given 
that sometimes there is a strong conflict of interest between the pursuer and the 
pursued. illustrated previously with the case of Jeffery Archer and Michael Hesletine, 
adverse publicity may be diluted or manipulated for the sake of damage limitation. 82 
Fisse is also not clear over the true value of publicity as a sanction. He has 
noted that the case for using publicity, as a deterrent measure is weak if infliction of 
monetary loss is the only effect desired. He suggests that a much stronger case can be 
made out if it is sought to achieve deterrence by inducing loss of prestige or respect, 




Fisse, B. and Braithwaite, J. (1983), The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders, Albany: 
New York University Press. 
It should be noted that in this case although there may have seemed to be a conflict of interests, 
in reality such a scenario would be dealt with by high ranking civil servants first before passing 
any report to the M. P. in charge of the investigation. Reporters in this case tended to 
sensationalise the story first ignoring this point. It was in only later editions of this story that 
this fact was added. 
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6.3. Summary 
The superior resources of some, though not all defendants, can be used to present 
more credible defence strategies, many of which exploit the many ambiguities in the 
law itself and the ambiguities criminal status of offences. This enables many 
defendants to deny imputations of blame, to present themselves as fundamentally 
honest and reputable business persons and thus, of course, as undeserving of harsh 
punishment. They may be able to control potentially damaging information about the 
persistence and seriousness of their offences, even though this may be a factor 
precipitating prosecution. 
While cases prosecuted are likely to represent the more ̀ heinous', serious or 
persistent offences, this is not evident in court as the long history of warnings and 
negotiations that typically precedes prosecution is not relevant. Defendants are, 
therefore, able to portray offences as trivial, technical matters, which are isolated 
incidents or unavoidable accidents. The strategic nature of these presentations can be 
seen in the reactions of enforcement officers 
in court who are often cynical and 
critical when 
hearing defences. Many complain that magistrates may be taken in by 
what they see as posturing, and may misunderstand the nature of enforcement 
policies. 
The credibility of defence presentations further reflects the ambiguous criminal 
status of white-collar offences. 
Levi, for example, points out that there is a 
fundamental distinction between ̀excusing' the activities of fraudsters as 'common 
pruclice', when similar attitudes would certainly not prevail 
towards lower class 
defendants. 83 
Defendants' arguments are therefore made more credible because their offences 
are assumed to 
be less criminal than others. Appeals to business values assume that 
business offences are not really criminal. 
As Levi points out, suggestions that the, jury 
be abolished in complex 
fraud cases are more acceptable because fraud is not seen as 
83 Gerrard, M. and Sarker, R. (1999), 
Comment in Amicus Curiae, January, Vol. 13 Jan, at 32. 
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a `real' crime. 84 If this were to be suggested for real crimes it could be seen as 
infringing a basic principle of criminal justice. 




The Problems Associated with 
the International Element 
Overview 
This chapter critically analyses the issue of extraterritoriality and its impact on fraud 
investigations. It seeks to emphasise the problems and developments ºuule'rtaken by 
the United States and United Kingdom in an ejfbrt to improve their nºrthodº of 
detection and prosecution offinancial criminals who embrace the use of nmhi- 
jurisdictions to mask their evidential trails. 
This chapter is divided in four parts. Part one examines the general problems 
associated with extraterritoriality and it impact on financial crime. Part hro 
examines the conflicting judicial reasoning adopted tinder 
United Kingdom common 
law and examines the impact legislation has had in this area. Part three c firers a 
contrasting perspective on how the United States has dealt with this problem. 
Finally, part four examines the problems associated with memoranda (Y' 
understanding and treaties, and the effect they have on the extraterritoriality. 
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7.1. Jurisdiction, Aloney Laundering and Fraud 
Regulatory and prosecution agencies are often faced with perplexing issues when 
securities frauds or insider dealing cases crosses over state boundaries., It emphases 
the fact that securities and futures markets'- are equally hit by similar problems 
associated with extraterritoriality and that they invariably fail to recognise 
jurisdictional and political considerations place upon the process of regulatory 
enforcement until it is too late. All too often it is stated and reiterated in one form or 
another that: 
"... Securities regulation is local [and that] securities trading is 
international... "3 
Yet the impact of extraterritorial application has become all the more emphasised 




For the purposes of this chapter the issues concerned with manipulative practices are largely 
ignored due to the nature of section 47(2) Financial Services Act 1986 which essentially 
includes provisions for issues of extraterritoriality in section 47(5) FSA'86. 
Although fraud centring on futures exists due to the nature of this research and because of word 
restraints imposed by university regulations only fraud associated with general securities will be 
discussed. However, this is not to say that there are not a number of outstanding articles on 
derivative fraud and the problems faced by the notion of extraterritoriality. Therefore, see 
Swan, N. (1995), The International Reach ofAmerican Derivatives Regulation', Futures and 
Derivatives Law Review. Vol. 2, No. 2, at 48 et seq.; Prezioso, D. and Cook, C. (1994). 
'Current Regulatory Proposals Regarding the Derivatives Activities of United States Broker- 
Dealers'. European Financial Services Law, Vol. I, No. 2, at 56 et seq.; Malkin, N. (1985). 
'Extraterritorial Application of United States Commodity and Securities Laws to Market 
Transactions in an Age of Intercontinental Trading Links', North Western Journal of 
International Law and Business, Vol. 7, at 351 and Earls, D. (1984), 'Extraterritorial 
Application of Fraud Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act', Washington and Lee Law 
Review. Vol. 41, at 1215. 
Levi, M. (1993), `White-Collar Crime: The British Scene' in Geis, G. and Jesilow, P. (eds. ), 
H hire-Collar Crime: Special Issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Newbury Park, Ca: Sage, at 79 et seq.: 
'... almost all serious securities frauds involve extraterritorial informational needs on the 
part of national agencies ... (with 80% of cases investigated in London having) some 
cross-border aspects. ' 
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the utilisation of modern telecommunications and technological advancements. 4 
Indeed the waters of investigation are further muddied given that purely domestic 
attempts to deal with unlawful security activity are, at best, cumbersome. 5 Moreover. 
the definition of extraterritoriality, 6 jurisdiction and fraud7 are often ill defined or 
even intertwined. 8 Therefore it is not surprising that the problems associated with the 
concept of the extraterritorial application of securities regulation has aroused 
considerable debate and comment. 9 
4 Rutledge, D. (1997), ̀ The Internet and United States Financial Afarkets', European Financial 
Services Law, Vol. 4, No's. 11 and 12, at 304 et seq. and Courtney, E. (1998). '7/ Skv :s thc. 
Limit', The Banker, Vol. 148, No. 864, at 52. 
S See figures in chapter one. Interestingly a possible solution to this problem was originally 
proposed by a Royal Commission Report on the Law of h7dictahle Offences in 1879: 
"... Every offence shall ... 
be deemed to be committed at any place where any act is dune 
or omitted the doing or omission of which forms a part of the ojTence, or where and event 
happens necessary to the completion of the offence, whether the person accused was (it 
such place or not at the time of such an act, omission or event ... 
" 
6 The Roskill Committee Report on Fraud Trials, (1986), at paragraph 2.28 cat seq.: 
"... At present there are no statutory provisions expressly covering the territorial 
jurisdiction of the criminal law of England and Wales, In principle, the criminal law is 
territorial, confined to acts performed in England and Wales. However, problems in 
determining where an offence has been committed may arise, in particular where the 
offences contains more than one main element, some elements taking place here and 
others abroad... " 
7 Roskill (1986), op cit.: 
"... Fraud is not a defined term: there has never been anv general offence of criminal 
fraud in English law. There are in fact several hundred criminal offences on thc' statute 
book, together with a few common law offences, which may form the basis of a charge ºf 
fraud, in that one of the main ingredients of what is generally understood to be fraud 
may be present, such as dishonest practice, deception, false disclosure, concealment of 
assets or other activities of that nature... " 
8 `The English court has power to try anv defendant who is properly brought before the 
court. In that sense the court always has jurisdiction over the defendant. But if the 
defendant is alleged to have committed an offence outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court, then unless the offence is an extra-territorial one, he has committed no offence 
against English law. The court would have jurisdiction over the defendant, but he could 
not be indicted. ' 
R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Osman [ 1990] 1 W. L. R. 277 at 289, per Lloyd U. 
9 1-lemmann, D. H. J. (1986), ̀ Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Securities Laws Regulation', 
Cumberland Law Review, Vol. 16, at 207 et seq.; Murano, J. (1984), 'Extraterritorial 
Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934', 
International Tax and Business Lawyer, Vol. 2, at 298 et seq.; Mizrack. D. (1975), 'Recent 
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Yet once trans-national elements come into force the problems assume near 
impossibility. 10 It is a fact that once matters of jurisdiction are raised issues relating 
to sovereignty and domesticity enter the political arena. 1 I Therefore, extraterritorial 
issues can uncover unsettled scores between jurisdictions or regulators. 12 Combined 
with matters relating to choice of law, judicial policy making and the general cost 
effectiveness that warrants the deployment of state resources, the international 
element has become a fundamental problem. 13 Ashe aptly highlights this by stating: 
Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934', Business Law, Vol. 30, at 367 et seq.; Note (1978): 'Extraterritorial Application of the 
Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Acts', Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 11, at 137 
et seq.; Note (1969): 'Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934', 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 69, at 94 et seq.; Note (1976): 'American Adjudication of 
Transnational Securities Fraud', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 89, at 553 et seq.; Note (1973): 
'Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S', Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 34, 
at 342 et seq.; Note (1976): 'Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of 
Laws Approach', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 28, at 1006 et seq.; Comment (1973): 'The 
Transnational Reach of Rule IOb-5', University of Pennsylvania Law, Vol. 121, at 1363 et seq. 
and Note (1978): 'Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code: An Examination 
of the Role of International Law in American Courts', Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
Vol. I I. at 71 l et seq.. 
10 
II 
Rider, C3. A. K. (I 995) Address to Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime, (September): 
"... It is only the most unimaginative and causal commercial criminal who would fail to 
take the elementary precaution of deploying the almost insurmountable hurdle of a 
second or third legal system in his scheme... " 
Rubin, J. (1971), 'Afultinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis', 
Law and Politics of International Business Law, Vol. 3, at 1: 
'... The cult (of national sovereignty) has become mankind's major religion. The 
intensity of worship of the idol of the national state is of course no evidence that national 
sovereignty provides a satisfactory basis for the political organisation of mankind... The 
truth is the very opposite... ' 
12 
13 
Sre R v. Ellis [1899] I QB 230 and R v. Holmes [1883] 12 QBD 23. 
However, possible solutions to some of these shortcomings have been suggested. See 'No 
lli/ing Place', (August (1992)), Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial 
Law, at 356: 
'... One result of the conventional arrangements for financing criminal investigations is 
that requests often lie unprocessed for want of resources. Prosecutors and police 
officers have some difficulty dealing with all domestic matters required of them, let alone 
oversews requests. It seems a pity that important international co-operation in this field 
should fail for want of resources when the more practical approach of asking requesting 
states to pay a contribution which would enable help to be 'brought-in' and might mean 
quicker results... ' 
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I 
`... offshore deals in the securities markets are one of the many difrculties 
placed in the way of enforcement of insider trading laws. A determined 
insider or manipulator will go to a lot of trouble to cover his tracks, and 
those tracks may never be found. All it seems to require is an offshore 
nominee and a foreign bank account. ' 14 
indeed, Rider has reiterated this on many occasions: 
`At the heart of the inadequate response to commercial crime is, however, 
the fundamental problem of jurisdiction. No mailer what approach to 
jurisdiction the courts adopt, it is probable that in many cases of 
international commercial crime either the perpetrator, the victim, the 
medium for the commission of the offence, the proceeds, the evidence or 
the confederates will be beyond jurisdiction. Having regard to the 
profound problems that exist in obtaining evidence overseas, let alone in 
imposing jurisdiction on the perpetrator, there is a very strong temptation 
on the part of the prosecutors and investigators to give tip. The general 
rule in most commonwealth countries is that only evidence which can be 
tested before the court, through cross-examination, is admissible in a 
criminal trial. Therefore, where the evidence is overseas, the practical 
difficulties in securing it and the cost involved generally render it 




Ashe, T. M., and Counsel], L. (1993), Insider Trading, London: Fourmat Publishing at 191 et 
seq.. 
Rider, B. A. K. (1985), `Combating International Commercial Crime -A Commonwealth 
Perspective', International Commercial and Maritime Law Quarterly, Vol. 2, at 217 et seq.. See 
also Palmer, J. 
R. J. (1985), `Combating Commercial and Economic Crime in a Practical Way', 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 6, at 78 et seq.: 
`Those who deal with commercial or economic crime need no words of mine to 
underscore the difficulties which invariably accompany such matters. This is so even 
where all the elements of detection, investigation and litigation lie within a single 
jurisdiction. When one or more of these elements (perpetrator, witness, evidence, assets 
to satisfy judgement and so on, lie on the wrong side of the judicial dividing line, then the 
skies become dark again... ' 
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Such are the problems in attempting to secure a satisfactory result where there is an 
extraterritorial element that it has become self-evident that many cases will have to be 
abandoned or deemed to have no causative link with any offence committed within 
that jurisdiction due to the complexity of the issues involved. 
It is no secret to financial criminals that a complete breakdown of regulation and 
investigation often occurs once any element of such a trans-national modus operandi 
is used. It is also abundantly clear that many organised crime syndicates effectively 
use financial markets and their global nature to 'wash' illegal profits or gains., 6 
Where most developed stock markets entail transactions in twelve or thirteen figure 
sums on a weekly basis, even a small amount of such a sum is very attractive. The 
fluidity of crime is a fact of life: the days of specialisation have gone, in ironic 
contrast to the trend in the securities markets they sometimes infiltrate. No longer 
does one type of criminal enterprise independently exist from another. There is often 
a fundamental blurring between the interactions of one distinctly separate faction of 
criminality against another. 17 Indeed, in an age were daily technological 
breakthroughs have become commonplace the most prevalent medium for committing 
crime now involves the internct and anonymous computer networks rather than 
through 'normal' personal interaction. 18 
16 Rider. I3. A. K. and Ffrench, iI. L. (1979), The Regulation of Insider Trading, London: 
Macmillan. at 419: 
'... Perhaps even more disturbing is the evidence that organised crime has been active in 
recent years in the field of securities frauds. There have been cases of suspected kfafta 
involvement with stock market manipulation and insider trading and in the Far East 
there are many indications that Chinese 'Triads' have been similarly attracted to the 
securities markets of /long Kong and the Philippines... ' 
and Tupman, T. (1998), Where has all the Money Gone? The IRA as a Profit-hfaking 
('oncern', Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 1, No. 4, at 304 et seq.. 
17 
18 
This is particularly evident if one looks at former Eastern Bloc states and the impact organised 
crime has had on banking and financial services industries, Sinuraya, M. (1997), 'Integration of 
Criminal Capital firom Russia into West European Markets: An Assessment of Threat', Journal 
of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 1, No. 1, at 34 et seq.. 
McKenna, D. (1998), `Internet Fraud- New Dog, Old tricks', In-House Lawyer, Vol. 57, at 77 
ei seq.; Silverman, J. A. (1998), 'Liability in Cyberspace, Disclosure and Securities Fraud on the 
Internet', Computer Law and Security Report, Vol. 13, No. 6, at 447 et seq.; Benjamin, A. 
(1999), 'Jurisdiction and the Regulation of Financial Services on the Internet', Financial 
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As with all other types or enterprise money is often an essential factor in 
criminal activity. Often this is generated by criminality itself. Insider dealing profits, 
for instance, have been known to play their part in drug related activity and in some 
instances inside information has been exchanged for drugs. The Stock Exchange has 
for long been a favourite laundry for drug money. Like any other enterprise money is 
needed to fund manpower, facilitate official bribes, purchase necessary hardware and 
software and so on. 
19 Illegally obtained money has to be hidden in order to conceal 
the crime that `earned' it. 
20 This explains the necessity of `money laundering'2 that 
has quite simply been described as ̀ ... the crime of the 90''. 22 Money generated by 
organised crime often 
finds its way into businesses that operate as ̀ fronts' that exist to 
obscure proceeds. Sometimes these 
fronts are small businesses; often they are banks 
19 
Regulation Report, at 22 et seq.; Mackintosh, R. (1998), 'Spoof Internet Adverts May Worn of 
Fraud', The Financial Times, 29/5/98 and 'Enforcement actions brought as SEC 'cleans up' 
Internet' (1999) European Financial Services Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, at 91 et seq.. 
Sultzer, H. (1995), 'Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It', 
Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 63, at 198 et seq.. 
20 The majority of money laundering is used to replenish dirty money earned through drug deals; 
I lorowitz, E. (1985), ̀ Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics 
profits: The Caymen Islands Example', Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 20, at 134 et seq. 
See generally Strafer, M. (1989), `Money Laundering: The Crime of the 90's', American 
Criminal Law Review, Vol. 27, at 149 et seq. and Welling, N. (1989), 'Smurfs, Afoney 
Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions', University 
of Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, at 287 et seq.. See also President's Commission on Organised 
Crime: Record of Hearing 11,14/3/84, at v et seq.: 
"... Money Laundering - the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source 
or illegal application of income, and then disguises that to make it appear legitimate - 
has long been a vital component in the activities of organised criminal groups... 
(P)rofessional money launders have displayed increasing sophistication in the methods 
used to launder vast sums of money from narcotics trafcking, illegal gambling and 
other illegal activities... " 
22 
The Chairman of the Hearing, Judge Kaufman added, at 7: 
"... when criminals launder funds they avoid both taxation and the possibility of loss in 
civil forfeiture proceedings. Moreover, these foreign banking transactions which involve 
deposit of tens of billions of dollars in off-shore banks, also affect both national and 
international economies... " 
Zelden, L. K. (1994), `Money Laundering 101: Everything You Wanted to Know About Afane. v 
Laundering But Were Afraid to Ask', at C-6 in White Collar Crime,. 
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and financial houses; 23 and even the financial markets can end up facilitating the 
laundering process. 24 Thus it can inspire the national economy. Naylor notes: 
`... Since the late 1970's, when the world balance ofpayments statistics 
began to reveal those systematic growing discrepancies, the world has 
seen a dramatic rise in the organisational skills of white collar criminals - 
specifically their ability to control illegal markets, to render the operation 
of legal markets illegal, and to debauch the political systems that are 
supposed to keep their power in check... '25 
Often the money passes through `offshore' jurisdictions that preserve banking secrecy, 
into accounts held in the name of sham companies. All too often layers of nominees 
are used together with bearer stock companies to create innumerable maze-like 
schemes that are utilised to lose any evidential trail. 26 The amount of capital fleeing 




While some countries actively combat money laundering and see it as a societal blight, other 
actively solicits the money launders' funds and see it as a solid source of revenue. For example, 
the Seychelles Islands reportedly enacted legislation in late 1995 that gives those who make 
$10m investment in the island immunity from prosecution; Leander K. (1996), `How Money 
Launders are Fighting Back', Global Finance, at 54. However, this was allegedly dropped after 
pressure from United States officials. 
Naylor, R. T. (1987), Hot Money and the Politics of Debt, Linden Press: Simon and Schuster, at 
12 et seq.. 
Law Commission: Jurisdiction Over Offences of Fraud and Dishonesty with a Foreign Element 
(Law Commission No. 180) (27`h April 1989): 
`... Modern crimes of dishonesty often involve complex operations designed to conceal 
dishonest conduct and to make detection and conviction as difficult as possible, and the 
planning, preparation and execution of the many operations which are involved in a 
complicated swindle frequently take place in several different countries... ' 
and Rider, B. A. K. and Ffrench, H. L. (1979), supra, note 16, at 419: 
`... The nominee device accounts for the frustration of more securities fraud 
investigations than any other single factor. This single device if employed with care will 
enable ... 
little risk of exposure... ' 
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most developed countries in this way each year is estimated to be huge. 27 However, 
money laundering also exacts a price on a country's banking system. At best, 
legitimate businesses have been known to avoid or pull deposits out of countries that 
they suspect are involved in substantial money laundering. At worst, money 
laundering was an issue in the collapse of the Nugan Hand Bank in Sydney, Banco 
Ambrosiano in Milan, and most recently the Bank of Credit and Commerce 





A feature common to criminal activity in the financial markets is the 
dependency of nations on each other for its effective control. This is one of the less 
attractive by-products of the economic and social internationalisation that is a feature 
of modern commercial life. By laundering money to obscure sources inevitably it 
comes to rest in a stable deposit country. This in some ways explains why the 
penetration by criminal elements into the financial world to both control and protect 
investments has been so prevalent. However, from the perspective of re-coupment it 
can therefore become quite impossible to define when cash ceases to be `dirty'. Once 
successfully perplexed, laundered money has at this stage penetrated into the 
economy. Laundered money, while being used to control and protect other 
investments, can fund yet further investment which itself is used to facilitate 
laundering. There does come a stage in the perception of law enforcers and the 
business community when its immersion in legitimate business enterprise removes the 




Estimates of the amount of money that is laundered in a year are staggering. The Financial 
Action Task for money laundering created by the G-7 estimated that $300bn is laundered by 
United States drug dealers. While the United States' State Department believe it is nearer 
$500bn; Baldwin, E1. and Munro, K. (1994), `Overview of International and Americus 
Responses', in Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial Crimes, 
Butterworths: London. 
Staff of Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 98'x' Congress, I" Session, Crime and 
Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, (1993), at 5 et seq.. 
Rider, B. A. K. (1985), Colloquium on Maritime Fraud, October 23d - 25'x', at 7 et seq.: 
"... The more criminal groups or their nominees are allowed to penetrate the legitimate 
business and financial world, the greater will be the likelihood of their operations 
spreading through the political and social fabric of the slate... " 
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Attempts have been made recently in the United Kingdom, 30 the United 
States3 1 and many Commonwealth countries to hit at the profits of crime. This hits at 
proceeds, prevents further criminal financing, and provides a victim-orientated fund. 
Thus the overall picture must be of virtually every kind of criminal activity along the 
spectrum needing and generating money. 
Jurisdiction presents the barrier to effective regulation and enforcement. Money 
can be spirited away into a bank in a secret jurisdiction via a myriad of physical and 
technological means. As Naylor explains: 32 
`... Complementing the spread offinancial havens has been a rapid 
development of banking technology, specifically of electronic f uids - 
transfer system that functions virtually instantaneously... '33 
In addition offenders can benefit from the current range of extradition-free 
jurisdictions, or from those where rendition is made prohibitively troublesome. 34 The 
basic job of information gathering between regulatory authorities can break down as a 
30 Jackson, J. (1997), `Examining Criminal Organisations: Possible A9ethodologies', Transnational 





Berman, J. (1995), `The United States Securities and Exchange Commission and Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Regulating the Markets', Journal of International Business Law, Vol. 10, No. 6, at 
243 et seq. and Newcomb, A. and Landry, S. (1993), `How Foreign Governments Gain Access 
to US Information', Money Laundering Law Report, Vol. 4, at 5 et seq.. 
Naylor, R. T. (1987), supra, note 25, at 13. 
See, in addition, Budwitz, M. (1984), `The Finicky Computer, the Paperless Telex and the 
Fallible Swiss: Bank Technology and the Law', Boston College Law Review, Vol. 25, at 260 et 
seq.. 
Walmsely, K. (1978), New Law Journal, Vol. 128, at 253 et seq.: 
`... the complexities and restrictions of extradition procedures and the need to avoid 
unnecessary delay made it impossible to prefer charges which would have reflected the 
real extent of his misbehaviour... ' 
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result of elementary misunderstandings, incomprehensible mistrust, or fastidious 
judicial pronouncement. 
9 
It is important not to underestimate the importance securities and futures 
markets plays in the world of international crime. Securities and finance houses have 
on many occasions been set up to launder criminal funds. 35 Indeed, there are 
continuing worries about the effects of domestic and international insider dealing on 
these markets. 36 One must also take into account the associated ethical problems in 
the securities markets and its allied professions of law, banking and accountancy. 37 
In the light of this disquiet it also must be remembered that securities markets are 
entrusted with the public interest in that they reflect and indeed contribute to the 
economic and political well-being of the country. 38 Loss in confidence in the 
marketplace as a clean place to do business has its effects on the capital markets, the 
ability of companies to raise money abroad, the balance of payments and ultimately 
the economy as a whole. 39 Furthermore one must also bear in mind the effect on the 
economy of a nation when a massive fraud is affected within its society that can 
devastate public morale and political stability. 40 What is most insidious is the mask 





See generally Hamilton, K. (1986), The Financial Revolution, Longman: London, at 143 cat seq.. 
Levin, J. (1985), ̀ The Conflict Between United States Securities Law on Insider Trading and 
Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws', Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 7, at 318 et seq.. 
Santow, J: (1977), `Regulating Corporate Misfeasance and Maintaining Honest Markets', 
Australia Law Journal, Vol. 51, at 547 etseq. and Levi, M. (1981), The Phantom Capitalists, 
Heinemann: London, at 124. 
Lee, M. and Bishara, A. (1985), ̀ Securities Regulation and Market EJJiclencv', International 
Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 5, at 247 et seq.. 
39 Wraith, R. E. and Simpkins, E. (1963), Corruption in Developing Countries, Allen and Unwin, at 
57: 
'... (! )f the City of London had not ... been the city of probity and ethical standards It 
would not have dominated European finance in the way it did ... British trade and 
commerce depended on British incorruptibility... ' 
I 
40 Rider, B. A. K. (1985), supra, note 29, at 6: 
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These localised considerations take on an awesome importance when one views 
them in the light of the dual (but to a great extent unrelated) processes of deregulation 
and internationalisation of the securities markets of the world. Deregulation in the 
City of London41 has followed the same process in New York. 42 The 
internationalisation of the capital markets is a widely accepted fact at this stage. 43 
The world's securities and futures markets have become increasingly linked44 and, as 
a consequence, interdependent. This enhances the need for their effective regulation. 
The ethereal nature of capital market trading given technological developments has 
created ̀ the increasingly slippery nature of capital'; as regards the similar nature of 
on-exchange futures trading, a United States tribunal had this to say: 45 
"... a commodity futures contract has no lawful existence or being 
independent of the designated contract market on which it is traded.. " 
`... The effect of a major commercial scandal or even an attempted one, on the 
credibility, reputation and integrity of a government or political philosophy can have 
disastrous implications. Some countries, mindful of this danger have elevated the fight 
against economic crime to the level of almost national survival. Consequently, crimes 
such as exchange control violation and market manipulation are regards much in the 





Lynton-Jones, 1. (1986), ̀ Big Bang and the Stock Exchange', Company Lawyer, Vol. 7, at 99. 
Hamilton, K. (1986), supra, note 35, at chapter five. 
Merloe, P. (1986), `Internationalisation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Survey of U. S. and 
E. E. C. Disclosure Requirements', Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law, 
Vol. 8, at 250 el seq.; Cohen, M. (1971), `International Securities Markets: Their Regulation', 
St. John's Law Review, Vol. 46, at 264 and `Towards an International Securities Market', 
(1973), Law and Policy of International Business, Vol. 5, at 358 et seq.. 
Mann, K. et a!. (1987), ̀ Current Issues in International Securities Law Enforcement', American 
Bar Association Conference, at 211 et seq.. 
45 In the Mutter of Wiscope, S. A. [ 1977 - 1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) s20 - 
785, at 23. 
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The multi-market trading of many of these contracts further complicates 
matters. Legal regulatory developments have not kept pace. 46 Trading and market 
making exist on a level free and insouciant of national boundaries yet regulation 
continues to cling to the shackles of jurisdiction and territoriality. The SEC has 
recognised the resulting hiatus in enforcement and has dedicated its major intellectual 
resources to future resolution of the problems in this area. The situation they and, 
indeed, many other major regulators of the world find themselves in is as follows: 
t 
`... The development of this new and complex market system could rapidly 
overtake market professionals, government regulatory bodies and the 
international legal and financial communities before they can mould a 
legal framework for it. The jurisdictional and enforcement problems 
created for national law enforcers in an international trading 
environment are just beginning to be apparent... '47 
The markets have recognised the opportunities presented by internationalisation 
and the consequent interdependence in facilitating the effective running of those 
markets. The financial sector, regulators and enforcement agencies have been slow to 
really recognise any meaningful way interdependence with regard to the prevention of 
market abuse. 48 The law is out of step with the reality it seeks to control. 49 
46 
'... International law has neglected the area of international financial manipulations ... 
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146 et seq.; Stephenson-Burton, R. (1998), 'Scalpel or Sabre: the Creation of a Afore 
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8, at 182 et seq.. 
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49 This is particularly true in the case of developing countries or countries that 'turn a blind eye' to 
money laundering; see Wiener, R. (1997), 'Money Laundering: Transnational Criminals, 
Globalisation and the Forces of 'Redomestication ". Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 




7.2. The United Kingdom's Approach to Extraterritoriality 
7.2.1. `Result' and `Conduct' Crimes in the United Kingdom 
In England criminal jurisdiction over cross-border fraud offences has tended to turn 
on the distinction between what has been referred to as ̀ result' and `conduct' crimes. 
The former relates to those crimes that require for their completion not only the 
conduct but also the prescribed result, for example the dishonest appropriation of 
property by deception. 50 The latter relates to crimes of which the essence is the 
conduct of the accused. However this distinction has not passed without criticisms 1 
In the case of `conduct crimes' jurisdiction is determined by the location of the acts of 
the defendant, but in cross-border crimes the determination of the place of acting can 
present problems. Hence, in Treacy v. D. P. P. 52 the accused wrote and posted in 
England a blackmailing letter addressed to a woman in Germany, where she received 
the letter. The House of Lords held, by a bare majority, that the demand was made, 
and therefore the offence was committed, in England when the letter was posted there. 
In `result crimes' jurisdiction depends on the place where the proscribed 
consequence of the acts of the accused takes place. In D. P. 11. v. Slonehouse53 tile 
main issue before the House of Lords was whether a former minister could be tried in 





"... The offence is committed in England and justifiable by an English court if any part of 
the proscribed results takes place in England... " 
; Secretary of State for Trade v. Markus [1976] AC 35, at 6 1, per Lord Diplock, 
Law Commission Consultation Paper on Jurisdiction over Fraud Offences with a Foreign 
Element, (1987), at 11 et seq.. Also see generally Law Commission Report, No. 180, (1989). 
[1971] AC 537, 
[ 1978] AC 55. 
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downing in the United States after he had taken out, in England, substantial insurance 
policies on his life in his wife's name. He anticipated, as was the case that the news 
of his `deulh' would reach his wife (who was innocent of complicity) and she would 
then claim on the policies. In the course of deciding whether the courts had 
jurisdiction to try the offence of attempt, the House of Lords held that the basis of the 
court's jurisdiction to try the complete offence of obtaining property by deception was 
that the physical acts of the accused had caused the intended consequence in England 
that property belonging to another had been obtained by deception. 
Similarly, in the case of Secretary of State v. Markus54 an English company was 
established for the purpose of selling shares in an investment trust which was to be 
managed by a Panamanian company. The agents of the English company invited 
investors in Germany by means of misleading brochures to invest in the trust. The 
signed application forms were then transmitted from Germany to London, the 
investors' money having been deposited in a Swiss bank account. The manager of the 
English company was charged under section 13 of the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investment) Act 1958.55 
The court held it had no jurisdiction as part of the offence, the offering by the 
victim to take part in the scheme, took place abroad. The court held that this was not 
divisible from the `taking part in the arrangement'. Nonetheless the House of Lords 
held that although the offer was made by investors in Germany this did not preclude 
the offence of taking part in the arrangement; the court could try the offence as the 
victims did not become parties to the arrangement until the application forms had 
been processed in London. Lord Diplock held that the question as to whether 
jurisdiction existed or not depended on where the result took place, here the taking 
part of the offering. 
54 
55 
[ 1976] AC 35 
Section 47 FSA'86 essentially re-enacts section 13. However, section 13 has been criticised on 
an number of occasions for ineffectiveness; Rider, B. A. K. (1978), ̀ The Crime of Insider 
Truding', Journal of Business Law, at 19 et seq.. 
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Other offences that have amounted in result crimes include Board of Trade v. 
Owen56 where the House of Lords held that a conspiracy to defraud a German export 
control department in Germany was not an offence in England and were not triable. 
Likewise, in R. v. Baxter57 the accused, who resided in Northern Ireland, posted 
fraudulent pools claims forms to promoters in Liverpool. The court held that it had 
jurisdiction to try the charge of attempt to obtain property by deception. It was held 
the attempt was still in being when the forms arrived in Liverpool. 
s 
ý 
However, these distinctions and their elaborations have led to sonic absurd and 
anomalous results, in which fraudulent activity in England designed to obtain property 
abroad has led to the English courts declaring themselves to be without jurisdiction. 
Thus in R v. Harden58 the accused procured by fraudulent statements the posting to 
himself cheques in his favour from Jersey. It was held that because the gist of the 
offence was obtaining, the act was not done in England because the act of posting was 
completed in Jersey and property in the cheques passed to him outside the 
jurisdiction. Likewise, in R v. Tomsett, 59 although fraudulent steps were taken in 
England to procure the wrongful division of funds in foreign banks, there was no 
offence committed which was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In 4. G. 
Reference [No. I of 1982]60 the defendants were charged with conspiracy to defraud 
an English company by selling counterfeit products abroad bearing the false name of 
the victim's company. Lord Lane CJ held the court had no jurisdiction. lie asked 
what the `true object' of the conspiracy was. Since it was to obtain money from 
prospective purchasers in Lebanon it was immaterial that if the plan had been carried 
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represent a stubborn refusal to view damage done to the English company and 
illustrates a short-sighted attitude with regard to defrauded foreigners. 
It is not surprising therefore that in 1987 the Criminal Law Team of the Law 
Commission concluded that when investigating the issue of fraudulent offences with a 
foreign element, the aforementioned rules excluded from the jurisdiction of English 
courts many cases which inflicted serious implications for the economic interests and 
the property of English banks, companies and individuals, and that they represented 
perverse judicial reasoning. 61 




7.2.2. Extraterritoriality under United Kingdom Legislation and Otherwise 
Both insider dealing and market manipulation are quite unique offences within the 
United Kingdom due to the fact that they possess their own jurisdictional rules. 
Insider dealing, for instance, is covered under section 62 CJA62 while manipulative 
and misleading practices are covered under section 47(4) and (5) FSA'86. However, 
this has not stopped the United Kingdom from strengthening its position with regards 
to receiving and co-operating with requests from other jurisdictions in a bid to reap 
the benefits of reciprocity when carry out its own investigations. 63 
The embracement of Memorandums of Understanding ('MOU') and specific 
legislation to `grease the poles' of bureaucracy has increased the United Kingdom's 
ability to assist other jurisdictions, 64 albeit at their cost sometimes. 65 however, this is 
not to say that overseas assistance is a streamlined process. There are many problems 
associated with providing vital information to one jurisdiction or receiving it from 
another. Given that major frauds are often detected by a minor accounting infraction 
or discrepancy general objections, dislike or mistrust must be ignored if progress is to 
be made. Informal groupings, with no defined agenda or purpose, and without 
formalised power, must not be allowed to develop. They should rather be used to 
provide a preliminary foundation to a more legally sure mechanism. 
The creation of a system of effective and all embracing international agreements 
in this area is undoubtedly a major requirement. Ultimately one must hope for n 
multilateral treaty amongst the major markets' regulators. Ilowwwevcr the most 
62 In addition see Article 10 of the European Directive for Co-ordinaling Regulations on Insider 
Dealing and the Extradition Act 1989. 
63 See section 82(4) Companies Act 1989 ('CA'89'). 
64 See generally sections 82 - 91 and 196 CA'89. 
65 See section 82(6) CA'89. 
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effective securities regulation is by way of prevention. The FSA'86 and indeed the 
securities regulation in the United Kingdom is mainly based on the philosophy of 
disclosure. Entry into the marketplace is dependent on provision of detailed 
information to regulators. After the grant of authorisation the person is subject to a 
system of notification regulations that should set off the alarm bells should something 
go wrong. 
MOU's have for a number of years played a vital part in cementing relations 
between major players in the fight against financial crime. However, this system has 
not passed without criticism. Public policy grounds have been known to appear when 
a request is made from a jurisdiction that may not in the past have been forthcoming 
with information. Such a refusal of information ultimately hampers the object of 
rtIOU's. Perhaps the underlying difficulty of the system is that it does nothing to alter 
the national law of particular jurisdictions. However, in the long term a move towards 
standardisation of securities regulation and enforcement procedures is required. 
Given that national boundaries have become increasingly irrelevant in the 
operation of the financial world thought needs to be put into place so that flexible 
procedures that facilitate co-operation between different jurisdictions come into 
existence. However, such steps can cause problems in that a jurisdiction that creates 
such laws may not be treated the same way in another jurisdiction. The notion of 
reciprocity is the key issue. Such observations were made in Parliament upon the 
enactment of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990.66 
However, it has not been left up to the legislators solely to `flesh out' arrangements 
66 `First, having recognised the inadequacies of an existing legislation, we have been 
determined to secure arrangements which will place us in the first rank internationally in 
our ability to co-operate with other countries in this most important of areas. Secondly, 
we have sought to ensure that, once the measures which are proposed in the Bill have 
been enacted, we will be able to seek assistance from other countries to just the same 
extent, and in the same ways, as we are able to offer help to them. Thirdly, we have been 
conscious that, however much we may wish to assist other countries, we cannot ask 
Parliament to make greater powers available on behalf of overseas authorities than are 
available to our own police or prosecution authorities in domestic cases. ' 
Clouse of Lords Official Report, 12/12/89, at paragraph 1217. 
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between jurisdictions. General unofficial agreements and procedures already exist as 
many regulators and investigators realise that the common good - the ability to catch 
the financial criminal and not facilitate him - needs to take precedent over individual 
or collective differences. The international element in financial crimes is prevalent in 
a large proportion of cases investigated. This element rarely diminishes. Therefore, it 
is of paramount importance that such arrangements, whether official or not, are 
observed and enforced. 
4 
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7.3. The Growing Scope of Extraterritoriality and American Securities 
Laws - From `Conduct' and `Effect' to Internet Sites 
In recent years, the SEC has given a territorial interpretation to the registration 
provisions and permitted foreign and domestic issuers to sell unregistered securities 
abroad to United States individuals and also given a territorial interpretation to its 
broker-dealer registration provisions. The SEC has also changed its views and 
reasserted its jurisdiction role over foreign-based transactions in order to protect 
markets within the United States. 
Whether such jurisdictional expansionism is feasible or advisable in today's 
cyberspace markets, which are global in scope and regulated by foreign as well as 
United States regulators, is an interesting question since Congress contemplated that 
federal securities laws should be applied to trans-national securities transactions. 
Originally, the term ̀ interstate commerce' was defined in the SEA to include: 
`... trade, commerce, transportation or communication ... 
between any 
foreign country and any state, or between any state and any place or ship 
outside thereof 67 
Under section 30(b) EA any individual is exempt from that Act's provisions if: 
`... he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the 
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe. '68 
67 
68 
Section 3(a)(I7) SEA and 15 USC sections 77(b)(7), 78c(a)(17) (1997). 
15 USC section 78dd(b) (1997). The SEC has never passed any rules to implement this section. 
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The interests of international law and comity might have been best served by 
giving the phrase `without the jurisdiction of the United States' a territorial 
interpretation. However, the SEC and the courts determined to give the SEA 
extraterritorial effect, interpreting `jurisdiction' as a legal rather than a geographical 
concept. This was aptly illustrated in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc.. 69 In this case a 
class action was brought by a large number of multinational plaintiffs against the 
Bernie Cornfeld financial empire. The action related to the securities of lOS Ltd., a 
company organised under the laws of Switzerland. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
underwriters impliedly represented to the public that IOS was suitable for public 
ownership when it was not; and that the prospectus failed to reveal illegal activities by 
IOS and its officers that had seriously damaged the company. The decision, and the 
judgement of Judge Friendly have important repercussions on the `conduct' and 
`effects' tests. 7° The judge concluded that since the fraud was committed by placing 
the allegedly false prospectus in the purchaser's hands, that there were no United 
States purchasers, the company was not identified with the United States economy 
and the plaintiffs were all foreign there were no effects within the jurisdiction of the 
United States that would warrant the use of United States law. 71 
By contrast, in Kook v. Krang72 the plaintiff sought damages for breach of 
margin requirements under section 7(c) SEA. The plaintiff was a New Jersey resident; 
the defendants were citizens and residents of Canada, partners in the defendant 
brokerage firm, itself a member of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The firm was not a 
member of a national United States exchange, but was registered as a broker-dealer 
under section 15 SEA as it maintained a New York office that dealt only in 
institutional and not private investors. The plaintiff's dealing on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange was less than successful. During this time, although all transactions were 





389 F. Supp. 446,453-55 [SDNY 1974], rev'd in part, 519 F2d 974 [2d Cir. ], ccrt. dcnicd, 423 
U. S. 1018 [1975]. 
Ante and Post. 
Supra, note 69, at 986 et seq.. 
182 F. Supp. 388 [SDNY 1960]. 
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general market advice from the New York office. The employees there made no 
suggestions that led to purchases, although one offered general `informal' advice as an 
acquaintance. 
The court held that since the extension of credit in alleged breach of section 7(c) 
occurred in Canada and had no connection with the New York office there was no 
jurisdiction. One the question of section 30(b) the court stated: 
`Whatever choice of law might be applied, these were Canadian 
transactions, and the use of the mails and telephone within the United 
Slates does not change the locale. The question is whether there are 
contracts with the United States sufficient to give this court jurisdiction, 
no one questions that, but rather whether Congress intended to make the 
statute applicable to these transactions. We hold that such was not the 
intention of the legislature and that jurisdiction as used in section 30(b) 
contemplates some necessary and substantial act within the United 
States... '73 
However, the 1968 Second Circuit decision of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook74 was 
a landmark opinion explicating the law on the extraterritorial application of the EA. 
This was a derivative action brought by an American shareholder of a Canadian 
corporation, Banff Oil Ltd., whose shares were listed and traded on the American 
Stock Exchange. The complaint alleged that Banff sold treasury shares at a deflated 
price to two foreign companies. The plaintiff's theory of the case was that its 
directors defrauded Banff and controlling stockholder who combined to force it to sell 
treasury stock at the prevailing market price when they knew this price was artificially 
low. The defendants argued that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction 
since the entire transaction in Canada between foreign corporations. The Second 
Circuit rejected that argument stating: 
73 Op cit., at 390. 
74 405 F2d 200 [2d Cir. 1968], at 206 cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U. S. 906 
[1969]. 
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"We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have 
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who 
have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect 
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign 
transactions in American securities. "75 
It further went on to state that section 10(b) SEA and the rules made under it could 
have extraterritorial effect. This would be so when there was a violation that was 
injurious to United States investors. Acts done outside the jurisdiction but intended to 
produce and producing detrimental effects within the jurisdiction may be punished as 
if the acts were committed within the jurisdiction. However, this decision has not 
been without criticism. 
The court also discussed the effect of section 30 SEA. It pointed out that the 
SEC had not promulgated any rule exempting foreign transactions from rule I Ob-5. It 
further stated that while section 30(b) was intended to exempt persons conducting 
securities business through foreign securities markets, it would not prevent 
extraterritorial application of the act to persons engaging in isolated foreign 
transactions. Therefore while technically there was an exemption in this Act this was 
subject to the Commission's discretion that could be used to prevent evasion of the 
Act. The court concluded that the exemption was to relieve the SEC from regulating 
persons against whom it could not bring its investigatory powers to bear. It is notable 
that the court delimited the effect of the section on the basis of possibility of 
enforcement. The court had the benefit of an amicus brief by the SEC. It stated that 
the SEA is: 
`generally applicable extraterritorially wherever such application is 
necessary and appropriate for the protection ofAmerican investors and 
markets. ' 
l 
75 Op. cit., at 206. Note that in the last decade the ̀ silence' of Congress on the issue of 
extraterritoriality has been noted. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F2d 475,478 [2d Cir. ], cert. denied, 502 
U. S. 1005 [199 1 ]. See also Sachs, S. (1991), 'The International Reach of Rule lOb-S. The Alpth 
of Congressional Silence', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 28, at 677 cl seq. 
arguing Congress intended the benefits of the Exchange Act to be enjoyed within the United 
States only. 
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Yet they maintained that the protective theory of jurisdiction was not meant by 
Congress to be taken to its absolute limits. They stated that Congress intended three 
bases of jurisdiction. The first was the `jurisdictional means'; the mails and other 
`instrumentalities of interstate commerce'. The second was regulation of persons in 
the securities business. As regards the securities exchange. The third was regulation 
of persons in the securities business. As regards the first element, the SEC argued that 
whether or not a transaction was foreign or domestic it was reasonable to apply 
United States law. They argued that section 30(b) was addressed to the third 
category: 
`The final group of operative provisions of the original version of the Act 
was applicable to persons in the securities business even in the absence of 
a registered security or use of a jurisdictional means ... (T)he 'triggering' 
element was the identity of the person involved in the transactions, not the 
nature of the transaction itself, and any particular foreign transaction 
might or might not have a sufficient impact on American interests to 
justify the direct application of the Act to the transaction irrespective of 
the participation or non participation of someone in the securities 
business. In other words, although the United States might have power 
over a participant in a foreign transaction, the transaction itself might not 
have a sufficient impact on American interests and therefore not be within 
the direct legislative jurisdiction of Congress and under the Constitution 
and the law of nations. It was this problem that section 30(b) was 
addressed. ' 
Subsequently, the courts developed an alternative rationale for applying the 
securities laws extraterritorially - the `conduct' test. Using this test, the courts 
applied the antifraud provisions of the securities laws to losses from sales of securities 
to Americans resident in the United States, to Americans resident abroad if acts of 
material importance in the United States contributed to the losses, and even to 
foreigners outside the United States if acts within the United States directly caused 
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I 
Judge Friendly stated that: 
"... it was understood from the outset that all transactions would he 
executed in England. Still we must ask ourselves whether, if Congress 
had thought about the point, it would not have wished to protect an 
American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and 
fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad -a 
purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace. While ... we doubt 
that impact on an American company and its shareholders would suf jice 
to make the statute applicable if the misconduct had occurred soleh in 
England, we think its tips the scales in favour of applicability tit-hen 
substantial misrepresentations were made in the United States. " 78 
l 
their losses. 76 In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 77 the 
plaintiff an American corporation, alleged that the defendants, all United Kingdom 
citizens, had conspired to cause it to buy Pergamon stock at an unfairly inflated price 
in violation of section 10(b) SEA. Pergamon was a British Company listed on the 
United Kingdom stock exchange. It was neither listed nor traded on any United States 
exchange on any United States exchange. It was alleged that the fraud consisted in 
false and misleading statements by the defendants in London and New York to Lcasco 
officials. The court held that because some alleged misrepresentations were made in 




Robinson v. TCI/U. S. West Communications Inc., 117 F3d 900 [5°i Cir. 1997]; Zoelsch v. Arthur 
Andersen and Co., 824 F2d 27,33 [D. C. Cir. 1987]; ßersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F2d 
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More recently, in Itoba Limited v. Lep Group PLC, 79 the subsidiary of a 
Bermuda based holding company, listed on the New York Stock Exchange Inc., sued 
Lep Group Plc., a London based holding company, with NASDAQ-listed ADRs, for 
omissions in its Form 20-F filed with the, SEC. Based on these omissions and similar 
fraudulent information in Lep's United Kingdom annual reports, the plaintiff 
purchased shares of Lep on the London Stock Exchange, which resulted in a write-off 
of $522 million. Further, an individual defendant who was a United States director of 
Lep sold shares through his United States broker that were sold to plaintiff on the 
London Stock Exchange. The court held there was subject matter jurisdiction under a 
combination of the `conduct' and `effect' tests. 
Over the last two decades academics have also sought some form of resolution 
associated with the fundamental problems linked with extraterritoriality. 80 Hence, the 
Federal Securities Code was devised. 81 The main provision is section 1905 that 
states that the Code applies within the limits of international law while the remainder 
is drafted with a prolixity causing doubts in the worth of thus `clarifying' the law. 82 
The Code's principles are as follows: 
`(1) establishing a broad, prima facie prescription for extraterritoriality; 
(2) subjecting the broad prescription to specific rulemaking authority; 
and 
(3) restricting both the prescription and the rulemaking authority to the 
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i 
The Code generally applies: 
`with respect to any ... prohibited required or actionable conduct' 
if the 
`constituent elements' either `occur to a significant (but not necessarily 
predominant) extent within the United States'or `cause a substantial effect 
within (the United States) as a direct and reasonably foreseeable result of 
the conduct. '84 
4 
Nowhere in the cases is there a stipulation that the `constituent elements' occur within 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the plural use of the word would seem to suggest that all 
constituent elements must so occur. This goes far beyond the cases and is infinitely 
less preferable to the flexible approach of the second circuit. Also, it sets an almost 
impossibly high standard as regards law enforcement in this area. The Code is 
intended to apply to an offer, purchase or sale of a security; a proxy solicitation; a, 
tender offer, and any activity of an investment advisor. 
The Code's antifraud provisions apply where conduct either occurs or is 
initiated in the United States. The Code's non-fraud provisions apply where the 
specified conduct: 
`occurs within the United States although ... is initialed outside the United 
States. '85 
The Code's non-fraud provisions do not apply in the opposite situation, for 
example where an act ̀ that occurs outside the United Slates ... is initiated wilhin the 
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relate generally to the internal organisation of companies to which any extraterritorial 
application would offend sovereignty. 87 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U. S. also takes an 
expansive view of SEC jurisdiction, but emphasises ̀ reasonableness', placing some 
weight on comity and the need to accommodate the interests of foreign states. 88 In 
fact, although the SEC has always claimed the greatest possible jurisdictional reach, it 
has not attempted to impose its registration requirements on all transactions occurring 
abroad. Traditionally, the SEC took the position that the registration requirements of 
section 5 of the Securities Act were primarily intended to protect United States 
investors. In 1964 the Commission therefore announced that it would not take any 
action for failure to register securities of United States issuers distributed outside the 
territory of the United States to foreign nationals even though use of the jurisdictional' 
means might be involved in the offering. 89 
A serious change in the SECs view of its own jurisdiction occurred in 1980 
when the commission adopted both regulation S90 pertaining to offshore offerings and 
rule 15a-691 pertaining to broker-dealer registration 
To qualify for regulation S, all offers and sales must be made in an `offshore 
Transaction', which means that no offers may be made to persons in the United States 
and either the buyer must be offshore when the buy order is placed or the sale must be 







Loss, L. (1979), supra, note 80, at 307 et seq.. 
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Securities Act. Release No. 4708 (July 9,1964). See also Securities Act Release No. 5068 
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'Offshore Offers and Sales', 17 CFR section 230.901-04 (1997), adopted in Securities Act 
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`Directed selling efforts' into the United States, that is, activities that condition 
the United States market for the securities offered destroy the `offshore transaction' 
safe harbour. The issuer safe harbour in regulation S distinguishes among categories 
of securities based on the nationality and reporting status of the issuer and the extent 
of United States market interest in the issuer's securities. As a practical matter, 
regulation S has meant a change to a shorter seasoning period for most offerings 
abroad, from the 90-day lock-up period preventing sales to United States persons, 
which previously prevailed, to a 40-day lock-up period. 92 
I 
I 
Rule 15a-6, setting forth registration requirements for foreign broker-dealers, 
was also based on a territorial interpretation of the jurisdictional reach of the federal 
securities laws. In the past, the SEC had applied the EA to foreign financial 
institutions in their dealings with United States nationals even if such dealings had 
occurred entirely abroad if the Commission perceived such dealings as an evasion of 
United States regulations or a threat to United States markets. 93 
In adopting rule l 5a-6, the SEC reiterated its traditional view that the terms 
'broker' and `dealer' as defined in the EA, 94 include both domestic and foreign 
persons performing the activities described, and any use of United States 
jurisdictional means could trigger broker-dealer registration requirements. The SEC 
noted, however, that as a policy matter it had only applied these registration 
provisions `territorially' to broker-dealers physically operating within the United 
States, and also to finns that from abroad solicit business from persons in the United 
States. Using this rationale, the SEC made rule 15a-6 an exemption from registration, 
rather than an exclusion from the statute. 
Like regulation S, however, rule 15a-6 was an interpretative rule, setting forth a 
conception of SEC jurisdiction that was territorially based but captured solicitations of 
92 Silverman, J. and Braverman, D. (I990), Regulation S and Other New A/easures Af%eeting the 
International Capital Markets, Securities and Commission Regulations, Vol. 28, at 179 et seq.. 
93 
94 
United States v. Weisscredit ßanca Commerciale E. D'hrvestimentl. 325 F. Supp. 1384,1391 
[SDNY 1971]. 
15 USC sections 78c(a)(4), (5) (1997). 
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United States residents from overseas. Rule 15a-6 is less protective of United States 
institutional investors. It contains exemptions for non-direct contacts through 
unsolicited transactions and the distribution of research reports and also allows for 
direct contacts with specified institutional investors without intermediaries. 95 
In addition, foreign broker-dealers may, without registration, contact or effect 
transactions with SEC-registered broker-dealers or banks, international organisations, 
foreign persons temporarily present in the United States and foreign agencies or 
branches of United States persons. 
Currently, the SEC is reassessing its approach to both regulation S and rule 15a- 
6 and has pending proposals that would be a reversion to the SEC's more aggressive 
Jurisdictional claims of the 1960s and 1970s. The changes the SEC is contemplating 
under regulation S have been prompted in large part by the SEC's belief that 
regulation S has been abused by domestic issuers. 
According to the SEC, some issuers, affiliates and others involved in the 
distribution process are using regulations S as a guise for distributing securities into 
United States markets without the protections of registration under section 5 of the 
SA. Therefore, the SEC issued an interpretative release on problematic practices 
under regulation S and instituted a number of enforcement cases that involve domestic 
issuers. 96 
Yet, the SEC did not limit either its proposed amendments to regulation S or its, 
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`... although abusive practices involving the equity securities of foreign 
issuers are not as evident as with domestic issuers, there is equal potential 
for abuse where the principal trading market for those securities is in the 
United States. '97 
4 
The SEC proposals would treat equity offerings by domestic issuers and equity 
offerings by foreign issuers whose principal equity securities market is in the United 
States the same, and subject offerings by them to the resale restrictions of rule 144.98 
This would be a big conceptual change. Instead of looking at a territorial 
limitation on the exercise of securities registration requirements, the SEC would be 
changing regulation S to a private placement exemption for domestic and certain 
foreign issuers. The SECs rationale for such a significant change is the: 
`increasing internationalisation of global securities markets, the growing 
use of the Internet for securities transactions, the further integration of the 
European and other markets through common currencies and regulatory 
treatments, and other recent and ongoing developments in the securities 
markets ... 
' 
With regard to the registration of foreign broker-dealers, the . SEC also is 
contemplating important conceptual changes. The rationale for these possible 
changes is that it is now possible for United States investors: 
"to obtain real-time information about trading on foreign markets from it 
number of different sources and to enter and execute their orders on those 
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In view of technological developments in cross-border trading, the SEC has 
proposed three possible regulatory approaches: 
(1) reliance on a foreign market's home country regulator; 
(2) requiring all foreign markets to register as national securities exchanges or 
apply for an exemption; or 
(3) develop a tailored regulatory scheme to capture the entity that provides 
United States investors with ability to trade directly on foreign 
markets. 100 
The SEC has never favoured mutual recognition, and it probably recognises that 
compelling foreign trading systems to register either as exchanges or broker-dealers 
would mean subjecting them to heavy day-to-day regulation of their businesses and 
affairs, now regulated in many cases by foreign regulators. Accordingly, the SEC 
proposed the creation of a new potential registration category - `securities 
information processors. ' 101 Although there is such a regulatory category in the 
EA. 102 compelling only foreign trading systems to register is novel and controversial. 
The common thread in the SEC's reassessment of its territorial theory of 
securities and broker-dealer regulation seems to be fear of the internet. Both 
regulation S and rule 15a-6 depend to some extent on the principle of non-solicitation. 
Foreign issuers and intermediaries may escape SEC registration if they refrain from 
soliciting United States investors. On the internet, however, an issuer or financial 
institution does not solicit anyone in particular but simply advertises to the world. 
There are few cases interpreting internet jurisdiction, and so far none are securities 
cases. 
100 Op. cit., at 30522. 
101 Supra, note 99, at 30524-25. 
102 15 USC sections 78c(a)(22), 78k-1 (1997). 
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In one trademark infringement case, the court held that where an Italian 
publisher created an internet site, made it available to United States users and invited 
United States users to download images, the foreign publisher was distributing its 
publications in the United States. 103 In another trademark case, however, the Second 
Circuit held that creation of a web site in Missouri was not a tortious act in New York, 
subjecting the creator to personal jurisdiction, even if the web site caused injury to 
persons or property in New York. 104 
I 
If current developments require a rethinking of SEC jurisdiction, a number of 
approaches are logical and possible. Fox has suggested that the SEC limit its 
jurisdiction to United States issuers and allow foreign regulators to control foreign 
issuers, whether the regulatory or litigation question is registration or tort., 05 Greene 
and other practitioners have urged the SEC to move to a regime of mutual 
recognition. 106 Salbu has advocated harmonisation through statutes. 107 
We have previously argued that mutual recognition is feasible only where some 
harmonisation exists, and the SEC is unlikely to accept mutual recognition without 
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rethinking of existing legal concepts. Concepts like solicitation can be refined to take 
internet communications into account. 109 
The territorial approach to jurisdiction has served the SEC and its constituents 
well and should not be lightly abandoned. It has made for relative certainty in 
structuring transactions, and it has avoided conflicts and tensions between the SEC 
and foreign regulators. 
The SEC is a leader among the world's securities regulators and it is important 
to the future of regulation of the global capital markets that the SEC maintain respect 
and good relations with other regulators. While some current challenges involving the 
internet and other mechanisms in the evolving international markets may well be a 
cause for rethinking jurisdictional issues, the SEC should avoid taking approaches that 
will result in confrontations with foreign issuers, financial institutions, regulatory 
authorities and courts. 
109 Coffee, D. (1997), `Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities 
Regulation' Business Lawyer, Vol. 52, at 1229 et seq.. 
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7.4. The Notion of Co-operation - The Weak Link 
I 
l 
The theoretical problem posed by the notion of extraterritoriality fundamentally 
highlights the problems caused when one state's political interests of independence, 
integrity and freedom are sought to be questioned by another. The result is, usually 
one of a political dilemma, with the odds stacked against the state seeking answers. 
One possible solution may be seen to exist in Treaties and MOU's, which arc 
basically informal understandings between securities enforcement agencies and are 
primarily concerned with overcoming problems associated with secrecy and blocking 
laws. 
Bank secrecy laws are a species of financial privacy laws whose purpose is to 
establish statutory obligations and duties applicable to the relationship between 
banker and his customer. I 10 Other species of financial secrecy laws include structural 
banking forms and impediments, and blocking statutes. Structural banking forms and 
impediments include use of anonymous (including numbered) accounts and accounts 
held under false names. The account holder signs an agreement with a personal bank 
agreeing to the conditions of the relationship and receives a number or pseudonym. 
These forms are intended to protect the customer by insulating bank employees who 
may be the target of inquiries (including bribes) from third parties seeking the identity 
of the account holder. Trusts and corporate structures also disguise financial 
transactions as a trust can include either an individual fiduciary holding assets in its 
own name or for a beneficiary. Combining a trust with a confidential account creates 
additional layers of anonymity. 
110 Jones, A. (1991), 'Complusion over Comity: The United Stales' Assault on Foreign Dank 
Secrecy', Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 12, at 454 et seq.. The 
most often-cited and inaccurate justification for bank secrecy laws is the belief that financial 
secrecy is somehow part of an individual's fundamental right of privacy, Gagnon, S. (1990), 
'International Banking Secrecy: Developments in Europe Prompt New Approaches', Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 23, at 657 et seq.. 
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Statutes known as ̀ blocking laws' are used to prohibit the disclosure, inspection 
or removal of documents located in one country in compliance with the orders of 
another country. Generally, there are two types of blocking laws. One prohibits 
production of documents or testimony before a foreign tribunal. The other prohibits 
substantive compliance with foreign governments' orders. While bank secrecy laws 
are designed to protect banking relationships, blocking laws are not uncommon in 
bank secrecy jurisdictions as they are used to impede legal discovery techniques. 
Most date back to the early 1980's when the SEC began to seek formal commitments 
by governments to co-operate in cross-border investigations, using the promise of 
reciprocity as consideration. Under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 a new section 21(a)(2) was enacted to the SEA which 
authorises the SEC to provide assistance to foreign securities authorities. The SEC, 
upon request of a foreign securities authority, may provide assistance if the requesting 
authority states it is conducting an investigation that it deems necessary to determine 
whether any person has violated any laws or rules relating to securities matters that 
the requesting authority administers or enforcers. If necessary, the SEC may conduct 
its own investigation to collect information and evidence pertinent to the request for 
assistance. 
Thirteen years ago a MOU was entered into between the SEC and he DTI in 
relation to securities. Its purpose was to set out the basis upon which the SEC and 
DTI could supplement information exchanges relating to on and off-market fraud. 
However, it is a shameful side of the United Kingdom's approach to the matter that 
the United Kingdom's authorities were among those European nations that displayed 
a stubborn resistance, often bordering on hostility, to implement meaningful and 
speedy change with regards to this area. Needless to say, quite apart from the fact that 
this results in a continued absence of effective international co-operation, this also is a 
waste of time and money. Some nations, according to regulators in the United States, 
erected petty obstacles to deadlock negotiations and succeed in dragging discussion 
levels to a dog-fight over alarmingly minor points. Even more serious is the damage 




Very little of course can be done to dissuade negotiators from adopting this type 
of narrow-minded attitude. All that seems possible is continued condemnation against 
such action. What might lessen the situation would be the involvement of regulators 
from the very beginning in the negotiation process as opposed to general civil 
servants, which seems to be the current situation. While their involvement is 
necessary at the outset, on the diplomatic level, their involvement should be 
dramatically curtailed as soon as the introductions are over. 
The current approach to treaties and MOU is to specify its scope. Their purpose 
is to define the legal framework of enquiries covered. They should be as wide as 
possible; therefore it should cover not only statute and regulations, but also 
administrative requirements and good market practice. Then a liberal approach has to 
be taken to define what triggers a request. Suspicion should be enough; but most 
states favour good reason or evidence of a breach of a law or rule; it should not be 
necessary that civil, administrative or criminal proceedings be already in train before 
the foreign regulator may co-operate. The most negotiation will be with regard to the 
safeguarding against the unauthorised use of information by the receiving authority. 
This should not be a problem where the regulator undertakes to only disclose the 
information for the purpose of criminal, civil or administrative proceedings related. 
directly or indirectly to the general subject matter of the treaty. But it has caused 
problems in the past in United Kingdom negotiations. Provisions should also be made 
for the foreign authority to pursue enquiries or seek information within the other's 
territory. This is not possible under United Kingdom law as the FSA '86 relates only 
to investment business in the United Kingdom. IIowever where there is an overlap, 
and it is possible to construe the activity as being in the United Kingdom there is 
nothing in the FSA '86 to stop the DTI or Authority from investigating a matter of 
foreign law, or allowing agencies of the foreign regulator from investigating a matter 
jointly with the United Kingdom authorities. 
Most treaties and MO U's create the opportunity for the requesting state to refuse 
co-operation on the grounds of local public interest. This is in fact rarely used and 
268 
creates no harm by its presence. The only use it seems to serve is to allow for the 
interests of national security to be catered for. Obviously each MOU will need to 
provide for the possibility of amendment in the light of experience. 
The principal area of difficulty in the negotiation of MOU's seems to relate to 
territoriality and confidentiality. With regards to the former parties may disagree as to 
the scope of their respective territorial jurisdiction. This has not arisen in the context 
of actual practice in the field of securities co-operation; when it has dual jurisdiction 
has not been a problem or has been resolved by consultation. However, there are 
some problems, albeit relatively minor, caused by the issue of confidentiality, 





7. S. Summary 
It has been noted in this chapter that the greatest and probably most frustrating 
element of any financial crime investigation is where the criminal has sought to utilise 
the element of another, usually uncooperative, jurisdiction to mask his evidential trail. 
This in the past would have put an end to such an investigation. Moreover, in the last 
decade such activities have become even more of a threat given the influence the 
internet and organised crime factions have had in this area. Yet, it has also been a 
time of growth for both regulators and investigators in their stark acknowledgement of 
the problems faced by this facet and understanding of the need for co-operation. 
The use of MO U's and treaties have openly been grasped by many as the way 
forward. While both the United Kingdom and United States have also actively sought 
to reduce the perplexing problems associated with the extraterritorial nature of 
financial crime via a number of different legal ways unofficial channels of' co- 
operation have proven to be the most effective in tracking down those who wish to 
remain anonymous. It is hoped that in the future such channels can be extended 
further so that eventually there will be little or no room for the criminal to manoeuvre 
in. However, this seems unlikely given the financial impetus that surrounds crimes. 
Weaker jurisdictions will undoubtedly bow to the wishes of a wealthy businessman in 
the interests of their own gain. So what can be done to reduce this? At present it 
seems that many alliances are built on good will and the interchanged of valued 
information. It seems logical to assume then that the latter rather than the termer 
issue may play a part ultimately in lifting the lid of secrecy with less co-operative 
jurisdictions although the information provided must be more beneficial than the 
amount of financial gain being sacrificed. 
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Chapter Eight 
Drawing the Strands Together - General Conclusion 
I 
4 
The aim of this research was to evaluate the methods used both in the United 
Kingdom and United States to assess whether any lessons could be learnt from both 
regarding the regulation, investigation and deterrence of insider dealing and market 
manipulation. It sought to analyse the various methods adopted by comparing, where 
relevant, legal, procedural and policy considerations in an attempt to clarify the 
weaknesses and strengths of each jurisdiction. 
During the last five years the United Kingdom has actively sought more than 
any other time to recognise and develop rules and mechanisms by which to deter the 
aforementioned activities. Whether they will be successful is a matter of conjecture at 
present, as they have not been fully implemented. Yet one thing stands out more than 
any new changes in the law. This relates to the impetus now given to the effect such 
crimes have on financial markets. Whether this is due to the change in government is 
debatable but it is a welcome addition to the powers, albeit limited compared to the 
United States, which already exist. However that said, by comparison to the United 
States the United Kingdom is still wilfully lacking a driving force that has helped the 
former jurisdiction become one of the most successful countries in investigating, 
prosecuting and deterring insider dealing and market manipulative activities. 
The United States has long recognised the problems associated with financial 
crime. Jurisprudentially speaking, it has a long history of regulating financial 
criminals via its use of the vast array of laws at its disposal. Yet, it too has had 
problems in recent times, notably during the 1980's, with the unwanted growth of 
insider dealing. Its overall attitude to deal with such problems head-on, with the 
implementation of specific legislation to attack the problem is to be commended. 
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With any sought of activity that generates vast amounts of capital it is common 
to find that individuals with less than honourable and genuine motives will be 
attracted. Insider dealing and market manipulation are two such activities. It is not 
surprising then to find that when the value of markets grow such unwanted activities 
also follow. However, in the last five years a growing trend in exploiting such 
markets from the confines of cyberspace has presented many regulators with 
problems that they may not have thought existed. While the United States has sought 
to embrace new ways of dealing with this added dimension the United Kingdom, in 
comparison, is still far behind. Added to this equation is the fact that many organised 
crime syndicates now see financial markets as a successful way of laundering illegal 
profits with little chance of being caught. 
In chapter one of this thesis it was noted that insider dealing and market 
manipulation are not new crimes. Both practices have been documented to exist 
many centuries ago. Indeed, it has been argued that at times both where acceptable 
market practices. Given the findings made in the appendix relating to how today's 
practitioners in the United Kingdom view this it can be observed that this view still 
exists for many. It is not surprising therefore that so few cases of insiders really feel 
the full extent of the sanctions that should be imposed upon them. 
Chapter two examined how both jurisdictions regulated financial crime. By 
comparison to the United States it was observed that the United Kingdom has now 
embraced a centralised form, albeit not as well defined in role, of regulation. The 
:1 uihorily cannot be viewed as an equivalent to the SEC but must be seen a step in the 
right direction. This chapter also acknowledged that the belief in investor confidence 
played a paramount role in determining why financial crime should be regulated. 
Chapter three acknowledged that both jurisdictions used differing methods of 
regulation in deterring and prosecuting insider dealing. While the United States has 
long advocated the use of case law to define the parameters its legislation has in 
determining a potential insiders liability the United Kingdom, along with many other 
European states has sought to follow, albeit loosely in parts, the European Directive 
on Insider Dealing brought about in 1989. The United Kingdom has also been a 
strong advocate of the criminal law while the United States has long favoured using 
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the civil law in the vast majority of cases. The Criminal law is only used in severe 
cases and is dealt with the Department of Justice. Such a separation of powers and 
the general kudos enveloped by the United States has helped them immensely in 
effectively regulating this practice. 
ý 
Chapter four specifically examined how market manipulation and misleading 
practices were regulated. It highlighted the problems associated with the ambiguous 
nature of manipulation, in that there was sometimes a fundamental blurring between 
activities that may or may not be illegal. The United Kingdom was seen to long 
favour the use of the FSA'86 in dealing with such matters whilst the United States has 
followed similar procedures to that developed alongside insider dealing. It was 
concluded that the United Kingdoms position needs drastic amendment in order to 
gain more credit and enhance its ability to ensnare manipulators. 
Chapter five sought to examine the differences and problems faced by regulators 
both here and in the United States. The general findings related to the fact that insider 
dealing and market manipulation were extremely difficult activities to spot, especially 
on markets where trading is volatile and encourages complicated transactions to 
occur. Derivative trading and markets are prime examples of this. Interestingly, in 
this chapter the effect market abuse and its regulation were examined. What was 
concluded was that although it created an additional layer of liability for market 
players it was not defined enough and consequently unless amended may ensnare an 
innocent individual or companies embarking on some form of innovative but legal 
procedure or trading technique. 
Chapter six examined the problems associated with the process of prosecution of 
financial fraud. It examined the main problems linked with the public perception of 
financial crime coupled with matters relating to the suitability of juries and 
sentencing. The public perception of financial criminals exposed a general belief that 
such criminals were not as heinous as murders or rapists due to the anonymity of the 
damage committed by them. The notion of a ̀ victimless crime' as examined in 
chapter two seemed to be the biggest stumbling block in convincing juries that such 
criminals were indeed similar. That said, it was perceived that juries played an 
important part in the prosecution process and that in no way did this detract from their 
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overall ability to decide the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The role of 
sentencing was also critically examined to determine the most suitable form of 
punishment. Adverse publicity and criminal sanctioning seemed to be the most 
effective deterrence. 
The notion of extraterritoriality has long caused problems for regulators and 
investigators of financial crime whether they are based in the United Kingdom or 
United States. Yet in stark comparison with one another it was noted that the latter 
jurisdiction has more actively sought to utilise its own domestic law in an 
extraterritorial capacity than the former. However, the use of unofficial treaties and 
MOU's were deemed to be the most useful tools in the fight against the element of 
jurisdiction. 
To summarise this conclusion the following findings have been made: 
" Insider dealing and market manipulative practices are neither new nor 
perceived threats to financial markets both in the past and present by 
many. 
" The true extent of the penetration of such activities will never be known 
given the complexities that exist surrounding financial markets. 
" Such activities have indeed shaped both jurisdictional attitudes towards 
how such markets should be regulated. 
"A divide exists between how both the United Kingdom and United States 
perceive the effectiveness and usefulness of both the civil and criminal 
law. 
" There are stark constitutional differences between both jurisdictions that 
have dramatically shaped their views on the regulation of financial fraud. 
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I 
" The complex nature of secondary financial markets, the use of internet 
trading and fraud and the threat they possess regarding being exploited 
by financial criminals is only now being realised. 
" The notion of extraterritoriality and the problems associated with it when 
carrying out investigations has been recognised but effective procedures 
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